湯姆‧科頓議員報告(六)——《戰勝中共國:針對性脫鉤與經濟持久戰》

五月花寫作組 | 翻譯:jiasen | 校對:紫丁香 | 編輯、美工、發稿:滅共小宇宙

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湯姆‧科頓議員報告序言——《戰勝中共國:針對性脫鉤與經濟持久戰》

湯姆‧克頓議員報告(一)——《戰勝中共國:針對性脫鉤與經濟持久戰》

湯姆‧克頓議員報告(二)——《戰勝中共國:針對性脫鉤與經濟持久戰》

湯姆‧科頓議員報告(三)——《戰勝中共國:針對性脫鉤與經濟持久戰》

湯姆‧科頓議員報告(四)——《戰勝中共國:針對性脫鉤與經濟持久戰》

湯姆‧科頓議員報告(五)——《戰勝中共國:針對性脫鉤與經濟持久戰》


CHINA’S RELIANCE ON THE UNITED STATES 

中共國對美國的依賴

While the United States relies on China in key areas, the knife cuts both ways; one country’s point  of exposure is another’s point of leverage. Indeed, China’s fortunes are tied to the United States  more closely than ours are to China, a fact that American strategists must keep in mind. 

盡管美國在關鍵領域依賴中共國,但這是一把雙刃劍。 一個國家的曝光點恰是另一個國家的制衡點。 實際上,中共國的命運與美國的關聯,遠比我們的命運與中共國的關聯更緊密,這是美國戰略家必須牢記的事實。

China relies on the United States to access high-end research and technology. It embeds agents in  U.S. research and development institutions in order to acquire early-stage research at minimal cost  and risk. Chinese firms then apply this research, scale it quickly, and compete with U.S. firms  in the global marketplace on unfair terms. Qiaohai Shu of the China Academy of Social Sciences  (CASS) explained the logic behind this strategy when he wrote, “Innovation is time-consuming,  laborious and risky…but when it comes to applying technology, the opportunity cost to leap ahead  is low, the chances of success are high.” 

中共國依靠美國獲得高端研究和技術。它將間諜隱藏在美國研發機構中,以便以最低成本和風險獲得早期研究成果。然後,中共國公司就應用這些研究成果,迅速擴大規模,在全球市場與美國公司進行不公平競爭。中共國社會科學院(CASS)的喬海曙解釋了該策略背後的邏輯,他寫道:“創新既費時、費力,又有風險……但是,在應用技術方面,實現超越的機會成本很低, 而成功的幾率卻很高。

This strategy helps explain why China allocates only six percent of its R&D budget to basic  research, while the United States allocates 17 percent.It also sheds light on why Beijing spends  a whopping 84 percent of its R&D funds on experimental development while the United States  spends only 63 percent.

這一策略有助於解釋為什麼中共國僅將其研發預算的6%分配給基礎研究,而美國卻達到17%。這也揭示了為什麼北京將高達84%的研發資金用於實驗開發,而美國只花費63%。

Access to American research and innovation is therefore a central plank in China’s long-term  economic, military, and political planning. Chinese strategists fret, with good reason, about a  “high-tech blockade” that could slow the country’s economic development. 

因此,獲得美國研究和創新成果是中共國長期經濟,軍事和政治規劃的核心內容。中共國的戰略家們有充分理由擔心“高科技封鎖”會減緩中共國的經濟發展。

Washington could confound and disrupt the CCP’s economic strategy by ending this parasitic  relationship. If China is denied access to U.S. research and high-end technology, such as  semiconductors, it would have to make additional investments in basic research. These investments would be funded by a smaller economy with a more burdensome debt load—  China’s total domestic debt was an estimated 335 percent of GDP in late 2020. Beijing  would have to make these investments while simultaneously maintaining its proficiency in  experimental development, rapid scaling, and production. This would tax China more severely  than the status quo. 

通過終止這種寄生關系,華盛頓可以打亂並挫敗中共的經濟戰略。如果中共國被剝奪了獲得美國研究成果和半導體等高端技術的機會,它將不得不在基礎研究上進行額外投資。這些投資或將由債務負擔更加沉重、規模更小的經濟體來承擔——到2020年末,中共國的國內債務總額預計占GDP的335%。中共國將不得不在保持其實驗開發,快速擴張,和生產方面熟練程度的同時,進行這些投資。這會使中共國的內耗比現有狀況更為嚴峻。

Foreign investment is another key point of reliance in the U.S.-Chinese economic  relationship. U.S. real estate and equities are a safe harbor for Chinese companies and elites,  although strict controls imposed by the CCP in 2017 to stabilize the balance of payments  have curtailed capital flight. 

外國投資是美中經濟關系的另一關鍵依賴點。盡管中共在2017年為穩定國際收支平衡而實施了嚴格的管制,遏制了資本外逃,美國的房地產和股票市場仍是中共國公司和精英階層的避風港。

American investment, meanwhile, plays a critical role in China’s economic rise. This  investment lends legitimacy to the CCP, builds its industrial and technological capabilities,  and creates a political constituency within the United States committed to preventing  confrontation with the CCP. Reducing this investment would do material harm to China’s  economy, international standing, and, potentially, the CCP itself. 

