The Elements of the China Challenge


by The Policy Planning Staff, Office of the Secretary of State


Executive Summary


Awareness has been growing in the United States — and in nations around the world — that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has triggered a new era of great-power competition. Yet few discern the pattern in China’s inroads within every region of the world, much less the specific form of dominance to which the party aspires.

The CCP aims not merely at preeminence within the established world order — an order that is grounded in free and sovereign nation-states, flows from the universal principles on which America was founded, and advances U.S. national interests —but to fundamentally revise world order, placing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the center and serving Beijing’s authoritarian goals and hegemonic ambitions.

In the face of the China challenge, the United States must secure freedom.




China is a challenge because of its conduct. Modeled on 20th-century Marxist-Leninist dictatorship, the CCP eventually spurred rapid modernization and produced prodigious economic growth — thanks in no small measure to the party’s decision in the late 1970s to embrace free-market elements and to the decision by the United States and nations around the world to engage, and welcome commerce with, China. The party today wields its economic power to co-opt and coerce countries around the world; make the societies and politics of foreign nations more accommodating to CCP specifications; and reshape international organizations in line with China’s brand of socialism. At the same time, the CCP is developing a world-class military to rival and eventually surpass the U.S. military. These actions enable the CCP to credibly pursue the quest — proceeding outward through the Indo-Pacific region and encompassing the globe — to achieve “national rejuvenation” culminating in the transformation of the international order.

To understand China’s peculiar form of authoritarianism and the hegemonic goals to which it gives rise, it is necessary to grasp the intellectual sources from which China’s conduct springs: the CCP’s Marxist-Leninist beliefs and the party’s extreme interpretation of Chinese nationalism.

中國是一個挑戰,因為它的行為。中國共產黨以20世紀馬列主義專政為藍本,最終推動了中國的快速現代化,並帶來了驚人的經濟增長–這在很大程度上要歸功於該黨在20世紀70年代末決定接受自由市場的元素,以及美國和世界各國決定與中國接觸並歡迎與中國通商。今天,該黨利用其經濟力量來合縱連橫,脅迫世界各國;使外國的社會和政治更加適應中共的規格;並按照中國的社會主義品牌重塑國際組織。同時,中共還在發展一支世界級的軍隊,以與美軍相抗衡並最終超越美軍。這些行動使中共能夠可信地追求–通過印度洋-太平洋地區向外進行,並覆蓋全球–實現 “民族復興”,最終實現國際秩序的轉變。


Notwithstanding its authoritarian rule over PRC citizens and the threat it presents to freedom around the world, China under the CCP is marked by a variety of vulnerabilities. These begin with the disadvantages endemic to autocracy: constraints on innovation, difficulties forming and maintaining alliances, and costs arising from internal repression. They also include vulnerabilities specific to the PRC: economic instability; demographic imbalance; environmental degradation; persistent corruption; oppression of ethnic and religious minorities; daunting expenses incurred in monitoring, censoring, and indoctrinating 1.4 billion people in China; separation of the military, which is controlled by the party, from the people; and — particularly in the wake of the illness, death, and social and economic devastation wrought worldwide by the COVID-19 pandemic born in Wuhan — mounting international anger at the CCP’s contempt for human life, indifference to other nations’ well-being, and disregard for international norms and obligations.

盡管中國共產黨對中國公民實行專制統治,並對全世界的自由構成威脅,但中國共產黨領導下的中國還是存在著各種脆弱性。這些弱點首先是專制統治所特有的劣勢:創新受到限制,難以形成和維持聯盟,以及內部鎮壓所帶來的代價。它們還包括中國特有的弱點:經濟不穩定;人口不平衡;環境惡化;持續的腐敗;對少數民族和宗教少數群體的壓迫;監督、審查和灌輸14億中國人所產生的巨大費用;中國人的分離。 中國有40億人;由黨控制的軍隊與人民分離;以及–特別是在武漢發生的COVID-19大流行病在全世界造成的疾病、死亡和社會經濟破壞之後–國際社會對中共蔑視人的生命、漠視其他國家的福祉、無視國際準則和義務的憤怒日益增加。

Meeting the China challenge requires the United States to return to the fundamentals. To secure freedom, America must refashion its foreign policy in light of ten tasks.


First, the United States must secure freedom at home by preserving constitutional government, promoting prosperity, and fostering a robust civil society, all of which nourish the civic concord that has always been essential to meeting the nation’s challenges abroad.


Second, the United States must maintain the world’s most powerful, agile, and technologically sophisticated military while enhancing security cooperation, grounded in common interests and shared responsibility, with allies and partners.


Third, the United States must fortify the free, open, and rules-based international order that it led in creating after World War II, which is composed of sovereign nation-states and based on respect for human rights and fidelity to the rule of law.


Fourth, the United States must reevaluate its alliance system and the panoply of international organizations in which it participates to determine where they fortify the free, open, and rules-based international order and where they fall short.


Fifth, in light of that reevaluation, the United States must strengthen its alliance system by more effectively sharing responsibilities with friends and partners and by forming a variety of groupings and coalitions to address specific threats to freedom while, in cooperation with the world’s democracies and other like-minded partners, reforming international organizations where possible and, where necessary, building new ones rooted in freedom, democracy, national sovereignty, human rights, and the rule of law.


Sixth, the United States must promote American interests by looking for opportunities to cooperate with Beijing subject to norms of fairness and reciprocity, constraining and deterring the PRC when circumstances require, and supporting those in China who seek freedom.


Seventh, the United States must educate American citizens about the scope and implications of the China challenge because only an informed citizenry can be expected to back the complex mix of demanding policies that the United States must adopt to secure freedom.


Eighth, the United States must train a new generation of public servants — in diplomacy, military affairs, finance, economics, science and technology, and other fields — and public-policy thinkers who not only attain fluency in Chinese and acquire extensive knowledge of China’s culture and history, but who also attain fluency in the languages, and acquire extensive knowledge of the cultures and histories, of other strategic competitors, friends, and potential friends.


Ninth, the United States must reform American education, equipping students to shoulder the enduring responsibilities of citizenship in a free and democratic society by understanding America’s legacy of liberty and also preparing them to meet the special demands of a complex, information-age, globalized economy for expertise in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics.


Tenth, the United States must champion the principles of freedom — principles that are at once universal and at the heart of the American national spirit — through example; speeches; educational initiatives; public diplomacy; foreign assistance and investment; sanctions in more difficult circumstances as well as other forms of non-military pressure; and, where the nation’s vital interests are at stake and all else has failed, military force.

第十,美國必須通過以下方式捍衛自由原則 — — 這些原則既具有普遍性,又是美國民族精神的核心 — — 以身作則;演講;教育倡議;公共外交;對外援助和投資;在更困難的情況下實施制裁以及其他形式的非軍事壓力;以及在國家的重大利益受到威脅而所有其他方式都失敗的情況下,使用軍事力量。

Grounded in America’s founding principles and constitutional traditions; invigorated by a bustling economy; undergirded by the world’s best-trained and best-equipped military; served by government officials who understand the American people and the American political system, recognize the diversity and common humanity of the peoples and nations of the world, and appreciates the complex interplay of ideas and interests in foreign affairs; and fortified by an informed and engaged citizenry — this multi-pronged approach will enable the United States to secure freedom.


  1. The China Challenge


For a fairly long time yet, socialism in its primary stage will exist alongside a more productive and developed capitalist system. In this long period of cooperation and conflict, socialism must learn from the boons that capitalism has brought to civilization. We must face the reality that people will use the strengths of developed, Western countries to denounce our countrys socialist development. Here we must have a great strategic determination, resolutely rejecting all false arguments that we should abandon socialism. We must consciously correct the various ideas that do not accord with our current stage. Most importantly, we must concentrate our efforts on bettering our own affairs, continually broadening our comprehensive national power, improving the lives of our people, building a socialism that is superior to capitalism, and laying the foundation for a future where we will win the initiative and have the dominant position.

— Xi Jinping, “Uphold and Develop Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” speech to the CCP Central Committee, January 5, 2013


– 習近平:《堅持和發展中國特色社會主義》,2013年1月5日在中共中央的講話。

Awareness has been growing in the United States — and in nations around the world — that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has triggered a new era of great-power competition. Even as the United States seeks cooperation and welcomes rules-based competition, responsible American statecraft depends on grasping the mounting challenge that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) poses to free and sovereign nation-states and to the free, open, and rules-based international order that is essential to their security, stability, and prosperity. The CCP’s recklessness in allowing the novel coronavirus born in Wuhan to develop into a global pandemic coupled with the concerted disinformation campaign that Beijing undertook to conceal China’s culpability should put doubts to rest. Yet many people lack a proper understanding of the character and scope of the China challenge.


Home to an extraordinary culture and to moral and political traditions stretching back thousands of years, China today is a great power governed by an authoritarian regime modeled on 20th-century Marxist-Leninist dictatorship. Prodigious economic growth has enriched China. Major military modernization has emboldened it. And nations around the world have enabled the CCP by engaging, and welcoming commerce with, Beijing.


Few, however, discern the pattern in the PRC’s inroads in every region of the world, much less the specific form of preeminence to which the CCP aspires. The failure to understand China’s interests and objectives derives in no small measure from neglect of the CCP’s governing ideas.1 Just as America’s commitment to a free, open, and rules-based international order composed of sovereign nation states arises from our dedication to “unalienable rights” — the language that America’s Declaration of Independence uses to describe the rights inherent in all persons2 — so too does the PRC’s determination to achieve “national rejuvenation” and transform the international order so that it places China at the center and serves Beijing’s ruling ambitions stem from the CCP’s Marxist-Leninist ideology and hyper-nationalist convictions.3

然而,很少有人能看出中國在世界每個地區的入侵模式,更不用說中共渴望的具體優勢形式了。對中國利益和目標的不理解,很大程度上源於對中共執政理念的忽視。 正如美國致力於建立一個由主權民族國家組成的自由、開放和以規則為基礎的國際秩序,源於我們對 “不可剝奪的權利 “的承諾–美國《獨立宣言》用這種語言來描述所有人固有的權利–同樣,中國決心實現 “民族復興”,改變國際秩序,使之以中國為中心,為北京的統治野心服務,也是源於中共的馬列主義思想和超民族主義信念。

The conventional wisdom long supposed that China is best understood in accordance with ideas of reasonable state behavior. For decades, influential observers in and out of government viewed China’s rise as an opportunity to enlarge the world market and thereby benefit all nations through increased global commerce. They lauded Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s decision in the late 1970s to introduce capitalist elements into the PRC’s state-controlled economy, which — over time and with assistance from the United States and other advanced industrial nations — spurred rapid modernization and generated double-digit economic growth. They hoped that incorporating a rising China into the established international order would induce Beijing to fully open and privatize its state-directed economy; to liberalize its authoritarian regime; and eventually to become a “responsible stakeholder” upholding the international order. Even after the CCP’s bloody June 1989 crackdown on hundreds of thousands of pro-democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square and throughout the country, many in the United States and around the world clung to high hopes for China.4

長期以來,傳統的智慧認為,對中國的理解最好是按照合理的國家行為理念來進行。幾十年來,政府內外有影響力的觀察家認為,中國的崛起是擴大世界市場的機會,從而通過增加全球貿易使所有國家受益。他們稱贊中國領導人鄧小平在20世紀70年代末決定將資本主義元素引入中國國家控制的經濟中,隨著時間的推移,在美國和其他先進工業國家的幫助下,中國經濟迅速現代化,並產生了兩位數的經濟增長。他們希望,將一個崛起的中國納入既有的國際秩序,將促使北京全面開放其國家控制的經濟並實現私有化;使其專制政權自由化;並最終成為維護國際秩序的 “負責任的利益相關者”。即使在1989年6月中共血腥鎮壓天安門廣場和全國各地數十萬民主抗議者之後,美國和世界各地的許多人仍然對中國抱有很高的希望。

But the much-anticipated political liberalization did not occur. China might have chosen the democratic path of former dictatorships in East Asia like South Korea and Taiwan. Speculations about “the end of history” — that liberal democracy, owing to its reasonableness and universal appeal, was spreading around the globe — nourished the faith.5 But the CCP has stuck to its authoritarian convictions. The party consistently affirmed its fidelity to Marxism- Leninism as a paradigm for China’s governance, and socialism — the state control of economy and society — as a model not only for the PRC but also for other nations and as the basis of an alternative world order.6 Still, some persist in believing that China’s conduct will stay within recognizable boundaries and that Beijing merely acts as would any great power in its geopolitical circumstances.7

