Executive Order Addressing the Threat Posed By Applications and Other Software Developed or Controlled By Chinese Companies


By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,

由美國憲法和法律賦予我總統的權力,包括《國際緊急經濟權力法》(美國法典第50篇 1701及以下)(IEEPA),《國家緊急法》(美國法典第50篇 1601及以下)及美國法典第3篇301节

I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, find that additional steps must be taken to deal with the national emergency with respect to the information and communications technology and services supply chain declared in Executive Order 13873 of May 15, 2019 (Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain).  Specifically, the pace and pervasiveness of the spread in the United States of certain connected mobile and desktop applications and other software developed or controlled by persons in the People’s Republic of China, to include Hong Kong and Macau (China), continue to threaten the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.  At this time, action must be taken to address the threat posed by these Chinese connected software applications.

本人,美國總統唐納德·J·川普決定,針對發佈於2019年5月15日行政令13873 (保障信息和通信科技供應鏈的安全)中宣佈的信息和通訊科技及服務供應鏈方面,必須採取以下步驟來應對國家緊急情況。尤其是中華人民共和國人員,包括中國香港和澳門,所開發的某些互聯移動和桌面應用程序及其它軟件在美國境內轉播的速度和普及程度,持續威脅著國家安全、外交政策及美國的經濟。此時此刻,我們必須採取相應的行動以應對這些與中[共]有關聯的軟件帶來的威脅。

By accessing personal electronic devices such as smartphones, tablets, and computers, Chinese connected software applications can access and capture vast swaths of information from users, including sensitive personally identifiable information and private information.  This data collection threatens to provide the Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with access to Americans’ personal and proprietary information — which would permit China to track the locations of Federal employees and contractors, and build dossiers of personal information.

通過使用個人電子設備,例如智能手機、平板電腦和計算機,中[共]互聯軟件應用程序能訪問並捕獲用戶大量的信息,包括敏感的個人身分信息及隱私。此种信息蒐集为中華人民共和國政府及中國共產黨提供并獲取美國個人及專利信息的機會— 也會讓中[共]能追蹤到聯邦職員、承包商,及個人信息檔案建立者的位置。

The continuing activity of the PRC and the CCP to steal or otherwise obtain United States persons’ data makes clear that there is an intent to use bulk data collection to advance China’s economic and national security agenda.  For example, the 2014 cyber intrusions of the Office of Personnel Management of security clearance records of more than 21 million people were orchestrated by Chinese agents.  In 2015, a Chinese hacking group breached the United States health insurance company Anthem, affecting more than 78 million Americans.  And the Department of Justice indicted members of the Chinese military for the 2017 Equifax cyber intrusion that compromised the personal information of almost half of all Americans.

中國政府及中國共產黨繼續竊取或以其他方式獲取美國個人數據,很明顯他們有意利用海量數據採集來優化中[共]國的經濟和國家安全議程。例如,人事管理辦公室2014年對超過2100萬人的安全許可記錄進行的網絡入侵是由中國特工精心策劃的。在2015年,一個中[共]黑客組織在打破美國安森健康保險公司保險網絡缺口,導致超過七百八十萬美國人民受影響。而司法部起訴中[共]軍方成員預 2017入侵Equifax 網絡,使幾乎一半美國人的個人信息被洩露。

In light of these risks, many executive departments and agencies (agencies) have prohibited the use of Chinese connected software applications and other dangerous software on Federal Government computers and mobile phones.  These prohibitions, however, are not enough given the nature of the threat from Chinese connected software applications.  In fact, the Government of India has banned the use of more than 200 Chinese connected software applications throughout the country; in a statement, India’s Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology asserted that the applications were “stealing and surreptitiously transmitting users’ data in an unauthorized manner to servers which have locations outside India.”


The United States has assessed that a number of Chinese connected software applications automatically capture vast swaths of information from millions of users in the United States, including sensitive personally identifiable information and private information, which would allow the PRC and CCP access to Americans’ personal and proprietary information.


The United States must take aggressive action against those who develop or control Chinese connected software applications to protect our national security.


Accordingly, I hereby order:


Section 1.  (a)  The following actions shall be prohibited beginning 45 days after the date of this order, to the extent permitted under applicable law:  any transaction by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, with persons that develop or control the following Chinese connected software applications, or with their subsidiaries, as those transactions and persons are identified by the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) under subsection (e) of this section: Alipay, CamScanner, QQ Wallet, SHAREit, Tencent QQ, VMate, WeChat Pay, and WPS Office.

第1節 (a) 在適用法律允許的情況下,該命令之日起45天內採取以下禁止行動:任何人的任何交易,或關於任何財產的交易,在美國管轄範圍內,與中[共]開發或控制的聯網軟件應用程序的個人、或及其分支機構進行的任何交易,因爲這些交易和個人由商務部長根據本節(e)項確定:支付寶、CamScanner、QQ錢包、茄子快傳、騰訊QQ、VMate、微信支付及WPS辦公軟件。

(b)  The Secretary is directed to continue to evaluate Chinese connected software applications that may pose an unacceptable risk to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, and to take appropriate action in accordance with Executive Order 13873.

