湯姆‧科頓議員報告(四)——《戰勝中共國:針對性脫鉤與經濟持久戰》

五月花寫作組 | 翻譯:風雲九霄(文蕭) | 校對:傘兵 | 編輯:jamie(文胤) | 美工、發稿:滅共小宇宙


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湯姆‧科頓議員報告序言——《戰勝中共國:針對性脫鉤與經濟持久戰》

湯姆‧克頓議員報告(一)——《戰勝中共國:針對性脫鉤與經濟持久戰》

湯姆‧克頓議員報告(二)——《戰勝中共國:針對性脫鉤與經濟持久戰》

湯姆‧科頓議員報告(三)——《戰勝中共國:針對性脫鉤與經濟持久戰》


HOW ARE THE U.S. AND CHINESE ECONOMIES INTERTWINED? 

美中兩國經濟是如何交織在一起的?

Before outlining an economic strategy to beat China, we need to understand how precisely our economies are intertwined. 

在概述擊敗中共國的經濟戰略之前,我們需要瞭解下兩國經濟是多麼緊密地交織在一起。

TRADE

貿易

The U.S. and Chinese economies remain deeply intertwined despite the recent trade war, leaving both countries vulnerable to the other. The early days of the coronavirus pandemic underscored the significance of this connection, when calls to restrict travel with China in the interest of public health elicited sharp criticism from groups whose fortunes are tied to China. Our dependence on Chinese producers for medicine, surgical masks, and other essential supplies became tragically clear later in the crisis.

盡管最近發生了貿易戰,但美中經濟仍然交織在一起,兩國很容易相互影響。CCP病毒大流行的初期凸顯了這種聯系的顯著性,當時出於公共衛生的利益而限制與中共國的旅行,這引起了與中共國有聯系的團體的尖銳批評。疫情危機凸顯了我們所需要的藥品,口罩和其他基本用品極度依賴中共國生產商。

The United States buys far more from China than the other way around. In 2019, $634.8 billion in trade passed between the two. That trade consisted of $471.8 billion in U.S. imports from China and $163.0 billion in U.S. exports to China, for a bilateral trade deficit of $308.8 billion. 

美國從中共國購買的商品遠多於其他方式。2019年,兩國之間的貿易額為6348億美元。該貿易額包括美國從中共國進口的4,718億美元和美國對中共國的出口1,630億美元,雙邊貿易逆差為3,088億美元。

While U.S.-China trade is substantial, it accounts for only a small share of overall economic activity and growth in the United States. U.S. exports to all countries accounted for a mere 11.7 percent of U.S. GDP in 2019, after peaking at 13.5 percent in 2013. U.S. exports to China accounted for under one percent of U.S. GDP in 2019. 

美中貿易雖然很大,但只占美國總體經濟活動和增長的一小部分。美國對所有國家的出口在2013年達到GDP的13.5%的峰值之後,在2019年僅占GDP的11.7%。美國對中共國的出口在2019年占美國GDP低於1%。

China is our single largest goods supplier, far surpassing key allies like the United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia.Eighteen percent of all U.S. imports by value came from China in 2019. And although China first entered our market by selling low-cost, low-quality consumer goods, today it occupies a higher position on the value chain, producing both high- and low-value manufactures.  China’s top exports to the United States by category in 2019 were electrical machinery ($125 billion), machinery ($92 billion), furniture and bedding ($27 billion), toys and sports equipment ($25 billion), and plastics ($18 billion).  

中共國是我們最大的商品供應國,遠遠超過了英國,日本和澳大利亞等主要盟國。2019年,按價值計算,美國所有進口商品的18%來自中共國。盡管中共國最初是通過出售低價低質的商品進入美國市場的,今天它在價值鏈上占據較高的位置,同時生產高價值和低價值的產品。按類別劃分,2019年中共國對美國的最大出口商品是電機(1250億美元),機械(920億美元),傢具和床上用品(270億美元),玩具和運動器材(250億美元)以及塑料(180億美元)。

American exports to China also are sizeable, accounting for six percent of overall U.S. exports in 2019. Our exported goods consist mostly of high-end manufactures in areas where China has not developed cutting-edge capabilities. Top exports by category were electrical machinery ($14 billion), machinery ($14 billion), aircraft ($10 billion), optical and medical instruments ($9.7 billion), and vehicles ($9.1 billion), with an additional $14 billion of agricultural products such as soybeans, cotton, and pork. 