但備受期待的政治自由化並沒有出現。中國可能選擇了南朝鮮和臺灣等東亞前獨裁國家的民主道路。關於 “歷史終結 “的猜測–自由民主因其合理性和普遍吸引力,正在全球範圍內蔓延–滋養了人們的信心。 但中共一直堅持其專制信念。該黨一貫申明其忠於馬列主義,將其作為中國治理的典範,而社會主義–國家對經濟和社會的控制–不僅是中國的模式,也是其他國家的模式,是另一種世界秩序的基礎。 但仍有一些人堅持認為,中國的行為將保持在可識別的範圍內,而北京只是在其地緣政治環境下與任何大國一樣行事。

Meanwhile, the CCP has patiently developed the PRC’s capabilities over the last 40 years with the long-term goal of achieving global preeminence and placing a socialist stamp on world order. Captive to the conventional wisdom, the United States and other countries proceeded largely unaware of or indifferent to the long-term strategic competition launched by the CCP and affirmed with increasing boldness by CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping. As a veteran U.S. policymaker recently wrote, “This prolonged failure in China policy could turn out to be the biggest U.S. policy deficiency in the past seven decades, given the accumulating dangerous strategic consequences of the rise of Chinese power for world order as well as for the United States and its allies and friends.”8


Even as proponents of the conventional wisdom dug in their heels, keen observers of China effected a salutary shift in perspective. Their books and articles bring into focus the CCP’s one-party, repressive rule as well as its defiance of, and determination to remake, international norms, standards, and institutions.9


The Trump Administration achieved a fundamental break with the conventional wisdom. It concluded that the CCP’s resolute conduct and self-professed goals require the United States and other countries to revise assumptions and develop a new strategic doctrine to address the primacy and magnitude of the China challenge. The administration presented its thinking to the public in the 2017 National Security Strategy, 2018 National Defense Strategy, 2020 United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China, 2020 annual report to Congress on China’s military power, and in many high-profile speeches by senior administration figures.10


The administration’s outlook recognizes that it is unreasonable to suppose that today’s leaders of the Chinese Communist Party — who view themselves as heirs to a great civilization, who espouse a 20th-century ideology and political system the cruelty and repression of which have left tens of millions dead, and who pursue hyper-nationalist goals — comprehend domestic politics and world affairs as do the United States and other liberal democracies.11 In recent years, the CCP has consolidated authority and — by nefarious means ranging from digital surveillance to strict indoctrination to concentration camps for religious and ethnic minorities — intensified the subordination of PRC citizens to party-defined collective interests. The CCP has developed — and acquired illegally in many instances — advanced technologies not only to control its own population but also to collect data on persons across the globe and to build a world-class military. The CCP has pursued extravagant claims in, and militarization of, the South China Sea in brazen defiance of international law while crushing freedom in Hong Kong and threatening to do the same in Taiwan. The CCP has undertaken major infrastructure and investment projects, debt-trap diplomacy, and other predatory economic practices in every region of the world, the better to induce or compel sovereign nation-states, particularly their governing and business elites, to aid and abet China in the reshaping of world order. And the CCP has leveraged its integration into international organizations to infuse them with norms and standards rooted in the party’s authoritarianism.


China’s conduct reflects the CCP’s short-term priorities and long-term ambitions, the party’s assessment of China’s current stage of development, and its understanding of the geopolitical environment in which China operates. “In this long period of cooperation and conflict, socialism must learn from the boons that capitalism has brought to civilization,” Xi proclaimed in 2013. “Most importantly, we must concentrate our efforts on bettering our own affairs, continually broadening our comprehensive national power, improving the lives of our people, building a socialism that is superior to capitalism, and laying the foundation for a future where we will win the initiative and have the dominant position.12 Examination of the CCP’s conduct in light of its communist and hyper-nationalist ideas demonstrates that by achieving “the initiative” and attaining “the dominant position,” Xi means displacing the United States as the world’s foremost power and restructuring world order to conform to the CCP’s distinctive way of empire.

中國的行為反映了中國共產黨的短期重點和長期雄心,反映了黨對中國現階段發展的評估,反映了黨對中國所處地緣政治環境的理解。”在這個長期的合作與沖突中,社會主義必須學習資本主義給文明帶來的恩惠,”習近平在2013年宣布。”最重要的是,我們要集中力量辦好自己的事情,不斷擴大綜合國力,改善人民生活,建設優於資本主義的社會主義,為將來贏得主動、占據主導地位奠定基礎。 “從中共的共產主義和超民族主義思想來審視中共的行為,可以看出,習近平所說的取得 “主動權”、獲得 “主導地位”,就是要取代美國成為世界上最重要的大國,重構世界秩序,使之符合中共獨特的帝國之道。

The purpose of this unclassified Policy Planning Staff paper is to step back and take a long-term view, elaborate the elements of the China challenge, and sketch a framework for the fashioning of sturdy policies that stand above bureaucratic squabbles and interagency turf battles and transcend short-term election cycles. The United States’ overarching aim should be to secure freedom.


  1. Chinas Conduct


To understand the character of the contest for supremacy launched by the CCP, it is necessary to grasp the major features of China’s conduct. These include the PRC’s brand of authoritarian governance, its use of economic might to surpass the United States in influence in every region of the world as well as in international organizations, and its development of a world-class military designed to counter and eventually surpass the U.S. military. These features have been studied in isolation and each is well-known to experts in one field or another. Their comprehensive and interlocking character, however, is not widely appreciated. Considering them together brings into focus the CCP’s paramount geopolitical aim: to achieve global preeminence by reorganizing the international order around the party’s understanding of socialism.


Authoritarianism at Home


China’s conduct in world affairs stems from the CCP’s form of authoritarian government. In line with 20th-century communist dogma and the precepts and practices of Marxist-Leninist regimes, the CCP exercises repressive, single-party rule over some 1.4 billion people. Recently, the party amended the PRC constitution to remove term limits on the presidency occupied by CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping.


In the decades after the violent suppression of pro-democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square in 1989, the CCP intensified internal repression and fortified its control over the country by expanding the systematic use of indoctrination, censorship, disinformation, high-tech surveillance, forced disappearances, and other brutal means.13 To erase the ethnic and religious identities of Xinjiang’s nearly 11 million Turkic Muslims, the party has damaged and destroyed mosques; imprisoned more than one million Uyghurs in so-called “re-education” camps that subject prisoners to indoctrination, compulsory labor, forced sterilization, involuntary birth control, and other heinous abuses; and implemented mass surveillance, DNA collection, and other forms of coercive social control.14 As part of China’s national policy to forcibly integrate minorities, which is sometimes referred to as “stability maintenance,” the CCP has heightened repression of some 6 million Tibetans — severely restricting freedom of speech, religion, movement, association, and assembly.15 It has also curtailed the freedom of more than 4 million ethnic Mongolians living in China’s Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region in an effort to sinicize them.16 And, as part of its crackdown on Christians in China, a population estimated to number as many as 70 million, the CCP has imprisoned pastors, shut down churches, banned online religious services, and contemplated a plan to rewrite the Bible to purge it of ideas that conflict with party dogma.17

在1989年天安門廣場暴力鎮壓民主抗議者之後的幾十年裏,中共加強了內部鎮壓,並通過擴大系統地使用灌輸、審查、造謠、高科技監控、強迫失蹤和其他殘酷手段,加強了對國家的控制。為了抹去新疆近1100萬突厥穆斯林的民族和宗教身份,中國共產黨破壞和摧毀了清真寺;將100多萬維吾爾族人關押在所謂的 “再教育 “營中,對囚犯進行灌輸、強制勞動、強迫絕育、非自願節育和其他令人發指的虐待;並實施大規模監控、DNA采集和其他形式的強制性社會控制。作為中國強行整合少數民族(有時被稱為 “維穩”)的國家政策的一部分,中國共產黨加強了對大約600萬藏族人的鎮壓–嚴格限制言論、宗教、行動、結社和集會自由。而且,作為鎮壓中國基督徒(估計有七千萬人)的一部分,中共監禁牧師、關閉教堂、禁止網上宗教活動,並考慮重寫《聖經》的計劃,清除與黨的教條相沖突的思想。

The CCP also seeks to extend the reach of China’s sovereignty. In the months following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, China — in defiance of its promises to keep Hong Kong free and open and to maintain the territory’s high degree of autonomy under the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and Hong Kong’s Basic Law — imposed a national security law that destroys the territory’s autonomy and robs Hong Kong’s residents of their essential freedoms.18 Beijing also insists that Taiwan — today a free and prosperous democracy — has always been and must remain part of China and threatens reunification by military force.19 And, asserting maritime claims in the South China Sea far beyond those recognized by international law, China has shifted the balance of power in the sea by building on and militarizing disputed islands.20

中共還試圖擴大中國主權的範圍。在COVID-19疫情爆發後的幾個月裏,中國無視其根據1984年《中英聯合聲明》和香港《基本法》作出的保持香港自由開放和保持香港高度自治的承諾,強行實施了一項國家安全法,破壞了香港的自治,剝奪了香港居民的基本自由。北京還堅持認為,臺灣–今天是一個自由和繁榮的 民主國家–一直是、也必須繼續是中國的一部分,並 威脅要以軍事力量實現統一。而且,中國在南中國海的海權主張遠遠超出了國際法所承認的範圍,中國通過在有爭議的島嶼上進行建設並將其軍事化,從而改變了海上的均勢。

The communism that the CCP professes is more than a mode of authoritarian domestic governance. It is also a theory of a globe-spanning universal society, the ultimate goal of which is to bring about a socialist international order. At the same time, the CCP proclaims hyper-nationalist aspirations with roots in Chinese cultural and political traditions — however much twisted and deformed by the party — that require the PRC to occupy the commanding position in world affairs. The party’s synthesis of 20th-century communist dogma and extreme Chinese nationalism drives the PRC’s conduct within and beyond its borders.


Economic Co-optation and Coercion


Economic power is a leading element of the CCP’s quest for preeminence in world affairs. Before modernization, China often acquired leverage over its neighbors, whom it more or less viewed as comprising the known world, through the creation of dependence in commerce.21


Today, thanks in part to globalization and to the CCP’s rapid modernization over the last forty years, the known world for China has expanded to encompass the globe. The CCP has adapted the old approach to China’s new circumstances. All major economies are vulnerable to the CCP’s economic co-optation and coercion because of their extensive commercial ties with the PRC and their desire to maintain access to China’s low-cost labor force and enormous consumer markets. America’s own economic entwinement with China dwarfs U.S. commercial relations with the former Soviet Union.22


As China reaped the benefits of modernization and accelerated economic development, the CCP set its sights on dominating the global economy by leading in the cutting-edge sciences and the high-tech revolution. On its way to building the world’s second largest economy after the United States, the party developed various initiatives and programs integral to Beijing’s long-term strategy of using a “whole-of-nation” approach to achieve — including by deceptive, corrupt, and illicit means — decisive advantage over the United States and other advanced industrial nations.

隨著中國從現代化和加速經濟發展中獲益,中國共產黨將目光投向了通過在尖端科學和高科技革命中的領先地位來主導全球經濟。在建設僅次於美國的世界第二大經濟體的道路上,中國共產黨制定了各種舉措和計劃,這些舉措和計劃是北京的長期戰略的組成部分,即利用 “全國性 “的方法,包括通過欺騙、腐敗和非法手段,取得對美國和其他先進工業國家的決定性優勢。

First, China engages in massive intellectual-property theft.23 The PRC has perpetrated the greatest illegitimate transfer of wealth in human history, stealing technological innovation and trade secrets from companies, universities, and the defense sectors of the United States and other nations.24 According to research cited by the Office of the United States Trade Representative, China’s efforts — including forced technology transfer, cyberattacks, and a whole-of-nation approach to economic and industrial espionage — cost the U.S. economy as much as $600 billion annually.25 This staggering sum approaches the Pentagon’s annual national defense budget and exceeds the total profits of the Fortune 500’s top 50 companies.

