湯姆‧科頓議員報告(七)——《戰勝中共國:針對性脫鉤與經濟持久戰》

五月花寫作組 | 翻譯:文蕭 | 校對:虹陵 | 編輯、美工、發稿:滅共小宇宙

往期鏈接:

湯姆‧科頓議員報告序言——《戰勝中共國:針對性脫鉤與經濟持久戰》

湯姆‧克頓議員報告(一)——《戰勝中共國:針對性脫鉤與經濟持久戰》

湯姆‧克頓議員報告(二)——《戰勝中共國:針對性脫鉤與經濟持久戰》

湯姆‧科頓議員報告(三)——《戰勝中共國:針對性脫鉤與經濟持久戰》

湯姆‧科頓議員報告(四)——《戰勝中共國:針對性脫鉤與經濟持久戰》

湯姆‧科頓議員報告(五)——《戰勝中共國:針對性脫鉤與經濟持久戰》

湯姆‧科頓議員報告(六)——《戰勝中共國:針對性脫鉤與經濟持久戰》


SECTION TWO: Targeted Decoupling 

第二節:有針對性的脫鉤

The United States has entered a phase of open and mutual antagonism with China, yet the failed dream of engagement haunts our economic policy. We must identify and disentangle strategically important economic sectors while thwarting China’s parasitic approach to global trade and commerce. 

美國與中共國已經進入了開放和相互對抗的階段,然而合作夢想的失敗還困擾著我們的經濟政策。我們必須確定和理順具有戰略意義的重要經濟部門,同時制止中共國對全球貿易和商業的寄生方式。

Such a task requires a focus on broad areas of concern such as trade and investment, higher education, entertainment, and advanced technologies and essential supplies for which reliance on China is unacceptable. This section examines a selection of these technologies and essential supplies in greater detail, including semiconductors, telecommunications, rare-earth elements and critical minerals, medical supplies and equipment, and artificial intelligence and quantum computing. 

這項任務需要關註廣泛領域,例如貿易和投資、高等教育、娛樂、先進技術和基本用品,這些領域對中共國的依賴是不可接受的。本節更詳細地研究了這些技術和基本供應品的選擇,包括半導體,電信,稀土元素和關鍵礦產,醫療用品和設備,以及人工智慧和量子計算。

This section is not an exhaustive list of areas where decoupling from China is advisable. No doubt some of the technologies and fields that will shape the future strategic landscape are unknown to or underappreciated by today’s policymakers. Rather, this list identifies sectors of urgent concern to the United States right now. China is already a world leader in some of these sectors and is targeting all of them through massive investment and espionage—including espionage that masquerades as investment. The United States must end its reliance on China in sectors that will affect the relative strength of nations in the future.

本節並不是和中共國脫鉤領域的詳盡建議清單。毫無疑問,影響未來戰略前景的某些技術和領域對於當今的決策者來說,是未知的或未被重視的。確切地說,本列表標識了當前美國急需關註的領域。中共國已經是其中一些行業的世界領導者,並且正在通過大量投資和間諜活動,包括偽裝成投資的間諜活動,來針對這些領域。美國必須結束這些領域對中共國的依賴,這將影響到國家未來的相對實力。

OBJECTIVES AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR TARGETED DECOUPLING 

針對性脫鉤的目標和註意事項

RESTORE SECURE, SCALABLE, DOMESTIC PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY IN AREAS CRITICAL TO NATIONAL SECURITY 

對國家安全至關重要的領域恢復安全,可規模化的國內生產能力

The most basic obligation of the federal government is to provide for the common defense. Yet today, key sectors of the economy rely heavily on Chinese suppliers and manufacturing. The United States cannot be fully free or safe if its access to essential supplies is subject to the whims of the CCP. America must therefore restore secure, scalable, and domestic productive capacity in strategic areas. Private industry, finance, and the government have roles to play in regenerating manufacturing that has been lost to China.  

聯邦政府的最基本義務是提供共同防禦。時至今日,經濟的關鍵部門嚴重依賴中共國供應商和製造業。如果美國的基本物資受到中共隨心所欲的控制,它就不能獲得完全自由或安全。因此,美國必須在戰略領域恢復安全,可規模化的國內生產能力。私營工業,金融和政府在那些已經流失給中共國的製造業再生中可以發揮作用。

American industry has declined, in part, because of China’s 2001 accession to the WTO and the related decision to grant China Permanent Normal Trade Relations status. In 2004, the United States was the world’s dominant manufacturer, producing approximately $1.61 trillion in value-added manufacturing (22.3% of global output) to China’s $625 billion (8.7% of global output). By 2019, the United States produced $2.35 trillion (16.8% of global output) in value-added manufacturing while China produced $4 trillion (28.7% of global output).125 The nation that brought manufacturing technology to maturity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been overtaken by its number-one rival in the twenty-first century.  

