五月花寫作組 | 翻譯:jiasen | 校對:虹陵 | 編輯:jamie(文胤) | 美工、發稿:滅共小宇宙









Knowledge, innovation, and technology are force multipliers that allow a country of 330 million people to compete against a country of 1.4 billion people. The United States will be unable to compete against China over the long run if it doesn’t retain a decisive—and proprietary—edge in science, technology, innovation, and development. China understands the importance of knowledge in driving outcomes, which is why it has been working for decades to reach the cutting edge of scientific and technological disciplines—whether by innovation or theft. This campaign has yielded results. In some areas, including quantum computing, China has reached the frontier of technical knowledge, and is now pressing ahead of the pack as an innovator. 

知識,創新,和技術是力量倍增器,使3.3億人口的國家與14億人口的國家競爭。如果美國不能在科學,技術,創新和研發方面保持決定性和獨有的優勢,那麼從長遠來看,美國將無法與中共國競爭。中共國清楚知識對推動成果的重要性,這就是為什麼數十年來,無論是通過創新還是盜竊,它一直致力於達到科學技術各個學科的最前沿。這一努力取得了成果。 在某些領域,包括量子計算,中共國已經到達了技術知識的前沿,並且正以創新者的身份努力處於領先地位。

The Chinese government prioritizes acquiring knowledge—specifically, American knowledge— in its economic, technological, and intelligence-gathering strategies. This priority is evident in China’s systematic and largely successful infiltration of American knowledge institutions, such as U.S. colleges and universities, research labs, and private companies. The United States must treat these institutions, and the knowledge they generate, as key national assets. America’s economic edge depends on it. 


Higher Education 


China acquires American technology and know-how prior to its commercialization and deployment by infiltrating the U.S. higher-education system and research laboratories. In 2018- 19, roughly 370,000 Chinese students studied in the United States, up from fewer than 100,000 a decade earlier. Nearly half of these students are enrolled in STEM courses, which are of special relevance to any nation’s technological and military advancement. U.S. universities trained some of the Chinese military’s top minds. One report found that the Chinese military sponsored more than 2,500 scientists and engineers to study abroad in the past decade, with an estimated 500 of these individuals conducting research in the United States. The American footprint in Chinese higher education is, by comparison, trivial. 


Unfortunately, American citizens and legal permanent residents are sometimes agents of Beijing’s economic espionage. The CCP has created over 200 foreign talent recruitment programs that offer salaries, research funding, and lab space, among other incentives, to entice U.S.-based scientists and engineers to turn over the fruits of their research. The Department of Justice has charged a number of American scientists for lying about their ties to the Thousand Talents Program, China’s most prominent foreign talent initiative. For example, Charles Lieber, chair of Harvard’s chemistry department and a world-renowned leader in the field of nanoscale electronics, signed on to be a “strategic scientist” at China’s Wuhan University of Technology. For his participation, the CCP allegedly gave Lieber $50,000 a month, a $150,000 annual stipend, and a laboratory in Wuhan worth more than $1.5 million. Lieber now faces federal charges for hiding the full scale of his financial ties to China. U.S. officials announced Lieber’s charges on the same day as charges against another Harvard researcher, Zaosong Zheng, who was caught attempting to transport 21 stolen vials of cells to China. 

不幸的是,有些時候,中共國經濟間諜活動的代理人是美國公民和合法永久居民。中共已經建立了200多個外國人才招聘計劃,以提供薪水,研究經費,實驗室空間,以及其他激勵措施,來吸引美國的科學家和工程師將研究成果交給中共。許多美國的科學家因在解釋與中國最著名的外國人才計劃,即“千人計劃”之間的關系時說謊,而受到司法部的指控。例如,哈佛大學化學系主任,納米級電子領域的世界知名專家查爾斯·利伯(Charles Lieber)曾經簽約成為中共國武漢理工大學的“戰略科學家”。據稱,中共為吸引利伯的參與,為他提供了以下條件:每月5萬美元的工資,每年15萬美元的津貼,以及位於武漢超過150萬美元的實驗室。利伯目前因隱藏與中共國的全部金融關系而面臨聯邦指控。美國官員在宣佈對利伯的指控的同一天,宣佈了對另一名哈佛研究員鄭竈松的指控,而鄭竈松試圖將盜走的21小瓶細胞帶回中共國。

National security officials have warned repeatedly of the threat posed by Beijing’s “non traditional collectors” on U.S. college campuses. In July 2020, the FBI announced it was investigating almost 2,500 cases of Chinese espionage and intellectual property theft. Such cases occupied the time and resources of every FBI field office and comprised roughly half of the FBI’s counterintelligence cases.59 These warnings have largely fallen on deaf ears in academia.  


The CCP’s penetration of American higher education has encountered little resistance from American faculty and administrators who depend on full-freight tuition payments of international students. Take a recent case at Boston University, where a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officer embedded within a laboratory conducting cutting-edge artificial intelligence research with a renowned physicist. When authorities uncovered the plot in January 2020, the physicist stated he was “not interested in politics…If a person anywhere in the world wants to come to my group, and they have the money to come, I say why not?” According to that physicist’s resume, roughly 75 of the more than 200 research associates and visiting scientists that worked in his labs were from China.