首先,中國進行了大規模的知識產權盜竊。 中國進行了人類歷史上最大規模的非法財富轉移,從美國和其他國家的公司、大學和國防部門竊取技術創新和商業機密。根據美國貿易代表辦公室引用的研究結果,中國的努力–包括強制技術轉讓、網絡攻擊以及整個國家的經濟和工業間諜活動–每年給美國經濟造成的損失高達6000億美元。 這個驚人的數字接近五角大樓的年度國防預算,並超過《財富》500強前50家公司的利潤總額。

All 56 FBI field offices are conducting China-related economic-espionage investigations across nearly every industrial sector.26


Second, China pursues control over key international supply chains and essential materials and goods. Since Beijing’s controversial 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization, U.S. multinational companies have relied increasingly on the PRC’s low-cost labor force to produce and export cheaper finished goods, especially in high-technology and advanced-manufacturing sectors. This shift resulted in lower prices for U.S. consumers and higher profits for U.S. companies. Among the costs, however, was a “China Shock” that devastated small- and medium-sized manufacturing in the United States and other nations, wiping out as many as 2.4 million jobs in America alone and leaving crucial international supply chains dependent on China.27 The global pandemic has thrown this supply-chain vulnerability into sharp relief.

其次,中國尋求對關鍵國際供應鏈和基本材料及貨物的控制。自從2001年北京有爭議地加入世界貿易組織以來,美國跨國公司越來越多地依賴中國的低成本勞動力來生產和出口更便宜的成品,特別是在高科技和先進制造業領域。這種轉變導致美國消費者的購買價格降低,美國公司的利潤增加。然而,代價之一是 “中國沖擊”,它摧毀了美國和其他國家的中小型制造業,僅在美國就消滅了多達240萬個工作崗位,並使關鍵的國際供應鏈依賴於中國。全球性的大流行病使這種供應鏈的脆弱性變得更加突出。

Third, China seeks worldwide industrial dominance, particularly in critical high-tech sectors. While manufacturing superiority proved decisive in U.S. victories in World War II and the Cold War, the United States lost that advantage in many essential industries. For example, China today accounts for 50 percent of global steel and aluminum production, 70 percent of consumer electronics manufacturing capacity, 90 percent of consumer drone production, 45 percent of shipbuilding production, and, by 2022, will likely account for 35 percent of the world’s integrated-circuit fabrication capacity.28 By 2022, China and Taiwan are set to house 70 percent of global capacity for integrated-circuit fabrication, including virtually all cutting-edge production,29 which is vital to the digital economy, advanced weapons systems, aerospace, artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, and other essential industries. The PRC aggressively implements industrial policy through efforts like its “Made in China 2025” initiative, which develops Chinese “national champion” companies in ten decisive areas: (1) AI, quantum computing, and next-generation information technology; (2) robotics and automation; (3) aerospace and space; (4) high-tech shipping and oceanic engineering; (5) high-speed railway; (6) energy efficiency; (7) new materials; (8) biotechnology, medical devices, and advanced pharmaceuticals; (9) next-generation energy and power generation; and (10) agricultural machinery.30 By displacing the United States and other advanced industrial nations in these vital domains, China intends not only to acquire control over global commerce, but also to support its “Military-Civil Fusion” (MCF) strategy for leveraging legally and illegally acquired advanced and emerging technologies to strengthen its armed forces. The PRC’s progress in AI poses a particular risk because the CCP, unconstrained by respect for individual liberty and human rights, exploits the massive quantities of data that it collects to refine the AI algorithms that will power the next generation of networked technology.31

第三,中國尋求在世界範圍內的工業主導權,特別是在關鍵的高科技領域。雖然事實證明,制造業優勢對美國在二戰和冷戰中的勝利具有決定性作用,但現在美國在許多重要行業失去了這一優勢。例如,中國今天占據了全球50%的鋼鋁產量,70%的消費電子制造能力, 90%的消費類無人機產量,45 %的造船產量,到2022年,中國可能將占據全球35%的集成電路制造能力。到2022年,中國大陸和臺灣將擁有全球70%的集成電路制造能力,幾乎包括所有尖端產品生產,這對數字經濟、先進武器系統、航空航天、人工智能(AI)、機器人和其他重要產業至關重要。中國通過 “中國制造2025 “計劃等努力積極實施產業政策,在十個決定性領域發展中國的 “國家冠軍 “企業。(1)人工智能、量子計算和下一代信息技術;(2)機器人和自動化;(3)航空航天和太空;(4)高科技航運和海洋工程;(5)高速鐵路;(6)節能;(7)新材料;(8)生物技術、醫療設備和先進制藥;(9)下一代能源和發電;(10)農業機械。 通過在這些重要領域取代美國和其他先進工業國家,中國不僅打算獲得對全球商業的控制權,而且還打算支持其 “軍民融合”(MCF)戰略,利用合法和非法獲得的先進和新興技術來加強其武裝力量。中國在人工智能方面的進展構成了一個特別的風險,因為中共在不尊重個人自由和人權的情況下,利用其收集的大量數據來完善人工智能算法,從而推動下一代網絡技術的發展。

Fourth, China aims to build the world’s fifth generation (5G) wireless-telecommunications physical and digital infrastructure as a steppingstone to broader dominance in emerging and next-generation information technologies. Beijing heavily subsidizes state-directed Huawei and ZTE, enabling these telecommunications behemoths to undercut rivals in the race to construct 5G networks on every continent.32 Since Huawei and ZTE are subject to China’s various national security laws that compel them to “support, assist and cooperate with the state intelligence work,” countries that use them as 5G vendors face growing threats to their network integrity, data privacy, economic stability, and national security.33 Moreover, under the guise of so-called “smart city” development projects, Huawei and ZTE can export to autocratic regimes around the world the same Orwellian tools that they provide the CCP to surveil people in China.34 Meanwhile, since military operations, espionage, and political warfare depend on information and data, China invests large sums to gain advantage in cyberspace, including physical architecture, operating systems, and hardware.35

第四,中國的目標是尋求建設世界第五代(5G)無線通信物理和數字基礎設施,以此作為在新興和下一代信息技術領域取得更廣泛主導地位的踏腳石。中國政府為國家主導的華為和中興提供了大量補貼,使這些電信巨頭能夠在各大洲建設5G網絡的競爭中壓倒對手。在中國各種安全法規的約束下,華為和中興必須“支持、協助和配合國家情報工作”,因此,以它們為5G供應商的國家,其網絡完整性、數據隱私、經濟穩定和國家安全都面臨著越來越大的威脅。 此外,在所謂的 “智慧城市 “發展項目的幌子下,華為和中興可以向世界各地的專制政權供應他們同樣為中共提供的監視中國人民的奧威爾式工具。 同時,由於軍事行動、間諜活動和政治戰爭都依賴於信息和數據,中國投入大量資金在網絡世界取得優勢,包括物理架構、操作系統和硬件。

Fifth, the CCP uses the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) — originally called One Belt One Road (OBOR) and still so designated by the PRC in Chinese-language sources — and other undertakings to expand foreign markets for Chinese companies and as a means of drawing nations, particularly their political and economic elites, into Beijing’s geopolitical orbit. BRI infrastructure projects — ports, railroads, highways, dams, industrial parks, civil nuclear facilities and other energy related initiatives, and more — typically rely on imported Chinese workers rather than local labor, and sometimes involve 50- to 100-year business relationships that entrench China’s long-term access to local elites and confer power over key parts of the host country’s critical infrastructure. Because of the heavy economic and environmental costs imposed by the CCP, host countries increasingly find these BRI projects unsustainable. As a result of China’s predatory development program and debt-trap diplomacy, for example, Sri Lanka lost control of a major port after defaulting on a burdensome loan.36

第五,中共利用 “一帶一路 “倡議(BRI)–原名為 “一帶一路”(OBOR),在中文資料中,中國仍將其稱為 “一帶一路”–以及其他項目,為中國公司拓展國外市場,並將其作為吸引各國,特別是其政治和經濟精英進入中國政府地緣政治圈子的一種手段。BRI基礎設施項目–港口、鐵路、高速公路、大壩、工業園區、民用核設施和其他與能源相關的項目等等–通常依賴使用中國工人而非當地勞動力,有時是涉及50至100年的商業合作,這鞏固了中國與當地精英的長期關系,並攫取了東道國關鍵基礎設施核心部分的權力。由於中共強加的沈重的經濟和環境成本,東道國越來越發現這些BRI項目是不可持續的。例如,由於中國的掠奪性發展計劃和債務陷阱外交,斯裏蘭卡在拖欠一筆沈重的貸款後失去了對一個主要港口的控制權。

Sixth, China leverages often unfettered access to foreign capital markets.37 In particular, U.S. stock exchanges today list over 130 Chinese companies — including Alibaba, PetroChina Company Limited, China Life Insurance Company Limited, China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation, Baidu, and Tencent — with a combined valuation of over $1 trillion.38 Following massive financial and accounting scandals in the early 2000s, the U.S. Congress enacted laws requiring regulators to inspect the audits of all U.S.-listed companies.39 China is the only country that invokes its state security laws to block U.S. regulators from conducting these inspections.40 Moreover, U.S. investors and pension holders unwittingly pour billions into managed funds that invest in Chinese companies that are listed on exchanges outside the United States. Moreover, some foreign-listed Chinese companies — including Hikvision, Dahua Technology, and the weapons-manufacturing subsidiaries of Aviation Industry Corporation of China — have ties to Beijing’s military modernization, espionage, and human rights abuses, and may be subject to U.S. sanctions and export controls.41

第六,中國基金往往不受限制地進入外國資本市場。 特別是,美國證券交易所今天列出了130多家中國公司–包括阿裏巴巴、中國石油天然氣股份有限公司、中國人壽保險股份有限公司、中國石油化工集團公司、百度和騰訊–總估值超過1萬億美元。 在2000年代初發生大規模財務和會計醜聞後,美國國會頒布法律,要求監管機構檢查所有在美國上市的公司的審計情況。 中國是唯一一個援引國家安全法阻止美國監管機構進行這些檢查的國家。 此外,美國投資者和養老金持有者在不知不覺中向投資於在美國境外交易所上市的中國公司的管理基金投入了數十億美元。不僅如此,一些在國外上市的中國公司–包括海康威視、大華科技和中國航空工業集團公司的武器制造子公司–與中國政府的軍事現代化、間諜活動和侵犯人權的行為有關,可能本應該受到美國的制裁和出口管制。

Seventh, China exploits the freedom and openness of the world’s liberal democracies to undercut their governance, prosperity, and national security. Beijing regularly threatens to cut off access to its vast markets to force foreign businesses in free countries to conform to the CCP’s political demands and speech regulations. Prominent cases include China’s efforts to compel foreign airlines to list Taiwan as part of the PRC, to silence the National Basketball Association after the Houston Rockets’ then-general manager tweeted — from U.S. soil — his support for Hong Kong protesters seeking to preserve their city’s individual freedoms and political autonomy, and to extract an apology from Mercedes-Benz for using an image of the Dalai Lama in online advertising.42 In addition, the CCP carries out massive propaganda and disinformation efforts.43 The party uses the Thousand Talents Program (TTP) and other party-run recruitment efforts to target universities and impel students and professors to obtain — lawfully or otherwise — technology, trade secrets, proprietary data, and research and development.44 It generously funds Confucius Institutes, which specialize in disseminating CCP propaganda,45 at universities in the United States and in other countries through confidential funding agreements that oblige the institutions to avoid criticism of China and to otherwise comply with CCP objectives.46 And the CCP tracks foreign government officials at the national and subnational levels, not least in the United States, to find opportunities for influence.47

第七,中國利用世界上自由民主國家的自由和開放,破壞它們的治理、繁榮和國家安全。北京經常威脅要切斷進入其廣闊市場的通道,來迫使自由國家的外國企業服從中共的政治要求和言論管制。著名的案例包括:中共強迫外國航空公司將臺灣列為中華人民共和國的一部分;在休斯敦火箭隊時任總經理從美國本土發推特支持香港抗議者維護其城市的個人自由和政治自治後,中國壓制NBA的聲音;以及要求梅賽德斯-奔馳公司就其在網絡廣告中使用達賴喇嘛的形象道歉。 此外,中共還進行了大規模的宣傳和造謠工作。 中共利用 “千人計劃”(TTP)和其他由該黨管理的招聘活動,以大學為目標,誘使學生和教授合法或以其他方式獲得技術、商業機密、專有數據和研究與開發。在秘密的避免批評中國並遵守其他中共規定的協議下,中共慷慨地資助美國和其他國家大學興辦孔子學院,來專門傳播中共的宣傳。中共跟蹤外國政府國家級和次國家級官員,尤其是在美國,以尋找影響的機會。

By means of these and other initiatives and programs — and unconstrained by respect for international law and human rights — the PRC wields its vast economic power globally to bring countries under its sway. Increasingly, the CCP links its clout in commerce and investment to shows of advanced military capabilities, with the aim of expanding its global influence.