美國對中共國的出口也相當可觀,占2019年美國總出口的6%。我們的出口商品主要是高端產品,那些中共國尚未掌握的尖端產能。出口最多的類別是電機(140億美元),機械(140億美元),飛機(100億美元),光學和醫療儀器(97億美元)和車輛(91億美元),另外還有140億美元的農產品,例如大豆,棉花和豬肉。

China exported $20.1 billion in services to the United States in 2019, principally in categories related to transportation, travel, and R&D. U.S. provision of services to China was much higher in 2019, reaching $56.5 billion.

中共國在2019年向美國出口了201億美元的服務,主要類別與運輸,旅行和研發有關。2019年美國對華服務的金額更高,達到565億美元。

CAPITAL 

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 

資本

外商直接投資(FDI

The United States and China invest billions of dollars in each other’s countries. These financial flows have slowed in recent years due to investor uncertainty about the trade war, capital controls imposed by the Chinese government, tougher scrutiny of Chinese acquisitions by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), and, most recently, the pandemic.  

美國和中共國相互投資數十億美元。近年來,這些資金流動近年來有所減緩,由於投資者對貿易戰的不確定性,中共國政府施加的資本控制,美國外國投資委員會(CFIUS)對中共國收購的嚴格審查,以及最近的CCP病毒疫情。

Chinese FDI in the United States peaked in 2016 at $46.5 billion. That same year, U.S. FDI into China was $12.9 billion, down from a high of $20 billion in 2008. Yet by the end of 2019, Chinese FDI into the United States had plummeted to less than $4.8 billion, a 90 percent decline from 2016. U.S. FDI into China remained relatively constant at $13.3 billion in 2019. 

中共國在美國的外國直接投資在2016年達到465億美元的峰值。同年,美國對華直接投資額為129億美元,低於2008年的200億美元。然而,到2019年底,中共國對美直接投資已降至48億美元以下,較2016年下降了90%;美國對華直接投資則相對穩定,為133億美元。

While foreign investment is typically a good thing for the recipient country, the details matter. Foreign investment can build factories, warehouses, plants, and other physical infrastructure in the recipient country. It also can license a country’s most valuable technology and intellectual property.  Licensing is profitable in the short term for the lawful owners of intellectual property, but it can also facilitate the development of foreign competitors. 

雖然外國投資對接受國通常是一件好事,但投資細節很重要。外國投資可以在接受國建造廠房,倉庫,工廠和其他有形基礎設施。它還可以授予一國最有價值的技術和知識產權的許可。對於合法的知識產權所有者而言,授權許可在短期內是有利可圖的,但它也可以促進外國競爭者的發展。

Roughly two-thirds—over $170 billion—of American investment in China over the last 30 years funded ‘greenfield’ projects to expand China’s industrial base and productive capacity. By contrast, Chinese entities devoted eight percent of their investment in the United States to building new physical infrastructure. The other 92 percent of Chinese investment funded acquisitions of American companies and intellectual property. 

在過去的30年中,美國對華投資中約有三分之二(超過1,700億美元)用於“綠地”項目,以擴大中共國的工業基礎和生產能力。相比之下,中共國實體將其在美國投資的8%用於建立新的基礎設施,另外的92%用來對美國公司和知識產權的收購。

Until recently, Chinese venture capital and private equity have been active in U.S. biotech, health, technology, and other sectors. These financial relationships, which have historically not always been captured in foreign-investment figures, have acted as a Chinese gateway to sensitive American technology. 

直到最近,中共國的風險投資和私募股權都一直活躍在美國的生物技術,健康,技術和其他領域。這些投資關系構成了敏感美國技術進入中共國的入口,一直以來外國投資數據中都未曾捕捉到這一點。

The CCP has directed Chinese firms to acquire stakes in American companies in order to obtain cutting-edge technology in strategically important areas. Between 2013 and 2016, Chinese firms spent $37 billion in an attempt to acquire or invest in at least 27 American semiconductor firms.  Chinese firms also invested in at least 51 American AI startups between 2010-16. Over the past decade, one Chinese defense contractor has purchased at least seven U.S. general aviation companies. Due to state involvement, Chinese acquisitions are not made on a purely commercial basis. Chinese firms can thus offer patient capital to firms with promising technology, while profit seeking investors operating on shorter timeframes pass over those same firms. 