中共對美國高等教育的滲透幾乎沒有受到任何來自美國教職和管理人員的阻力,美國高校依賴國際學生的全額學費。以波士頓大學最近的一個案例為例,一名人民解放軍(PLA)官員隱藏在一個實驗室中,該實驗室與一位著名的物理學家進行著尖端的人工智慧研究。當局於2020年1月發現該陰謀時,這位物理學家表示他“對政治不感興趣……如果世界上任何地方的人想加入我的團隊,而他們有錢帶來,我說,為什麼不?” 該物理學家的簡歷顯示,在他實驗室工作的200多名研究人員和訪問科學家中,大約有75名來自中共國。

These cases are the tip of the iceberg. China’s dark money permeates U.S. higher education. The Department of Education opened investigations into both Harvard and Yale in February 2020 as part of a review that indicates U.S. universities had not reported at least $6.5 billion in foreign funding, including funding from China.These investigations followed similar inquiries into Georgetown University, Cornell University, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

這些案例只是冰山一角。 中共國的黑錢滲入了美國的高等教育界。教育部於2020年2月對哈佛和耶魯進行了調查,這是一項審查的一部分,該審查表明美國大學沒有報告的外國資金至少有65億美元,包括來自中共國的資金。針對喬治敦大學,康奈爾大學和麻省理工學院,也有類似的調查。

Corporate and National Laboratories 


China’s drive to infiltrate U.S. research institutions extends to our most sensitive laboratories.  The Department of Energy (DOE), which oversees 17 national laboratories and the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, is fighting Chinese efforts to recruit its researchers. Investigators have exposed evidence of Chinese recruitment and penetration within the government. In May 2019, for instance, a former scientist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory was indicted for making false statements about his alleged involvement in a Chinese recruitment program. This came after an employee of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration pleaded guilty to illegally accepting money from a Chinese recruitment program.


The Thousand Talents Program also recruits through professional associations for Chinese engineers such as the Silicon Valley Chinese Engineers, the Hua Yuan Science & Technology Association (HYSTA), and the China Association for Science and Technology (CAST). According to one analysis, Silicon Valley is “ground [zero] for…legal, illegal and quasi-legal practices that fall just below the thresholds set by U.S. law.”  


China has made infiltrating, manipulating, and exploiting U.S. research organs a central plank of its economic and military strategy. Today, China wields immense, if hidden, power within American higher education and the U.S. research-innovation complex. The full depth and breadth of this influence is unknown. However, the CCP has publicly pledged more than $2 trillion to acquire top talent in support of its strategy to dominate key emerging technologies. This figure provides a sense of the scope, scale, and seriousness of the CCP’s science and technology efforts.  


Labor Force 


Chinese nationals play an outsized role at U.S. technology firms such as Apple, Amazon, Google, and Facebook, in part because of their access to U.S. higher-education institutions and focus on STEM education. In FY2019, the U.S. government issued 50,609 H-1B visas to specialized Chinese workers, making China the second-most represented country after India.  Sixty-six percent of H-1B visas granted in FY2019 were for computer-related fields.  

中共國公民在蘋果、亞馬遜、谷歌和臉書等美國科技公司中扮演著舉足輕重的角色,部分原因是他們可以進入美國高等教育機構並專註於STEM教育。2019財年,美國政府向中共國專業工人發放了50,609份H-1B簽證,使中共國成為僅次於印度的第二大代表性國家。  2019財年批準的H-1B簽證中有66%是計算機相關領域。

The United States relies heavily on foreign workers in high-technology sectors, partly due to the crisis in STEM education in America. The number of U.S. citizens enrolled in upper level science and engineering programs is in steady decline. The United States ranked 18th in science and 37th in math out of 77 countries on the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) in 2018. The United States places 13th in science and 31st in math within the 37-state Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).


The unique risk of espionage posed by Chinese nationals must be acknowledged when evaluating the cost and benefit of accepting foreign workers. From 2011-18, 90 percent of the Department of Justice’s cases alleging economic espionage involving a state actor concerned China, as did more than two-thirds of its cases alleging theft of trade secrets. Economic espionage cases with a connection to China have increased by roughly 1,300 percent over the past decade. While some of these cases involve China’s relentless cyberespionage, a significant portion involve physical theft by workers operating on U.S. soil. Recent examples of this practice include a Chinese scientist who stole hundreds of genetically engineered rice seeds with direct pharmaceutical applications from a U.S. research facility and a Chinese born employee at Raytheon who was caught smuggling top-secret missile-defense technology to China.


In the words of a recent White House report, “Law enforcement efforts alone cannot keep up with (or adequately deter) a state sponsored campaign of theft.” The United States must take more aggressive action to limit the number of Chinese nationals working in sensitive positions in U.S. laboratories and companies. 

用白宮最近的一份報告的話來說,“僅靠執法不能跟上(或充分阻止)一個國家資助的盜竊活動。” 美國必須採取更加積極的行動來限制中共國公民在美國實驗室和公司中的敏感職位的數量。


Beat China: Targeted Decoupling and the Economic Long War




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