同時,美國的投資對中共國經濟的崛起起著至關重要的作用。這樣的投資導致中共具有了合法性,增強了它的工業和技術實力,並在美國內部建立了一個政治團體,致力於防止與中共對抗。減少這樣的投資將對中共國的經濟、其國際地位,乃至中共本身造成切實打擊。

Another related point of reliance is China’s ability to list companies on U.S. stock exchanges,  despite its refusal to comply with the Security and Exchange Commission’s auditing  standards. This refusal spurred Congress to pass legislation, co-sponsored by Senator Cotton  and signed into law late last year, that delists Chinese and Hong Kong-based companies from  U.S. stock exchanges if they fail to comply with audits by the Public Company Accounting  Oversight Board (PCAOB). The combined market capitalization of the more than 250  Chinese and Hong Kong firms listed on U.S. exchanges is over $2 trillion. 

另一個相關依賴點是,盡管中共國拒絕遵守美國證券交易委員會(SEC)的審計標準,但它仍具有使其公司在美國證券交易所上市的能力。這種拒絕促使國會通過了一項由參議員科頓共同發起,並於去年年底簽署的立法,該法規定如果中共國和香港公司不遵守上市公司會計監督委員會的(PCAOB)審計程式,就會被退市。在美國證券交易所上市的250多家中共國和香港公司的總市值超過2萬億美元。

Meanwhile, China’s access to the U.S. dollar and dollar-denominated trading system is another  point of leverage for the United States. Because most dollar transactions clear through the  American financial system, the United States has the power to block, hold, or otherwise  intervene in many Chinese transactions. 

同時,中共國進入美元和以美元計價的貿易體系是美國的另一個制衡點。因為大多數美元交易都是通過美國金融系統進行清算的,所以美國有能力阻止,控制或以其他方式乾預許多中共的交易。

China also depends on access to the U.S. market, which received 19 percent of China’s exports  in 2018. The U.S. export market is an irreplaceable outlet for goods generated by China’s  oversupplied economy. Though China has made efforts to accelerate domestic innovation and  reduce its reliance on exports, it is a long way from matching the strength of U.S. innovation  or becoming as self-contained as the American economy. The large trade surplus China runs  with the United States is thus both a sign of China’s remarkable productive capacity and a  potential weakness the United States can exploit. 

中共國還依賴美國市場的準入,美國市場在2018年接收中共國出口總量的19%。美國出口市場是中共國經濟供過於求所生產的商品不可替代的出口。盡管中共國已經努力加快國內創新,減少對出口的依賴,但距離與美國創新實力相匹配,或者像美國一樣經濟自成一體還相去甚遠。因此,中共國對美國的巨額貿易順差既是中共國顯著生產能力的標志,又是美國可以利用的潛在弱點。

This dynamic has important political implications because slower growth has the potential  to cause internal discontent. Chinese citizens willing to accept an increasingly heavy-handed  authoritarian state in exchange for a higher standard of living may think twice if growth slows  or stagnates. As a result, the CCP fears that declines in exports, growth, and employment could  pose political liabilities. Other domestic problems would intensify pressure on the regime. These  problems include restrictions on home ownership, the absence of a humane welfare state, the inability of many Chinese men to find wives, and a lack of children to care for the elderly.The 90-million-member CCP may find it increasingly difficult to govern China’s 1.4 billion  people if the economy stagnates.

這種動態具有重要的政治意義,因為經濟增長放緩有可能引起內部的不滿。如果增長放緩或停滯,願意接受日益嚴歷的專制統治以換取更高生活水平的中共國公民可能會三思而後行。因此,中共擔心出口、增長和就業的下降會帶來政治後果。其它國內問題將加劇對該獨裁政權的壓力。 這些問題包括對房屋所有權的限制,人道福利缺失,許多中國男人找不到妻子,以及缺少子女照顧老人。如果經濟停滯不前,擁有九千萬黨員的中共可能會發現越來越難以統治中國的14億人口。

U.S. policymakers must recognize the immense leverage they have over China. Having grown  used to China wielding its domestic market as a weapon, many in the United States seem to have  forgotten that U.S. market access is one of the most valuable prizes in the world, particularly for  the world’s largest exporter. Access to the U.S. market may therefore be the single most powerful  point of leverage in the entire competition, provided the United States can create resilient supply  chains for essential goods that do not depend on Chinese manufacturing. 

美國決策者必須認識到他們對中共國的巨大影響力。由於習慣了中共國將其國內市場作為武器,許多美國人似乎已經忘記了美國的市場準入是世界上最有價值的獎賞之一,尤其是對世界上最大的出口國而言。因此,美國的市場準入可能是整個競爭中最有力的一個制衡點,使美國能夠為其必需商品建立彈性供應鏈,而不依賴中共製造業。

But time may be running short to exploit this opportunity. China’s economy is not as export oriented as it once was. Exports accounted for 36 percent of China’s GDP in 2006, but only 18  percent of its GDP in 2019. America’s window of opportunity to pressure China by restricting  access to its market is closing.

但是,利用這一機會的時間可能不多了。中共國經濟不再像以前那樣以出口為導向。2006年,出口占中共國GDP的36%,但到2019年,僅占其GDP的18%。美國通過限制其市場準入對中共國施壓的機會視窗正在關閉。

(未完待續)


原文鏈接:

Beat China: Targeted Decoupling and the Economic Long War


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