A World-Class Military


China’s economic might and technological prowess advance its development of a world-class military that is intended to rival and in the long-term surpass the U.S. military and those of its allies.48 The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which owes allegiance to the CCP, is central to the party’s goal of empowering China to play the decisive role on the world stage. Following his selection in 2012 as CCP General Secretary, Xi Jinping intensified the PLA’s decades-long military modernization. Also named chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xi used the 2012 Defense White Paper to direct the PLA to achieve a status “commensurate with” China’s “international standing.”49 On January 1, 2016, the PLA announced a comprehensive reorganization of its force structure, setting the military on a path of expansion that paralleled China’s economic advances, and which would enable it “to combat and win battles.”50

中國的經濟和技術實力推動了其建設世界級的軍隊,其目的是與美國及其盟國的軍隊相抗衡,並在遠期內超越它們。效忠於中國共產黨的人民解放軍,是中共尋求中國在世界舞臺上決定性話語權的中堅力量。在2012年被選為中共總書記後,習近平加強了解放軍長達數十年的軍事現代化建設。習近平還被任命為中央軍委主席,他在2012年的《國防白皮書》指示解放軍要實現與中國 “國際地位 “相稱的地位。 2016年1月1日,解放軍宣布全面調整部隊結構,使軍隊走上與中國經濟進步同步的擴張之路,這將使其 “能打仗、打勝仗”。

The CCP’s extensive military transformation exhibits China’s strategic intentions. The 2016 reorganization created five theater-based joint commands — akin to the United States’ geographic commands — and two functional commands. The responsibilities of the newly formed Strategic Support Force (SSF) include cyber and space operations and electronic warfare as well as psychological-warfare operations. The SSF, along with Joint Logistics Support Force, will enable the PLA to project military power over great distances and to contest “new military strategic commanding heights.”51 The 2016 reform elevated China’s nuclear forces, which Xi emphasizes are essential to China’s major-power status, from a subordinate command to a separate stand-alone military service. Accordingly, he called upon the PLA Rocket Force “to enhance its nuclear deterrents and nuclear counterstrike capabilities.”52

中共廣泛的軍事變革展示了中國的戰略意圖。2016年的重組建立了五個戰區聯合司令部–類似於美國的地域司令部–和兩個職能司令部。新組建的戰略支援部隊(SSF)的職責包括網絡和太空戰、電子戰以及心理戰行動。SSF與聯合後勤支援部隊一起,將使解放軍能夠遠距離投放軍事力量,爭奪 “新的軍事戰略指揮高地”。 2016年的改革將習近平強調對中國大國地位至關重要的中國核力量從一個下屬指揮部提升為一個單獨的獨立軍種。據此,他要求解放軍火箭軍 “增強核威懾和核反擊能力”。

Having undertaken these structural reforms, Xi used the 19th Party Congress in October 2017 to announce goals for the transformation of the PLA’s operations and capabilities. He directed the military to achieve mechanization, make strides in applying information technology, and improve its strategic capabilities. His goal is to complete the transformation of the PLA and the People’s Armed Police into “world-class forces by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the PRC’s founding.”53

在進行了這些結構性改革後, 2017年10月的黨的十九大上,習近平宣布了解放軍作戰和能力轉型的目標。他指示軍隊實現機械化,在應用信息技術方面取得進展,提高戰略能力。他的目標是,到2049年中華人民共和國成立100周年時,解放軍和人民武裝警察完成轉型,成為 “世界級軍隊”。

China learned well from U.S. military success in the 1991 Gulf War and the military offset strategy the United States adopted in the 1970s to address the Soviet challenge.54 To counter the U.S. military’s technological advantage, PLA leadership developed an offset strategy of its own. Top officials in the U.S. Department of Defense have warned that the United States can no longer take for granted military superiority in East Asia.55

中國很好地學習了1991年海灣戰爭中美國的成功經驗,以及美國在20世紀70年代為應對蘇聯挑戰而采取的軍事抵消戰略。 為了對抗美軍的技術優勢,解放軍領導層制定了自己的抵消戰略。美國國防部高官警告說,美國不能再把在東亞的軍事優勢視為理所當然。

China embarked on five distinct but mutually supporting lines of effort:

• “Military-Civil Fusion” (MCF) to achieve the world’s most technologically sophisticated military by acquiring, including through illegal means, advanced and emerging technologies from the United States and from countries around the globe;

• “Systems-destruction warfare” strategy — emphasizing attacks on command and control centers — to shut down enemy operational systems;

• Vast arsenals of ground-based precision missiles to penetrate U.S. defenses;

• “Assassin’s Mace” capabilities to surprise the adversary from unexpected vectors;

• Industrial dominance to attain world leadership in artificial intelligence.56

China’s offset strategy has resulted in a form of asymmetric arms racing. Beijing has invested in large numbers of ground-based theater missiles, third- and fourth-generation aircraft carrying advanced standoff missiles, diesel submarines capable of dominating regional waters, counter-space and cyber capabilities, and an increasingly advanced nuclear arsenal. The PLA’s rapid progress in producing and deploying hypersonic missiles — designed to defeat U.S. and allied missile defenses — underscores Beijing’s determination to achieve asymmetric advantages.57 It does not appear that China is mirroring Soviet behavior by sprinting to quantitative nuclear parity, but evidence mounts that Beijing seeks to at least double the size of its nuclear forces and achieve a form of qualitative equivalence with the United States.58


– “軍民融合”(MCF),包括通過非法手段等方式,從美國和世界各國獲取先進的新興技術,建成世界上技術最先進的軍隊。

– “系統破壞戰 “戰略—-強調攻擊指揮和控制中心—-以封閉敵方作戰系統。

– 龐大的陸基精確導彈庫,以穿透美國的防禦系統。

– “刺客之錘 “的能力,用意想不到的載體突襲對手。

– 工業主宰力在人工智能領域取得世界領先地位。

中國的抵消戰略導致了一種不對稱的軍備競賽。北京投資了大量的陸基戰區導彈、攜帶先進防區外導彈的第三代和第四代飛機、能夠支配地區海域的柴油潛艇、反空間和網絡能力,以及越來越先進的核武庫。解放軍在生產和部署高超音速導彈–旨在擊敗美國和盟國的導彈防禦系統–方面的快速進展凸顯了北京實現不對稱優勢的決心。 中國似乎並沒有效仿蘇聯的行為,急於實現數量上的核均勢,但有證據表明,北京試圖將其核力量的規模至少擴大一倍,並實現與美國在質量上的某種形式的對等。

Meanwhile, China has placed more satellites in space than any country other than the United States.59 Beijing is also working on a range of counter-space and anti-satellite capabilities designed to threaten U.S. nuclear and critical military command and control assets.60 The PLA demonstrated its progress in 2007 when it conducted a successful anti-satellite test, destroying a Chinese satellite operating in the same low-earth orbit as U.S. military-imaging satellites.

同時,中國在太空中布置的衛星數量超過了除美國外的任何國家。 北京還在研究一系列反太空和反衛星能力,旨在威脅美國的核力量和關鍵軍事指揮與控制設施。2007年解放軍戰室了其進展,在一次成功的反衛星試驗中,摧毀了一顆與美國軍事成像衛星在同一低地軌道上運行的中國衛星。

The PRC has also adopted non-military stratagems to complicate U.S. military operations. Previous administrations cited nonproliferation as a bright spot in U.S.-China cooperation, but the evidence belies the rosy assessments. Despite Chinese commitments, Iran, North Korea and Syria continue to obtain WMD material and technology from Chinese entities while using Chinese territory as a transshipment point.61 According to the State Department’s annual report on international compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements, China “has failed to adhere to its November 2000 commitment to the United States not to assist ‘in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons (i.e., missiles capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kilograms to a distance of at least 300 kilometers).’”62 The report went on to note, “This failure to adhere to its November 2000 commitment is reflected in Chinese entities’ continued supply of items to missile programs of proliferation concern.”63 Beijing’s direct assistance to WMD proliferators declined after it signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1992. Yet China continues to support, or at least condone, the proliferation of WMD and missile capabilities in order to undermine the security of those whom the PRC considers regional or global adversaries.64

中國還采取非軍事策略來迷惑美國的軍事行動復雜化。雖然前幾屆政府都將防擴散作為美中合作的亮點,但證據卻掩蓋了這些樂觀的評估。盡管中國做出了承諾,但伊朗、朝鮮和敘利亞扔可持續以中國領土為轉運點中國實體獲得大規模殺傷性武器材料和技術。 根據美國國務院關於國際遵守軍控、不擴散和裁軍協議的年度報告,中國 “沒有遵守2000年11月向美國作出的承諾,即不以任何方式協助‘任何國家發展可用於運載核武器的彈道導彈(即能夠將至少500公斤的有效載荷運到至少300公裏的距離的導彈)'”。”報告還指出,”中國實體繼續供應不擴散條約限制下的導彈項目物資,反映了中國未能遵守2000年11月的承諾”。 北京在1992年簽署《核不擴散條約》後,對大規模殺傷性武器擴散者的直接援助有所減少。然而,中國繼續支持,至少是縱容大規模殺傷性武器和導彈能力的擴散,以破壞那些被中國視為地區或全球對手的國家的安全。

While the PRC uses an offset strategy to advance its objectives in the first island chain — stretching from Japan to Taiwan to the northern Philippines to northern Borneo to the Malay Peninsula — CCP leadership and military strategists believe that AI and other emerging technologies will drive a revolution in military affairs that culminates in what they call “intelligent warfare.”65 By implementing a whole-of-system strategy and driving this revolution, the CCP hopes the PLA will achieve military dominance within the next 25 years.

雖然中國采用抵消戰略來推進其在第一島鏈–從日本到臺灣到菲律賓北部到婆羅洲北部到馬來半島–的目標,但中共領導層和軍事戰略家認為,人工智能和其他新興技術將推動一場軍事事務的革命,最終達到他們所說的 “智能戰爭”。 通過實施全系統戰略並推動這場革命,中共希望解放軍能在未來25年內實現軍事主導權。

In the near-to-medium term, China will use its military capabilities, operational concepts, and overall doctrine to turn the U.S. military’s technological strengths in the Indo-Pacific into weaknesses by credibly threatening to deliver massive punishment against American power-projection forces while thwarting the United States’ ability to provide reinforcement. This would signal to regional powers a fait accompli too costly to overturn. The PRC’s strategy is not only to prevail but also to demoralize America’s friends and partners by demonstrating that the United States cannot meet its security commitments in the region — at least not quickly or at an acceptable cost. This strategy is especially pertinent to Taiwan.


Chinas Long March to Global Preeminence: Increasing Region-by- Region Influence and Reshaping International Organizations


China’s quest for preeminence — powered by economic might, cutting-edge technology, and an increasingly powerful military — proceeds outward through the Indo-Pacific to encompass the globe. It includes the reshaping of international organizations, a domain critical to the CCP’s efforts to remake the norms and standards of global governance.


The Indo-Pacific


After World War II, the United States helped to develop the Indo-Pacific’s free and open order. The PRC seeks to diminish U.S. influence by fostering a sense in the region’s nations that China’s dominance is inevitable. Prime targets include U.S. treaty-based allies — Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines — as well as emerging strategic partners such as India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan. The PRC is also undermining the security, autonomy, and economic interests of many others in the region — such as member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including those in the vital Mekong Region, as well as the nations of the Pacific Islands. Moreover, China perceives rising India as a rival and seeks to impel it to accommodate Beijing’s ambitions by engaging economically while constraining New Delhi’s strategic partnership with the United States, Japan, Australia, and its relations with other democracies.