中共指示中國公司收購美國公司的股份,以便在具有戰略意義的領域獲得尖端技術。 2013-2016年,中共國公司花費了370億美元,試圖收購或投資至少27家美國半導體公司。在2010-2016年之間,中共國公司還投資了至少51家美國AI初創公司。在過去的十年中,一家中共國國防承包商至少購買了7家美國通用航空公司。由於國家的介入,中共國的並購並非純粹出於商業目的。因此,中共國公司可以為有技術前途的公司提供長期資本,而尋求利潤的投資者則可以通過較短時間的運營超越同類公司。

Chinese VC investments, while harder to trace, have followed a similar model. They target firms in areas that the government prioritizes, such as AI, autonomous vehicles, virtual reality, robotics, and blockchain technologies.Chinese investors targeted advanced technologies in more than three-quarters of the funding rounds they participated in between 2000 and mid-2018.

中共國的風險投資雖然較難追尋,但卻遵循了類似的模式。他們將投資目標對準了政府優先考慮的領域,例如人工智慧,自動駕駛汽車,虛擬現實,機器人技術和區塊鏈技術。在2000年至2018年年中,中共國投資者參與的融資中有四分之三瞄準了先進技術。

China also has exploited Joint Ventures (JV) by forcing foreign companies to hand over proprietary technology as a condition for producing or selling goods in the Chinese market. Technology transferred from foreign firms is often the Chinese partners’ most advanced technology. These forced transfers give Chinese firms a shortcut in the innovation process, allowing them to reverse engineer the technology and spur future domestic innovation. 

中共國還利用合資企業(JV)迫使外國公司交出專有技術,作為其在中共國市場生產或銷售商品的條件。外國公司轉讓的技術通常是中共國合作夥伴最先進的技術。這些強制性轉讓為中共國的企業提供了創新過程中的捷徑,使他們能夠對技術進行逆向工程並刺激未來的國內創新。

Debt 

債務

U.S. sovereign debt surpassed $27 trillion at the end of October 2020. China (including Hong Kong but not Taiwan) held $1.28 trillion of that debt in U.S. Treasury securities, making it the United States’ largest foreign creditor, barely ahead of Japan. 

到2020年10月底,美國主權債務超過27萬億美元。中共國(包括香港但不包括台灣)持有的1.28萬億美元美國國債,使其成為美國最大的外國債權國,稍高於日本。

Despite this large sum, China’s appetite for U.S. debt has waned. Mainland China in October 2020 held only five percent of U.S. outstanding public debt, down from a high of 14 percent in 2011. Beijing appears to be exploring alternatives to the U.S. dollar as a long-term store of value. In January 2020, China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), which manages China’s foreign reserves, announced plans to diversify its holdings.  

盡管有巨額資金,但中共國對美國債務的胃口有所減弱。到2020年10月,中共國大陸僅持有美國未償付公共債務的5%,低於2011年的14%。中共國似乎正在探索替代美元的長期價值存儲貨幣。 2020年1月,負責管理中共國外匯儲備的中國國家外匯管理局(SAFE)宣佈了多元化其持有股份的計劃。

China’s long-term goal is to develop an alternative to the U.S. dollar trading system. In 2005, U.S. dollar assets comprised 79 percent of China’s foreign reserves. By 2019, this figure fell to an estimated 59 percent. China has tried to develop alternative cross-border trading mechanisms to the ubiquitous, U.S.-dependent SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) clearing system, such as the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS). As early as 2009, China called for a global currency to replace the dollar trading system. 

中共國的長期目標是開發一種替代美元交易系統的方案。2005年,美元資產占中共國外匯儲備的79%,2019年,這一數字下降到大約59%。中共國試圖開發跨境交易機制,來替代無處不在的,依賴美國的SWIFT(環球銀行金融電信協會)結算系統,例如跨境銀行間支付系統(CIPS)。早在2009年,中共國就呼籲使用全球貨幣取代美元交易系統。


原文鏈接:

Beat China: Targeted Decoupling and the Economic Long War


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