(b) 任命商務部長繼續對國家安全、外交政策或美國經濟構成不可估量危險的中[共]聯網應用軟件程序進行評估,並根據《行政令13873》採取適當行動

(c)  Not later than 45 days after the date of this order, the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, shall provide a report to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs with recommendations to prevent the sale or transfer of United States user data to, or access of such data by, foreign adversaries, including through the establishment of regulations and policies to identify, control, and license the export of such data.

(c) 此行指令頒布後的45日內,商務部長應與總檢察長和國家情報局局長協商,需向國家安全事務總統助理提交一份報告:避免外國敵對势力出售或轉輸美國用戶數據或獲取此類數據,包括通過制定法規和政策以鑑別、控制和限定此類數據的導出。

(d)  The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted before the date of this order.

(d) 在本節(a)小節的禁止適用,但在法律規定的範圍內,或根據本行政令發佈的法規、命令、指令或授權中,可能得到許可。儘管此行政令頒布日前已簽訂任何協議,或授予任何授權,或許可得到承认。

(e)  Not earlier than 45 days after the date of this order, the Secretary shall identify the transactions and persons that develop or control the Chinese connected software applications subject to subsection (a) of this section.

(e) 此行指令頒布後的45日內,部長需以本節(a)小節鑑別開發或控制中[共]聯網軟件應用程序交易及人員。

Sec. 2.  (a)  Any transaction by a United States person or within the United States that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate the prohibition set forth in this order is prohibited.

第2節 (a) 任何美國個人或在美國境內規避或躲避交易,旨在規避或躲避,導致違反,或有意違反此行政令中的禁令的任何交易。

(b)  Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

(b) 任何密謀違反該行政令中宣布的禁令都會被禁制。

Sec. 3.  For the purposes of this order:

第3節 設定此行政令的目的:

(a)  the term “connected software application” means software, a software program, or group of software programs, designed to be used by an end user on an end-point computing device and designed to collect, process, or transmit data via the Internet as an integral part of its functionality.


(b)  the term “entity” means a government or instrumentality of such government, partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization, including an international organization;

(b)术语 “實體”意指一個政府或類似政府的機構、合夥企業、聯盟、受託團體、合資企業、公司、集團、隸屬組織、或其他機構,包括國際組織;

(c)  the term “person” means an individual or entity;

(c) 术语“個人”意指個人或實體;

(d)  the term “personally identifiable information” (PII) is information that, when used alone or with other relevant data, can identify an individual.  PII may contain direct identifiers (e.g., passport information) that can identify a person uniquely, or quasi-identifiers (e.g., race) that can be combined with other quasi-identifiers (e.g., date of birth) to successfully recognize an individual.


(e)  the term “United States person” means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States.


Sec. 4.  (a)  The Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including adopting rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to me by IEEPA, as may be necessary to implement this order.  All agencies shall take all appropriate measures within their authority to implement this order.

第4節 (a) 商務部長經與財政部長和司法部長協商後,獲此授權採取此類行動,包括通過規則和規例,並運用IEEPA授予我的所有權力,以執行此行政令。所有機構均應在其職權範圍內採取一切適當措施執行該行政令。

(b)  The heads of agencies shall provide, in their discretion and to the extent permitted by law, such resources, information, and assistance to the Department of Commerce as required to implement this order, including the assignment of staff to the Department of Commerce to perform the duties described in this order.

(b) 機構負責人應酌情在法律允許的範圍內向商務部提供執行該命令所需的資源、信息和協助,包括將人員分配給商務部以執行命令。按此順序描述的職責。

Sec. 5.  Severability.  If any provision of this order, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this order and the application of its other provisions to any other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

第5節 分割條款。如该行政令的任何條款,或对任何人或情况的任何條文的适用无效,则本行政令的其余部分及其他條款对任何其他人或情况的适用均不受影响。

Sec. 6.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

第6節 總則。(a) 此行政令中的任何內容均不能被解讀為損害或影響:

         (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof; or

         (i) 法律授予執行部門、機構或其負責人的權力;或

         (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

         (ii) 美國行政管理和預算局主管的職責是與預算、行政或立法提案相關連。

(b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(b) 該行政令應根據適用法律,並視撥款的情況而定。

(c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

(c) 本行政令無意在任何一方針對美國、其部門、機構或實體,其官員、員工或代理,或任何其他人士的法律或公正方面創造任何實質性或程序性的權利或利益。



January 5, 2021.




Source: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-addressing-threat-posed-applications-software-developed-controlled-chinese-companies/

翻譯:【V%】 校對:【Rainbow】 編輯:【Mark】


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