Beijing provides digital technology and physical infrastructure to advance the CCP’s authoritarian objectives throughout the region, including Northeast Asia, the South China Sea, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands. In addition to efforts to become the region’s 5G vendor of choice, China pursues deals on airports and seaports and other infrastructure for strategic purposes — for example, a 99-year lease on Australia’s Port Darwin, a $10-billion deal to build the Philippines’s Sangley Point International Airport outside Manila, and a $1.3-billion project to construct Burma’s Kyaukphyu deep-sea port.66


China has employed campaigns of disinformation, and even interference and malign influence, against in democracies across the Indo-Pacific, including Australia, New Zealand, and Taiwan.


These and other undertakings erode democratic institutions and norms, not least through intimidation designed to compel the adoption of policies that advance China’s interests.67


In South and Central Asia, the PRC invests heavily in transportation infrastructure to expand trade routes to Eurasia and Europe and to secure the flow of energy, raw materials, and other resources. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) serves as the Belt and Road Initiative’s Central Asia flagship. CPEC also connects to the BRI’s “21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” greatly enhancing China’s access to the Middle East through Pakistan’s Gwadar port and linking to PRC projects at Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port, Bangladesh’s Chittagong port, and the Maldives’s Feydhoo Finolhu Port.68 Through Chinese companies that are often untrustworthy vendors, the CCP offers public-security solutions — featuring “command centers, CCTV cameras, intelligent video surveillance, facial and license plate recognition technology, crowd monitoring, situational awareness detection, noise monitoring or detection, abandoned object detection, and social media monitoring”69 — to countries across the region.

在南亞和中亞,中國大力投資於交通基礎設施,以擴大通往歐亞大陸和歐洲的貿易路線,確保能源、原材料和其他資源的流動。中巴經濟走廊(CPEC)是一帶一路倡議的中亞旗艦。CPEC還連接了BRI的 “21世紀海上絲綢之路”,極大地增強了中國通過巴基斯坦瓜達爾港進入中東地區的能力,並與中國在斯裏蘭卡漢班托塔港、孟加拉國吉大港和馬爾代夫費迪虎菲諾爾胡港的項目相連接。 中共通過中國公司(通常是不值得信任的供應商)向該地區各國提供公共安全解決方案–包括 “指揮中心、閉路電視攝像機、智能視頻監控、面部和車牌識別技術、人群監控、態勢感知檢測、噪音監控或檢測、遺棄物檢測和社交媒體監控”。

China supplements economic power in the Indo-Pacific with demonstrations of military capability. The PLA Air Force regularly conducts long-range bomber patrols out to the second island chain70 (stretching from Japan through the Mariana Islands and Micronesia) while the PLA Navy operates surface and sub-surface naval forces from Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean, and challenges naval and law enforcement vessels in the South China Sea and East China Sea. The PLA recently provoked skirmishes along its disputed border with India, which killed dozens on both sides, and remains in a tense standoff with India’s military. Beijing menaces democratic Taiwan, which it considers a renegade province, intending to reunify Taiwan with the Mainland — by force if necessary.71 And the PLA Navy and Chinese Coast Guard increasingly challenge Japan’s administrative control of the Senkaku Islands.72

在印太地區,中國以展示軍事能力來補充經濟實力。解放軍空軍定期在第二島鏈(從日本延伸至馬裏亞納群島和密克羅尼西亞)進行遠程轟炸機巡邏,而解放軍海軍則從東南亞到印度洋開展水面和水下海軍行動,並在南海和東海挑戰他國海軍和執法船只。解放軍最近在與印度有爭議的邊境挑起小規模沖突,造成雙方數十人死亡,並仍與印度軍方處於緊張對峙狀態。北京威脅民主的臺灣,它認為臺灣是一個叛逆的省份,打算將臺灣與大陸統一–必要時以武力統一。 而解放軍海軍和中國海岸警衛隊越來越多地挑戰日本對釣魚島的行政控制。

China flexes its muscles in the Indo-Pacific in open defiance of international law. For example, since seizing administrative control of the Scarborough Shoal following a 2012 standoff with the Philippines, China has used PLA naval and civilian patrols to assert sovereignty over the shoal. Beijing dismissed the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s 2016 ruling, which rejects the PRC’s so-called “nine-dash line” historical claims to the South China Sea and upholds the Philippines’s claim to the shoal.73 The PRC also ignored the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s 2016 ruling that the Mischief Reef in the South China Sea belongs to the Philippines’s continental shelf and falls under its Exclusive Economic Zone. In defiance of the legal judgment, China maintains a military base, harbor, and runway on the atoll.74 By deploying anti-ship cruise missiles, long-range surface-to-air missiles, and other military systems in the Spratly Islands, moreover, the PRC blatantly violates Xi’s 2015 public pledge that “China does not intend to pursue militarization” in the disputed areas.75 China intensified its maritime militarization by provoking a dispute in December 2019, over the sovereignty of Indonesia’s Natuna Islands. In June 2020, China sank a Vietnamese fishing trawler, and, also this year, engaged in a six-month standoff with Malaysia over hydrocarbon resources in the latter’s Exclusive Economic Zone.76 Finally, while China has voted for all ten rounds of United Nations sanctions against North Korea, Beijing has watered down each resolution and continues to aid the dictatorial regime in Pyongyang through the provision of food, oil, and investment.77 By reducing pressure on North Korea, China’s uneven enforcement of the sanctions regime has enabled Pyongyang to develop its nuclear weapons program.78

中國公然藐視國際法,在印太地區大秀肌肉。例如,自2012年與菲律賓對峙後奪取斯卡伯勒淺灘的行政控制權以來,中國利用解放軍海軍和民兵來維護對該淺灘的主權。北京否認常設仲裁法院2016年的裁決,該裁決駁回了中國對南海的所謂 “九段線 “歷史主張,支持菲律賓對該淺灘的主權主張。 中國也無視常設仲裁法院2016年的裁決,該裁決認定南海的美濟礁屬於菲律賓的大陸架,屬於其專屬經濟區。中國不顧法律判決,在環礁上維持軍事基地、港口和跑道。 此外,通過在南沙群島部署反艦巡航導彈、遠程地對空導彈和其他軍事設施,中國公然違反了習近平2015年在爭議地區 “中國無意推行軍事化 “的公開承諾。 2019年12月,中國挑起印尼納土納群島主權爭端,加強了海上軍事化。2020年6月,中國擊沈了一艘越南拖網漁船,同樣在今年,與馬來西亞就後者專屬經濟區的油氣資源進行了為期半年的對峙。 最後,雖然中國在聯合國對朝鮮的十輪制裁中都投了贊成票,但北京稀釋了每一項決議,並繼續通過提供糧食、石油和投資來援助平壤獨裁政權。 通過減少對朝鮮的壓力,中國不均衡地執行制裁制度,使平壤得以發展其核武器計劃。



China finds a strategic partner in Russia, a fellow authoritarian power. In recent months, U.S. government officials and other international observers have noted Beijing’s growing efforts to coordinate with Moscow to spread disinformation around the world on COVID-19.79 The current version of China’s and Russia’s strategic partnership, however, long predates the global pandemic.80 While neither a formal military alliance nor devoid of tension, this partnership is grounded in shared interests — most notably weakening U.S. power and influence — and in recent years Beijing and Moscow have substantially expanded it.81

中國與同為獨裁大國的俄羅斯成為戰略夥伴。最近幾個月,美國政府官員和其他國際觀察家註意到,北京越來越努力地與莫斯科協作,在全世界傳播關於COVID-19的虛假信息。 然而,當前版本的中俄戰略夥伴關系,早已在全球大流行之前就存在了。 雖然既不是正式的軍事聯盟,也不缺乏關系緊張時刻,但這種夥伴關系的基礎有著共同的利益—最大程度削弱美國的權力和影響力–近年來,北京和莫斯科這種夥伴關系更加緊密了。

China has intensified economic, energy, and technological ties with Russia — especially after the United States and European nations imposed sanctions in response to Moscow’s illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its continuing aggression in the eastern Ukraine. The PRC worked with Russia to increase use of the Chinese yuan and Russian ruble over the U.S. dollar in bilateral trade, in part to insulate both nations from U.S.-led financial sanctions.82 China remains Russia’s biggest trading partner,83 and Russia has emerged as one of Beijing’s top oil suppliers: Moscow dropped to number two in 2019 after Saudi Arabia’s record 83.3 million tonnes of annual oil exports to the PRC slightly eclipsed Russia’s previous record of 77.6 million tonnes.84 Beijing and Moscow also initiated a “Power of Siberia” natural gas pipeline to the PRC, a $55 billion project over the next three decades that forms part of a larger $400 billion development deal for Russian natural gas.85 In addition, Russia and China cooperate in pursuit of energy in the Arctic, though Moscow and other Arctic nations eye with varying degrees of wariness the PRC’s efforts to establish itself as a “near-Arctic state.”86

中國加強了與俄羅斯的經濟、能源和技術聯系–尤其是在美國和歐洲國家針對莫斯科2014年非法占領和吞並克裏米亞及其在烏克蘭東部的持續侵略行為實施制裁之後。中國與俄羅斯合作,在雙邊貿易中增加使用人民幣和俄羅斯盧布而不是美元,部分原因是為了使兩國免受美國主導的金融制裁。 中國仍是俄羅斯最大的貿易夥伴,俄羅斯已成為北京最大的石油供應國之一。在2019年,超越了俄羅斯7760萬噸的記錄後,沙特阿拉伯創紀錄地向中國出口8330萬噸石油,莫斯科降至第二位。 北京和莫斯科還啟動了一條通往中國的 “西伯利亞之力 “天然氣管道,該項目在未來30年內耗資550億美元,是俄羅斯天然氣4000億美元大型開發交易的一部分。 此外,俄羅斯和中國還合作在北極地區尋求能源,盡管莫斯科和其他北極國家對中國謀求成為 “近北極國家 “的努力抱有不同程度的警惕。

Beijing and Moscow share a strong interest in the race for advanced technologies, with Russian President Vladimir Putin describing the U.S.-led international campaign against China’s telecommunications giant Huawei as “the first technological war of the coming digital era.”87 Authoritarian powers deeply distrustful of their own peoples, the PRC and Russia cooperate on surveillance and artificial intelligence for security and strategic applications.88

北京和莫斯科對先進技術的競賽有著濃厚的興趣,俄羅斯總統普京將美國主導的針對中國電信巨頭華為的國際行動描述為 “即將到來的數字時代的第一場技術戰爭”。作為對本國人民深感不信任的專制大國,中國和俄羅斯在涉及安全和戰略應用的監控和人工智能方面進行合作。

The convergence in their extensive use of propaganda and disinformation reflects the growing strategic alignment between Russia and China. Like Russia, the PRC finds fertile opportunities for expanding influence in European countries that are struggling to fight endemic corruption as they build sturdy, transparent, and accountable political institutions. Both China and Russia use strategic corruption — that is, the weaponization for strategic ends of corrupt individuals, organizations, and government bodies — to weaken freedom and democracy.89 Chinese influence operations in Europe, which have accelerated amid the COVID-19 pandemic, increasingly resemble those of Russia in their aggressive use of disinformation, manipulation of social divisions, and propagation of conspiracies.