美國工業的下滑,部分是由於中共國於2001年加入世界貿易組織(WTO)以及授予中共國永久正常貿易關系地位的決定。2004年,美國是世界主要製造國,其增值製造業的產值約為1.61萬億美元(占全球總產值的22.3%),而中共國為6,250億美元(占全球總產值的8.7%)。到2019年,美國的增值製造業產值達到2.35萬億美元(占全球總產值的16.8%),而中共國達到4萬億美元(占全球總產值的28.7%)。在19和20世紀使製造技術成熟的這個國家在21世紀被其第一大競爭對手超越。

The health of the manufacturing sector thus is not simply a commercial concern, but also a national-security imperative. Domestic manufacturers—and to some extent those of allies and trusted partners—provide the foundation and expertise for the nation to arm itself in wartime.  Under present conditions, it is unclear if the United States would be able to organize the kind of rapid, large-scale industrial mobilization that contributed decisively to Allied victory in World War II. This mobilization was possible because the United States already had a deep industrial base and pool of skilled engineers and laborers.126 Disturbingly, China may be better positioned to play the role of World War II-era America in any major conflict today, given its strong industrial base and deep pool of engineering talent. This must change.  

因此,製造業的健康不是簡單的商業問題,而是國家安全的當務之急。國內製造商,和那些在某種程度上的盟國和可信賴的夥伴,為國家在戰時武裝自己提供了基礎和專業知識。在目前條件下,還不清楚美國是否能像在第二次世界大戰一樣,有能力組織迅速的、大規模的工業資源調動,這種調動對盟軍的勝利起到了決定性的作用。當時之所以能夠動員起來,是因為美國已經擁有深厚的工業基礎,和熟練的工程師和勞工資源。令人不安的是,鑒於中共國的強大工業基礎和豐富的工程人才儲備,它可能在當今的任何重大沖突中都能更好地扮演第二次世界大戰時期美國的角色。這必須改變。

A strong industrial base not only supports vital national-security goals, it lays the groundwork for future innovation.127 The process knowledge and human capital gained through manufacturing leads to improvements in the production process itself. Robust industrial initiatives can thus spark virtuous cycles of expansion, reinvestment, and innovation. By contrast, a lack of investment today could jeopardize American prosperity and safety tomorrow.  

強大的工業基礎不僅支撐重要的國家安全目標,而且為未來的創新奠定了基礎。通過製造獲得的工藝知識和人力資本可改善生產過程本身。因此,強有力的產業計劃有助於擴張,再投資和創新的良性循環。相比之下,今天投資的缺乏可能會損害明天的美國繁榮與安全。

MAINTAIN TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE OVER CHINA IN STRATEGIC AREAS 

在戰略領域保持對中共國的主要技術優勢

Outnumbered more than four to one in population, the United States must maintain decisive advantages in technology and per-capita productivity to compete with China. This objective requires accelerating the development of advanced technologies and implementing safeguards so that China cannot steal our technological breakthroughs. 

中共國人口是美國的四倍多,美國必須在技術和人均生產率上保持決定性優勢,才能與中共國競爭。實現這一目標需要加快先進技術的發展並實施保障措施,以使中共國無法竊取我們的技術突破。

Current investment in R&D is inadequate to this task. The federal government spent $164  billion, or 0.7 percent of GDP, on R&D in 2020.128 By comparison, it spent between one and  1.5 percent of GDP on R&D during much of the Cold War, when the United States faced a  less populous and affluent competitor.129 Overall R&D spending in the United States has been  buoyed by the private sector, which increased R&D spending more than fourfold between 1980  and 2016.130 In 2018, U.S. firms invested more than $5 in R&D for every $1 spent by Chinese  companies.131 However, private-sector R&D often focuses on incremental improvements to  existing products with clear, short-term commercial applications. It is not optimized for the long-term, theoretical, or risky development projects that lead to breakthroughs and technology revolutions.  

當前在研發上的投資不足以完成這項任務。2020年,聯邦政府在研發方面的支出為1,640億美元,占GDP的0.7%。相比之下,在冷戰期間的大部分時間里,美國面對的是人口較少且不那麼富裕的競爭對手,聯邦政府在研發方面的支出占GDP的1%至1.5%。美國的整體研發支出受到了私營部門的提振,1980-2016年間,研發支出增長了四倍以上。2018年,中共國公司在研發上每支出1美元,美國公司則投入了5美元以上。然而,私營研發通常側重於通過清晰的短期商業應用對現有產品進行逐步改進。它並未對可以帶來突破和技術革命的那些長期的、理論的或有風險的開發項目進行優化。

Federal support for technological development must be paired with policies to protect the fruits of that research. Otherwise, China will continue to benefit from American investment through theft. Spending large sums of taxpayer money to develop leap-ahead technology without implementing controls to stop China from stealing that technology could, in effect, be worse than doing nothing.  

聯邦對技術發展的支持必須與保護該研究成果的政策相匹配。否則,中共國將繼續通過盜竊從美國投資中受益。花費大量納稅人的錢來開發超前技術,而不實施控制來阻止中共國竊取該技術,實際上,可能比什麼都不開發更糟。

(未完待續)


原文鏈接:

Beat China: Targeted Decoupling and the Economic Long War


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