五月花寫作組 | 翻譯:風雲九霄(文蕭) | 校對:傘兵 | 編輯:jamie(文胤) | 美工、發稿:滅共小宇宙








Before outlining an economic strategy to beat China, we need to understand how precisely our economies are intertwined. 




The U.S. and Chinese economies remain deeply intertwined despite the recent trade war, leaving both countries vulnerable to the other. The early days of the coronavirus pandemic underscored the significance of this connection, when calls to restrict travel with China in the interest of public health elicited sharp criticism from groups whose fortunes are tied to China. Our dependence on Chinese producers for medicine, surgical masks, and other essential supplies became tragically clear later in the crisis.


The United States buys far more from China than the other way around. In 2019, $634.8 billion in trade passed between the two. That trade consisted of $471.8 billion in U.S. imports from China and $163.0 billion in U.S. exports to China, for a bilateral trade deficit of $308.8 billion. 


While U.S.-China trade is substantial, it accounts for only a small share of overall economic activity and growth in the United States. U.S. exports to all countries accounted for a mere 11.7 percent of U.S. GDP in 2019, after peaking at 13.5 percent in 2013. U.S. exports to China accounted for under one percent of U.S. GDP in 2019. 


China is our single largest goods supplier, far surpassing key allies like the United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia.Eighteen percent of all U.S. imports by value came from China in 2019. And although China first entered our market by selling low-cost, low-quality consumer goods, today it occupies a higher position on the value chain, producing both high- and low-value manufactures.  China’s top exports to the United States by category in 2019 were electrical machinery ($125 billion), machinery ($92 billion), furniture and bedding ($27 billion), toys and sports equipment ($25 billion), and plastics ($18 billion).  


American exports to China also are sizeable, accounting for six percent of overall U.S. exports in 2019. Our exported goods consist mostly of high-end manufactures in areas where China has not developed cutting-edge capabilities. Top exports by category were electrical machinery ($14 billion), machinery ($14 billion), aircraft ($10 billion), optical and medical instruments ($9.7 billion), and vehicles ($9.1 billion), with an additional $14 billion of agricultural products such as soybeans, cotton, and pork. 


China exported $20.1 billion in services to the United States in 2019, principally in categories related to transportation, travel, and R&D. U.S. provision of services to China was much higher in 2019, reaching $56.5 billion.



Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 



The United States and China invest billions of dollars in each other’s countries. These financial flows have slowed in recent years due to investor uncertainty about the trade war, capital controls imposed by the Chinese government, tougher scrutiny of Chinese acquisitions by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), and, most recently, the pandemic.  


Chinese FDI in the United States peaked in 2016 at $46.5 billion. That same year, U.S. FDI into China was $12.9 billion, down from a high of $20 billion in 2008. Yet by the end of 2019, Chinese FDI into the United States had plummeted to less than $4.8 billion, a 90 percent decline from 2016. U.S. FDI into China remained relatively constant at $13.3 billion in 2019. 


While foreign investment is typically a good thing for the recipient country, the details matter. Foreign investment can build factories, warehouses, plants, and other physical infrastructure in the recipient country. It also can license a country’s most valuable technology and intellectual property.  Licensing is profitable in the short term for the lawful owners of intellectual property, but it can also facilitate the development of foreign competitors. 


Roughly two-thirds—over $170 billion—of American investment in China over the last 30 years funded ‘greenfield’ projects to expand China’s industrial base and productive capacity. By contrast, Chinese entities devoted eight percent of their investment in the United States to building new physical infrastructure. The other 92 percent of Chinese investment funded acquisitions of American companies and intellectual property. 


Until recently, Chinese venture capital and private equity have been active in U.S. biotech, health, technology, and other sectors. These financial relationships, which have historically not always been captured in foreign-investment figures, have acted as a Chinese gateway to sensitive American technology. 


The CCP has directed Chinese firms to acquire stakes in American companies in order to obtain cutting-edge technology in strategically important areas. Between 2013 and 2016, Chinese firms spent $37 billion in an attempt to acquire or invest in at least 27 American semiconductor firms.  Chinese firms also invested in at least 51 American AI startups between 2010-16. Over the past decade, one Chinese defense contractor has purchased at least seven U.S. general aviation companies. Due to state involvement, Chinese acquisitions are not made on a purely commercial basis. Chinese firms can thus offer patient capital to firms with promising technology, while profit seeking investors operating on shorter timeframes pass over those same firms. 

中共指示中國公司收購美國公司的股份,以便在具有戰略意義的領域獲得尖端技術。 2013-2016年,中共國公司花費了370億美元,試圖收購或投資至少27家美國半導體公司。在2010-2016年之間,中共國公司還投資了至少51家美國AI初創公司。在過去的十年中,一家中共國國防承包商至少購買了7家美國通用航空公司。由於國家的介入,中共國的並購並非純粹出於商業目的。因此,中共國公司可以為有技術前途的公司提供長期資本,而尋求利潤的投資者則可以通過較短時間的運營超越同類公司。

Chinese VC investments, while harder to trace, have followed a similar model. They target firms in areas that the government prioritizes, such as AI, autonomous vehicles, virtual reality, robotics, and blockchain technologies.Chinese investors targeted advanced technologies in more than three-quarters of the funding rounds they participated in between 2000 and mid-2018.


China also has exploited Joint Ventures (JV) by forcing foreign companies to hand over proprietary technology as a condition for producing or selling goods in the Chinese market. Technology transferred from foreign firms is often the Chinese partners’ most advanced technology. These forced transfers give Chinese firms a shortcut in the innovation process, allowing them to reverse engineer the technology and spur future domestic innovation. 




U.S. sovereign debt surpassed $27 trillion at the end of October 2020. China (including Hong Kong but not Taiwan) held $1.28 trillion of that debt in U.S. Treasury securities, making it the United States’ largest foreign creditor, barely ahead of Japan. 


Despite this large sum, China’s appetite for U.S. debt has waned. Mainland China in October 2020 held only five percent of U.S. outstanding public debt, down from a high of 14 percent in 2011. Beijing appears to be exploring alternatives to the U.S. dollar as a long-term store of value. In January 2020, China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), which manages China’s foreign reserves, announced plans to diversify its holdings.  

盡管有巨額資金,但中共國對美國債務的胃口有所減弱。到2020年10月,中共國大陸僅持有美國未償付公共債務的5%,低於2011年的14%。中共國似乎正在探索替代美元的長期價值存儲貨幣。 2020年1月,負責管理中共國外匯儲備的中國國家外匯管理局(SAFE)宣佈了多元化其持有股份的計劃。

China’s long-term goal is to develop an alternative to the U.S. dollar trading system. In 2005, U.S. dollar assets comprised 79 percent of China’s foreign reserves. By 2019, this figure fell to an estimated 59 percent. China has tried to develop alternative cross-border trading mechanisms to the ubiquitous, U.S.-dependent SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) clearing system, such as the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS). As early as 2009, China called for a global currency to replace the dollar trading system. 



Beat China: Targeted Decoupling and the Economic Long War




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