中國和俄羅斯廣泛使用宣傳和虛假信息,反映了中俄之間戰略同盟日益增強。與俄羅斯一樣,中國也發現了在歐洲國家擴大影響力的有利時機,這些國家在建立堅固、透明和負責任的政治機構的同時,征在忙於打擊地方性腐敗。中國和俄羅斯都利用戰略腐敗–即利用腐敗的個人、組織和政府機構來達到戰略目的–來削弱自由和民主。在COVID-19大流行的背景下, 中國加快了在歐洲的影響行動步伐,在積極利用虛假信息、操縱社會分裂和宣傳陰謀方面越來越像俄羅斯。

The renewed Sino-Russian partnership involves a consequential military component. Having long served as China’s principal arms supplier and exercise partner, Russia recently enhanced the types of weapons — including the S-400 air-defense system and Sovremenny-class destroyers and advanced cruise missiles for anti-ship warfare — that it sells to China.90 The partnership also has resulted in more sophisticated joint military exercises aimed at preparing for encounters with the United States and its allies and partners.91 Cooperation between Beijing and Moscow extends beyond the operational military level to include nuclear and strategic issues. In June 2019, Xi and Putin released a joint statement pledging to work together on nuclear arms-control issues and committing to maintain global strategic stability.92 A short time later, the two nations marked a new stage of strategic cooperation by conducting a joint long-range bomber patrol with nuclear-capable aircraft that violated South Korean and Japanese airspace.93  

中俄重新建立的夥伴關系涉及到一個相應的軍事部分。長期以來,俄羅斯一直是中國的主要武器供應國和演習夥伴,最近俄羅斯加強了向中國出售的武器類型–包括S-400防空系統和 “蘇維埃 “級驅逐艦以及用於反艦作戰的先進巡航導彈。 這種夥伴關系還導致了更復雜的聯合軍事演習,旨在為與美國及其盟友和夥伴的遭遇做準備。 北京和莫斯科之間的合作超越了軍事行動層面,包括核和戰略問題。2019年6月,習近平和普京發表聯合聲明,承諾在核軍控問題上共同努力,並承諾維護全球戰略穩定。 不久後,兩國聯合進行了一次攜帶核能力飛機的遠程轟炸機巡邏,侵犯了韓國和日本的領空,標誌著兩國的戰略合作進入了新階段。 

While the PRC and Russia operate as strategic partners, growing power disparities — along with the inevitable distrust that marks relations among authoritarian powers — make the establishment of a formal alliance unlikely.94 As the U.S. Economic and Security Review Commission has observed, “There are a number of areas where Beijing’s and Moscow’s national interests do not align, such as territorial claims and partnerships with countries that Russia or China consider regional rivals.”95 Moreover, Russia’s economic decline and China’s global rise — the PRC’s GDP is about eight times that of Russia’s economy, which suffers from stagnant growth and onerous sanctions96 — render Moscow the “junior partner,” raising Russian concerns that the PLA will become a military threat.97

雖然中國和俄羅斯以戰略夥伴的身份運作,但日益增長的實力差距–以及專制大國關系中不可避免的不信任–使得建立正式聯盟的可能性不大。 正如美國經濟與安全審查委員會所觀察到的那樣,”在一些領域,北京和莫斯科的國家利益並不一致,比如領土要求和與俄羅斯或中國認為是地區競爭對手的國家的夥伴關系。”  此外,俄羅斯的經濟衰退和中國的全球崛起–中國的GDP約為俄羅斯經濟的8倍,而俄羅斯則遭受增長停滯和繁重的制裁–使莫斯科成為 “初級夥伴”,這讓俄羅斯擔心解放軍會成為軍事威脅。

Europe and the UK


With their advanced economies and considerable diplomatic influence, Europe and the UK have emerged as an important front in the strategic competition between the United States and China. Knowing that a united transatlantic alliance would provide great advantages to the United States and allies and partners in the struggle over the shape of world order, the PRC wields its economic power to divide Europe and the UK from the United States and pull European nations and the British toward Beijing. Beijing does not necessarily seek allies in Europe and the UK; rather, it seeks to dissuade nations in the region from aligning with the United States and to limit the ability of Europe and the UK to unify against China. The PRC wants to convince Europe and the UK that their political future lies not in the free, open, and rules-based international order, but in a new multipolar arrangement that respects geopolitical spheres of influence and regards allegations of internal repression as infringements on national sovereignty.


As early as 2013, China identified Europe as a core component of the Belt and Road Initiative. That year, Xi introduced the Silk Road Economic Belt to “forge closer ties, deepen cooperation, and expand the development space in the Eurasian region.”98 The PRC later announced a New Eurasian Land Bridge traversing Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus and ending in Rotterdam. Beijing also proposed a China-Arctic Ocean-Europe Blue Economic passage, one of three maritime passages.99 Beyond the economic, political, and technological benefits, the PRC sees a BRI-forged direct line from Beijing to Europe as a counter to what it describe as U.S. encirclement efforts and as a way to balance against U.S. or Western encroachment in the Indo-Pacific.100

早在2013年,中國就將歐洲確定為一帶一路倡議的核心組成部分。當年,習近平提出了 “絲綢之路經濟帶”,以 “在歐亞地區建立更加緊密的聯系,深化合作,拓展發展空間”。 隨後,中國宣布了橫跨哈薩克斯坦、俄羅斯和白俄羅斯,以鹿特丹為終點的新歐亞大陸橋。北京還提出了中國-北冰洋-歐洲藍色經濟通道,這是三條海上通道之一。 除了經濟、政治和技術上的好處,中國認為,北京與歐洲之間的一帶一路直達線可以對抗它所描述的美國的圍堵努力,並作為平衡美國或西方在印度洋-太平洋地區侵占的一種方式。

Striving to persuade Europeans to pursue economic opportunities in the East, China is conducting negotiations with Brussels over an EU-China Comprehensive Investment Agreement. Between 2014 and 2019, China leveraged its initial investment in Europe’s eastern and southern periphery through a series of Memorandums of Understanding. Beijing develops these investments through what was originally called its “16+1 cooperation framework,” the nominal purpose of which was greater regional economic integration. In 2019, in the face of growing EU skepticism toward BRI, China turned the 16+1 into the 17+1 by incorporating Greece into the framework. The CCP viewed Athens’ inclusion as a victory, especially given China’s substantial investment in the port of Piraeus and the potential for greater access stemming from other investments in European ports and railroads. With a symbolic nod to the ancient Silk Road connecting the empires of Han and Rome, Italy recently became the first G7 country to sign a BRI MOU.

中國力爭說服歐洲人在東方尋求經濟機會,正在與布魯塞爾就歐盟-中國全面投資協定進行談判。2014年至2019年間,中國利用其在歐洲東部和南部周邊地區的初步投資,從而達成了一系列備忘錄。北京通過最初所謂的 “16+1合作框架 “來發展這些投資,其名義目的是加強區域經濟一體化。2019年,面對歐盟對BRI越來越多的懷疑,中國將16+1變成了17+1,將希臘納入框架。中共認為雅典的納入是一個勝利,特別是考慮到中國對比雷埃夫斯港的大量投資,以及對歐洲港口和鐵路的其他投資所帶來的更大準入潛力。意大利最近成為G7中第一個簽署BRI諒解備忘錄的國家,這象征著向連接漢帝國和羅馬帝國的古代絲綢之路致敬。

Despite skepticism in the European core, the UK, France, and Germany remain open to Chinese foreign direct investment, both to achieve greater independence from the United States and as a path out of the Eurozone’s economic struggles. The PRC has greatly increased investment in Europe — from less than $1 billion in 2008 to a high of approximately $42 billion in 2017.101 These large sums promote PRC military and technology interests and include investments in robotics, biotechnology, real estate, financial services, and infrastructure. Beijing uses its enhanced leverage to stifle meaningful criticism of its policies.


Huawei is keen to build Europe’s 5G networks. To the extent that this Chinese “national champion” succeeds, Beijing would obtain access to European states’ information flows, achieve a fuller understanding of their telecommunications vulnerabilities, acquire the ability to disrupt critical infrastructure and intercept sensitive transmissions, and accumulate enormous amounts of data crucial to refining AI algorithms.

華為熱衷於建設歐洲的5G網絡。如果這個中國的 “國家冠軍 “成功,北京將獲得歐洲國家的信息流,實現對其電信漏洞的更全面了解,獲得破壞關鍵基礎設施和攔截敏感傳輸的能力,並積累對完善人工智能算法至關重要的海量數據。

Likewise, China pursues opportunities in the civil nuclear markets across Europe, hoping to benefit from long-term partnerships, not least by obtaining control of important elements of European energy infrastructure.102 Backed by state financing, Chinese nuclear companies distort the market and undercut European and U.S. companies. The CCP has openly threatened governments in Europe that have merely paused to consider the economic and national-security costs of cooperating with China on key critical infrastructure projects.103

同樣,中共國也在歐洲各地的民用核電市場尋求機會,希望從長期的合作關系中獲益,尤其是通過獲得歐洲能源基礎設施重要要素的控制權。 在國家資金的支持下,中國核電公司扭曲市場,削弱歐洲和美國公司的實力。中國共產黨公開威脅歐洲各國政府,因為這些政府只考慮了與中共國在關鍵基礎設施項目上合作的經濟和國家安全成本。

The Middle East and Africa


In the near term, China aims to enhance its energy security in the Middle East and obtain market access to extend the Belt and Road Initiative and other PRC interests. Beijing also actively engages with the Iranian regime and Syria’s Assad regime, both of which face significant U.S. and international sanctions and also are U.S.-designated State Sponsors of Terrorism, proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, and egregious abusers of human rights. At the same time, the PRC’s brutal repression of millions of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang raises profound questions of conscience in particular for Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East and around the world. In the long term, China seeks to increase its economic and security influence in the region at the expense of the United States.104

短期內,中國的目標是加強在中東的能源安全,並獲得市場準入,以擴大 “一帶一路 “倡議和其他中國利益。北京還積極與伊朗政權和敘利亞阿薩德政權接觸,這兩個政權都面臨著美國和國際社會的嚴厲制裁,同時也是美國指定的恐怖主義國家支持者、大規模殺傷性武器擴散者和嚴重的人權侵犯者。同時,中國對新疆數百萬維吾爾族和其他突厥族穆斯林的殘酷鎮壓,使得中東和全世界穆斯林占多數的國家引起了良知方面的深刻思考。從長遠來看,中國試圖以犧牲美國為代價來增強其在該地區的經濟和安全影響力。

Beijing’s reliance on oil imports from the Middle East has grown tremendously in the last two decades, rising from 0.33 million barrels per day in 1998 to just over 4 million barrels per day in 2018.105 Meanwhile, the PLA Navy visits the region with an eye to developing deep-water ports like that of Salalah in Oman. China also wants to expand military sales — for example, Chinese defense companies sell unmanned aerial vehicles at cut-rate prices with little-to-no regard for nonproliferation106 — and expand security cooperation with regional states in other ways. This undermines U.S. defense companies. It also endangers regional partners’ access to U.S. military networks, eroding U.S. military interoperability and other forms of cooperation with regional partners.

在過去的20年裏,北京對從中東進口石油的依賴程度大大增加,從1998年的每天0.33萬桶增加到2018年的每天400多萬桶。 同時,解放軍海軍訪問該地區,著眼於開發像阿曼薩拉拉赫那樣的深水港。中共國還想擴大軍售–例如,中共國國防企業以削價出售無人駕駛飛行器,幾乎不考慮防擴散問題–並以其他方式擴大與地區國家的安全合作。這損害了美國國防公司的利益。它還危及地區夥伴對美國軍事網絡的訪問,削弱了美國與地區夥伴的軍事互操作性和其他形式的合作。

China sees a particularly appealing target for the Belt and Road Initiative in Israel, which possesses an innovative high-tech economy with few barriers to entry.107 Perhaps the most controversial of several projects underway is the Shanghai International Port Group’s partial construction and operation of a new terminal at the Haifa port, which also serves as the strategic port for the U.S. Navy 6th Fleet. If Chinese workers obtain “high levels of access to potentially sensitive commercial or military information,” the United States will face surveillance and cyber-espionage risks.108

中共國認為一帶一路倡議的目標特別吸引人,因為以色列擁有創新的高科技經濟,幾乎沒有進入壁壘。 在正在進行的幾個項目中,最具爭議的或許是上海國際港務集團在海法港建設和運營部分新碼頭,該港口也是美國海軍第六艦隊的戰略港口。如果中國工人獲得 “高度接觸潛在敏感商業或軍事信息的機會”,美國將面臨監控和網絡間諜風險。

In Africa, the PRC is bent on acquiring vast amounts of the continent’s abundant raw materials and mineral wealth to provide Chinese manufacturing with key components while disadvantaging companies in the United States and allied countries. Largely debt-financed, China’s projects in Africa often fail to meet reasonable international standards of sustainability and transparency, and burden local economies with heavy debt and other problems.109 China also expands its influence in African states by aggressively cultivating high-level relationships. General Secretary Xi, China’s premier, and the PRC’s foreign minister, for example, collectively made 79 visits to Africa between 2007 and 2017.110 At the same time, nationals from African countries who work in the PRC frequently face racism and discrimination, a problem that drew international outrage amid Beijing’s domestic reaction to the novel coronavirus.111

在非洲,中國一意孤行地獲取大量非洲大陸豐富的原材 料和礦產資源,為中國制造業提供關鍵零部件,同時使美 國和盟國的公司處於不利地位。中國在非洲的項目大多由債務融資,往往不符合可持續性和透明度的合理國際標準,並給當地經濟帶來沈重的債務和其他問題。 中國還通過積極培育高層關系來擴大在非洲國家的影響力。例如,中國總理習總書記和中國外長在2007年至2017年期間集體對非洲進行了79次訪問。 與此同時,在中國工作的非洲國家國民經常面臨種族主義和歧視,在北京國內對新型冠狀病毒的反應中,這個問題引起了國際社會的憤怒。

In 2017, China established in Djibouti its first foreign military base. The base looks out on the Bab-el-Mandeb Straits in the Gulf of Aden, through which passes nearly 10 percent of the world’s total seaborne-traded petroleum. This comprises 6.2 billion barrels per day of crude oil, condensate, and refined petroleum.112 Together with China’s anti-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden and growing presence in the Gulf of Guinea, the base has extended China’s military reach off Africa’s coasts and into the Indian Ocean.113

2017年,中國在吉布提建立了第一個外國軍事基地。該基地眺望亞丁灣的曼德海峽(Bab-el-Mandeb Straits),世界海運貿易石油總量的近10%通過該海峽。其中包括每天62億桶原油、凝析油和成品油。 加上中國在亞丁灣的反海盜活動和在幾內亞灣日益增長的存在,該基地將中國的軍事觸角延伸到了非洲沿海和印度洋。

Western Hemisphere


China’s geopolitical influence stretches deep into America’s backyard. Beijing accelerated bilateral trade investment in Latin America after the 2008 financial crisis to acquire extensive stakes in the region’s petroleum, mining, and energy sectors. China’s Huawei and ZTE are among the region’s top providers of telecommunications equipment and networks as well as of surveillance architectures — all of which pose espionage risks.114 In addition, Beijing pursues nuclear contracts in Brazil and Argentina, not only furnishing preliminary financing but also, in Argentina’s case, offering a slush fund of more than $2 billion for use as the government sees fit.115 Meanwhile, poorer Latin American countries export commodities and foodstuffs to the PRC while importing increasingly high-value Chinese manufacturing and technology goods. Loaning far more than it invests, the PRC often requires Latin American countries to repay in commodities, yielding resource security for China while incentivizing corruption abroad.

中國的地緣政治影響力深入到美國的後院。2008年金融危機後,北京加快了對拉美的雙邊貿易投資,在該地區的石油、礦業和能源行業獲得了廣泛的股權。中國的華為和中興通訊是該地區電信設備和網絡以及監控架構的頂級供應商,所有這些都會帶來間諜風險。 此外,北京還在巴西和阿根廷尋求核電合同,不僅提供初步融資,而且在阿根廷的案例中,還提供了20多億美元的專項基金,供政府酌情使用。  與此同時,較貧窮的拉美國家向中國出口商品和食品,同時進口價值越來越高的中國制造和技術產品。中國提供的貸款遠遠多於投資,經常要求拉美國家以商品還 款,為中國提供資源保障,同時鼓勵海外腐敗。

As the world’s biggest oil importer, China regards Venezuela — possessor of the world’s largest oil reserves — as an important partner. The PRC began lending to Venezuela to obtain oil, signing “loans-for-oil” agreements with former President Hugo Chavez.116 The largest recipient in South America of Chinese official finance, Venezuela has accepted more than $60 billion in loans from the China Development Bank (CDB) since 2007 in exchange for future oil shipments.117

作為世界上最大的石油進口國,中國將擁有世界上最大石油儲備的委內瑞拉視為重要的合作夥伴。中國開始向委內瑞拉提供貸款以獲得石油,與前總統烏戈-查韋斯簽署了 “貸款換石油 “協議。 委內瑞拉是南美地區中國官方融資的最大接受國,自2007年以來,委內瑞拉已經接受了中國開發銀行(CDB)超過600億美元的貸款,以換取未來的石油運輸。

In addition, Beijing takes advantage of the Western Hemisphere to further its ambitions in outer space. China has conducted nearly a dozen satellite launches from Latin American states and operates space observatories in Chile and a deep-space radar in Argentina.118


The United States and Canada are by no means exempt from China’s influence operations.119 The PRC targets key U.S. technological and economic sectors — at the national, state, and local levels — using cyberattacks, theft, and other methods to transfer to China valuable information, data, and technology. In Canada, where the government has yet to make a final decision on 5G vendors, Huawei partners with companies to bring high-speed internet access to remote communities. The United States and Canada also rely on China as a supplier for a number of critical minerals. At the same time, China’s state-owned and state-directed companies — including those sanctioned by the United States and linked to China’s military modernization, espionage, and human rights abuses — enjoy active and passive investment from a number of the public pension funds in various U.S. states.120 As the price of doing business in China, the CCP demands that American and Canadian businesses — from finance and industry to media and professional sports — toe the party line, which companies often do. And the PRC exploits consulates in the United States as platforms to steal American intellectual property.121

美國和加拿大也絕不能幸免於中國的影響行動。 中國的目標是美國的關鍵技術和經濟部門–在國家、州和地方層面–利用網絡攻擊、盜竊和其他方法向中國轉移有價值的信息、數據和技術。在加拿大,政府還沒有對5G供應商做出最終決定,華為與公司合作,為偏遠社區帶來高速互聯網接入。美國和加拿大還依賴中國作為一些關鍵礦產的供應商。與此同時,中國的國有和國家指導的公司–包括那些被美國制裁的、與中國軍事現代化、間諜活動和侵犯人權有關的公司–享有美國各州一些公共養老基金的主動和被動投資。 作為在中國做生意的代價,中共要求美國和加拿大的企業–從金融和工業到媒體和職業體育–都要服從黨的路線,而這些公司往往都會這樣做。而中國利用駐美領事館作為平臺,竊取美國知識產權。

The PRC commits serious abuses in American higher education. Although in many cases China obtains technological knowledge from the United States through legitimate and productive academic exchanges, it also acquires such expertise illegally through the Thousand Talents Program and other state-run or party-run recruitment efforts. Recent cases at the University of Kansas and Harvard illustrate the dangers.122 Furthermore, while the United States welcomes Chinese students to introduce them to the blessings of political freedom, the CCP has an interest in conscripting Chinese nationals studying abroad to advance the interests of communist dictatorship. Indeed, the PRC punishes Chinese students studying in the United States for dissenting from official CCP views and for otherwise speaking freely.123 Universities’ financial dependence on tuition dollars from China complicates matters: in recent

years, American universities have intentionally admitted more Chinese nationals because they, unlike many American students, pay ballooning tuition costs in full.124 At the graduate and undergraduate level, China sends more students to the United States than any other country.125 And Beijing uses Confucius Institutes not only to promulgate CCP-approved views about China and the world but also to press U.S. universities to censor discussion, curtail inquiry, and generally conform to CCP dogma and political objectives.126

中國嚴重濫用美國高等教育。盡管在許多情況下,中國通過合法和富有成效的學術交流從美國獲得技術知識,但它也通過 “千人計劃 “和其他國營或黨營的招聘活動非法獲得這些專業知識。最近在堪薩斯大學和哈佛大學發生的案件就說明了這種危險。 此外,雖然美國歡迎中國學生並向他們介紹政治自由的好處,但中共對征召中國公民出國留學有興趣,以推進共產主義專政的利益。事實上,中共懲罰在美國留學的中國學生當中持和中共官方的觀點相左的人或自由發言的人。大學對來自中國的學費的財政依賴使問題變得更加復雜:近年來,美國大學有意招收更多的中國公民,因為他們與許多美國學生不同,全額支付膨脹的學費。 在研究生和本科生階段,中國向美國輸送的學生比其他任何國家都多。 而中國政府不僅利用孔子學院頒布中共認可的關於中國和世界的觀點,而且還向美國大學施壓,要求它們審查討論,限制探究,並要求校方符合中共的教條和政治目標。

Transforming International Organizations from Within


Beijing continues to throw its weight around at the United Nations and in other international organizations to align these institutions with China’s transformative ambitions. China generally delivers higher levels of development assistance to countries voting with it in the UN General Assembly.127 As a veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council, the PRC — in cooperation with Russia — has frustrated significant measures proposed by the United States and European nations to address challenges in Syria, Ukraine, North Korea, Venezuela, Iran, and elsewhere. To advance its revisionist agenda and counter U.S. efforts to promote transparency and accountability, the PRC vigorously pursues leadership positions, using its voting advantages as a member of the Group of 77 at the United Nations and in the Non- Aligned Movement.128 A growing number of PRC citizens now serve as heads of international organizations — including the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) — and in other top-level leadership and management positions at such organizations.129 China tries to insert into multilateral documents communist language derived from so-called Xi Jinping Thought and references to the Belt and Road Initiative and other signature efforts to give China’s communist propaganda a UN imprimatur.130 Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, China provided a dramatic illustration of abuse of the international system, compelling the World Health Organization to comply with Beijing’s self-serving preferences — including the exclusion of Taiwan.

北京繼續在聯合國和其他國際組織中施加壓力,使這些機構與中國的轉型雄心保持一致。一般來說,中國向在聯合國大會和其投相同票的國家提供的發展援助較高。 作為聯合國安理會擁有否決權的成員,中國與俄羅斯合作,挫敗了美國和歐洲國家為應對敘利亞、烏克蘭、朝鮮、委內瑞拉、伊朗和其他地區的挑戰而提出的重大措施。為了推進其修正主義議程,對抗美國促進透明度和問責制的努力,中國利用其作為77國集團成員在聯合國和不結盟運動中的投票優勢,積極爭取領導地位。 越來越多的中國公民現在擔任國際組織–包括國際電信聯盟(ITU)、國際民用航空組織(ICAO)、聯合國工業發展組織(UNIDO)和糧食及農業組織(FAO)–的負責人,並在這些組織中擔任其他高層領導和管理職務。 中國試圖在多邊文件中插入源自所謂的習近平思想的共產主義語言,並提及 “一帶一路 “倡議和其他簽字努力,以使中國的共產主義宣傳得到聯合國的認可。 在COVID-19大流行期間,中國提供了一個濫用國際體系的戲劇性例子,迫使世界衛生組織遵從北京的自私偏好–包括排除臺灣。

Over the long run, the CCP views international organizations as an opportunity — to shield its abusive development practices and egregious human rights record from criticism, and to gradually adjust global norms, standards, and institutions to socialism’s tenets.




Viewed as a whole, the major components of China’s conduct — preservation of a Marxist- Leninist dictatorship; leveraging of the country’s wealth to produce economic dependence and political subordination abroad and to reorient international organizations from within around CCP criteria and goals; and development of a world-class military — reveal a great power that sees the transformation of international order as critical to its plans to dominate world affairs. The PRC’s interests and ambitions have not developed accidentally, nor do they simply reflect China’s geopolitical circumstances. They give expression to ideas rooted in 20th-century communist ideology and the party’s extreme interpretation of Chinese nationalism. These ideas are the intellectual sources of China’s conduct.


  1. The Intellectual Sources of Chinas Conduct


Many misunderstand the shape and significance of China’s conduct because they disregard the Chinese Communist Party’s ideas about communism, about China, and about the world. In the United States, this neglect of ideas is sometimes rooted in the supposition that all governments want the freedom for their people in which the United States was conceived and to which it remains dedicated. At other times, the neglect stems from an unrealistic internationalism that downplays power in politics or an unrealistic geopolitical realism that discounts the political significance of opinion, culture, and tradition. The China challenge demands a more reasonable approach, one that honors principle in the execution of prudent judgment by taking seriously both interests and ideas.131 Instead of imposing America’s self-image on China or foisting America’s preconceived notions about international politics on world affairs, it is crucial to examine the CCP’s understanding of its short-term priorities, long­-term objectives, and rightful place among nations in order to grasp how, and the purposes for which, the PRC exercises power.

許多人誤解中國行為的形態和意義,是因為他們忽視了中國共產黨關於共產主義、關於中國、關於世界的思想。在美國,這種對思想的忽視有時根源於這樣一種假設,即所有政府都希望自己的人民享有自由,而美國正是在這種自由中被孕育出來的,並且仍然致力於這種自由。在其他時候,這種忽視源於一種不切實際的國際主義,這種國際主義淡化了政治中的權力,或者是一種不切實際的地緣政治現實主義,這種地緣政治現實主義忽視了輿論、文化和傳統的政治意義。面對中國的挑戰,我們需要一個更加切合實際的方法,一種通過認真對待利益和思想,在執行審慎判斷時尊重原則的方法。 與其將美國的自我形象強加給中國,或者將美國對國際政治的先入為主的觀念強加給世界事務,不如審視中國共產黨對其短期優先事項、長期目標以及其在國家中的合法地位的理解,從而把握中國如何行使權力以及行使權力的目的。

It is reasonable to wonder to what extent CCP statements, speeches, and authoritative writings are designed for domestic consumption — to preach to the faithful, to demonize dissenters, and to define the full range of the regime’s supposed enemies — and to what extent they reflect the party’s core convictions and essential thinking. But without examining them, one cannot determine whether CCP statements, speeches, and authoritative writings are only rhetorical weapons of great-power competition or also expressions of deep-seated beliefs and abiding aims and aspirations. Such examination discloses a tight connection between the CCP’s words and deeds. As John Garnaut argues. “There is no ambiguity in Xi’s project. We see in everything he does and — even in a system designed to be opaque and deceptive — we can see it in his words.132

我們有理由懷疑,中共的聲明、講話和權威性著作在多大程度上是為了國內消費–向信眾說教、妖魔化異己、全面定義政權的假想敵–以及在多大程度上反映了黨的核心信念和基本思想。但如果不對它們進行考察,就無法確定中共的聲明、講話和權威性著作是否只是大國競爭的修辭武器,還是也表達了根深蒂固的信念和持久的目標和願望。這樣的考察披露了中共的言行之間的緊密聯系。正如約翰·加諾特(John Garnaut)所認為的那樣。”習近平的項目沒有任何模糊性。我們從他所做的每一件事中都能看到,而且–即使在一個被設計成不透明和具有欺騙性的系統中–我們也能從他的言語中看到。

China’s pursuit of global preeminence and drive to remake world order flow from the CCP’s overarching sensibility. That sensibility is authoritarian, collectivist, and imperial. Two streams of ideas nourish it. Seminal CCP writings and speeches proclaim cardinal tenets of Marxism- Leninism as interpreted by successive Chinese communist leaders beginning with Mao Zedong, CCP chairman from 1943 to 1976 and the PRC’s founding ruler. CCP writings and speeches also espouse an extreme interpretation of Chinese nationalism. The result is an ideological stance that is neither strictly communist nor purely nationalist, but resolutely authoritarian, collectivist, and imperialist.


Although both communism and nationalism are compatible with authoritarianism, collectivism, and imperialism, communism and nationalism are generally seen as opposing ideologies. Communism, as Marx taught, culminates in a single, worldwide, classless society. In pursuit of that goal, communist parties have tended to be authoritarian, collectivist, and imperialist. Nationalism emphasizes a particular people and its distinctive traditions and sense of political destiny; it varies as customs, practices, and political experiences vary. Accordingly, national traditions can be drawn on to justify repression and conquest but also to vindicate the claims of freedom and democracy — as, for example, in the United States, whose founding principles and constitutional system revolve around individual liberty, human equality, and government grounded in the consent of the governed. The CCP reconciles the conflicting imperatives of Marxism-Leninism and its extreme intrepretation of Chinese nationalism by assigning to China the dominant role in interpreting the ultimate configuration of, achieving, and administering international socialism.


Neither the communist authoritarianism the CCP has imposed on the people in China nor its hyper-nationalism are inevitable. Indeed, prominent alternatives to CCP authoritarianism have prospered in the region. No less steeped in Confucian traditions than the population of the People’s Republic of China, the people of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea embraced freedom and democracy.


Nevertheless, because the Chinese Communist Party calls the shots in China, the party’s ideas about communism must be well understood. So too must the traditional political ideas that the party draws on be taken into account.133 Grasping both brings into focus the authoritarian, collectivist, and imperial synthesis that drives the CCP’s conduct.


The CCPs Communism


In 1954, Mao stated, “The force at the core that leads our cause is the Chinese Communist Party; the theoretical foundation that guides our thinking is Marxism-Leninism.”134 Daniel Tobin has underscored the continuity of the party’s ideological convictions: “In his first speech to a Politburo group study session as general secretary in November 2012, Xi [Jinping] echoed each of his post-Mao predecessors in insisting: ‘Only socialism can save China, and only Chinese socialism can lead our country to development.’”135 And only socialism, from the party’s point of view, can confer upon China its deserved role in world affairs. The CCP aims to make China “a global leader in terms of power and global influence,” as Xi stated in 2017, by strengthening socialism as its “path, theory, system, culture.” Following former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, Xi calls this approach “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”136

1954年,毛澤東指出:”領導我們事業的核心力量是中國共產黨,指導我們思想的理論基礎是馬克思列寧主義。”  丹尼爾-托賓強調了黨的思想信念的連續性。”2012年11月,習[近平]作為總書記在政治局集體學習會上的第一次講話中,呼應了毛澤東之後的每一位前輩,堅持:’只有社會主義才能救中國,只有中國社會主義才能引領我國發展’。”  而從黨的觀點來看,只有社會主義才能賦予中國在世界事務中應有的作用。正如習近平在2017年所言,中國共產黨的目標是通過加強社會主義這個 “道路、理論、制度、文化”,使中國 “成為全球力量和全球影響力的領導者”。繼中國前領導人鄧小平之後,習近平將這種做法稱為 “中國特色社會主義”。

In governing China, the CCP adheres to familiar features of 20th-century Marxism-Leninism. The party is supreme. It acts on the assumption that the communist end sanctifies all means. It absorbs the state, subordinating the individual to the collectivity. It directs the economy (even as it permits a degree of private ownership and creates limited space for market forces). It controls education, media, culture, and religion. It regularly purges counterrevolutionary forces. It preaches the priority of socialism’s struggle to defeat international capitalism and political freedom. It proclaims the inevitability of socialism’s victory, which, it maintains, the scientific laws of social and economic development guarantee. And it promulgates among the people a rigid ideology from which it tolerates no dissent


Ideological indoctrination is among the party’s paramount concerns. The CCP imposes conformity of thought and action, for example, through the Great Firewall of China, which censors the internet, and a national “social credit” system that rewards good behavior and punishes bad behavior. To control information and surveil the population, “Chinese authorities are knitting together old and state-of-the-art technologies — phone scanners, facial-recognition cameras, face and fingerprint databases and many others.”137 Meanwhile, Xi is determined to put the power of the state behind the one and only legitimate understanding of economics, politics, and international relations. “We will work harder to study and develop Marxist theory,” he vowed in 2017. “We will foster a Marxist-style of learning, and make it regular practice and an institutionalized requirement for all Party members….”138

思想灌輸是該黨最關心的問題之一。中國共產黨強行規定思想和行動的一致性,例如,通過審查互聯網的中國長城,以及獎勵良好行為和懲罰不良行為的國家 “社會信用 “系統。為了控制信息和監視民眾,”中國當局正在將舊的和最先進的技術–手機掃描儀、面部識別相機、人臉和指紋數據庫等編織在一起。”  同時,習近平致力於將國家權利集中於一人之手,並致力於對經濟,政治,國際關系的合法化理解。”我們將更加努力地學習和發展馬克思主義理論,”他在2017年發誓。”我們將培養馬克思主義的學習方式,並使之成為全體黨員的經常性實踐和制度化要求….”

In a landmark 1979 speech, Deng announced the Four Cardinal Principles, which distill the CCP’s communist convictions: “1) We must keep to the socialist road; 2) We must uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat; 3) We must uphold the leadership of the Communist Party; 4) We must uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.”139 In 1982, the CCP wrote the Four Cardinal Principles into the PRC Constitution; the principles also form an essential part of the party’s constitution. Since then, party leaders have emphasized that the CCP’s loosening of state control of the economy in some areas beginning in the late 1970s — a decisive factor in unleashing China’s economic potential and propelling China to great-power status — did not diminish China’s dedication to communism. In 2019, Xi lavishly celebrated the 40th anniversary of the declaration of the Four Cardinal Principles.140

鄧小平在1979年發表了具有裏程碑意義的講話,宣布了 “四項基本原則”,濃縮了中國共產黨的共產主義信念。”1、必須堅持走社會主義道路;2、必須堅持無產階級專政;3、必須堅持共產黨的領導;4、必須堅持馬克思列寧主義、毛澤東思想。”  1982年,中國共產黨將 “四項基本原則 “寫入《中華人民共和國憲法》,這些原則也是黨章的重要組成部分。此後,黨的領導人強調,中共從上世紀70年代末開始在一些領域放松國家對經濟的控制–這是釋放中國經濟潛力、推動中國走向大國地位的決定性因素–並沒有減少中國對共產主義事業追求的熱衷。2019年,習近平奢華慶祝 “四項基本原則 “宣布40周年。

Central to the CCP’s understanding of world affairs is the Marxist teaching that throughout history human societies have been divided into an oppressed class and an oppressor class. In the modern era, the emergence of two opposed economic and political systems dividing the world heightens the contradiction. On one side, according to the Marxist view, stands capitalism, with its fraudulent commitment to a political and economic freedom that inherently exploits the individual. On the other side, Marxism teaches, stands communism, based on central planning and the conscription of the people in service to the party, and devoted to what communism believes to be true human emancipation.141


Xi embraces this Manichean view of world affairs. In 2013, shortly after he came to power, the CCP issued “Document No. 9,” which enumerated seven perils to Chinese society emanating from the West. 142 These include constitutional democracy, human rights, free speech, robust civic participation, and a vigorous free market. Daniel Tobin stresses that for the CCP, “individual human rights, including freedom of speech, assembly, and religion are to be subjugated in the name of the collective ends of security, development, and the Chinese nation’s status in the world.”143 At the 19th Party Congress in 2017, the CCP reaffirmed that China offered a new model of socialism that would prevail in the great struggle with capitalism and, by so doing, overcome the division between oppressor and oppressed and bring harmony to world affairs. As some Central Party School scholars have noted, the party intends to replace the post-World War II order which, in its view, is grounded in unjust Western political and economic principles, with a new one rooted in the CCP’s socialism.144 Despite Xi’s promises of “win-win” deals with the outside world, a recurring phrase from internal CCP directives proclaims the encounter between capitalism and socialism to be a matter of “you die, I live.”

習近平接受了這種摩尼教式的世界觀。2013年,他上臺不久,中共發布了 “9號文件”,列舉了中國社會面臨的來自西方的七大危險。  其中包括憲政民主、人權、言論自由、強有力的公民參與和充滿活力的自由市場。丹尼爾-托賓強調,對中共來說,”個人的人權,包括言論自由、集會自由和宗教自由,都要以有礙安全,發展以及中華民族在世界上的地位為名而受到壓制。” 在2017年的黨的十九大上,中國共產黨重申,中國提供了一種社會主義新模式,這種新模式將在與資本主義的偉大鬥爭中取得勝利,並以此克服壓迫者與被壓迫者之間的分歧,使世界事務和諧發展。正如一些中央黨校學者所指出的那樣,該黨打算用根植於中共社會主義的新秩序取代二戰後的秩序,因為在該黨看來,二戰後的秩序是建立在不公正的西方政治和經濟原則之上的。盡管習近平承諾與外界進行 “雙贏 “交易,但中共內部指令中反復出現的一句話卻宣稱,資本主義和社會主義的交鋒是 “你死我活 “的問題。

According to the CCP, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc communist countries betrayed the cause, which compelled China to lead the struggle for socialism. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and the emergence of a post-Cold War international order that welcomed fledgling Eastern European democracies, the CCP — though governing the world’s most populous country — saw China as greatly outnumbered in a perilous geopolitical environment.145 Since then, the accumulation of economic clout and military power have fortified the CCP’s belief that China is socialism’s savior and herald of an alternative world order.


Notwithstanding the CCP’s unswerving professions of fidelity to the fundamental tenets of Marxism-Leninism, decisive features of the PRC’s conduct resist explanation in strictly communist terms. The CCP’s determination to indoctrinate the nation with an extreme theory of Chinese moral and institutional superiority is not drawn from the Marxism-Leninism playbook.146 While communism aims to create a universal and classless international order, the CCP seeks to export the Chinese model of authoritarian governance and create economic dependence on Beijing in nation-states around the world. And whereas communism envisages the eventual withering away of the state, the CCP has made a paramount national priority of rectifying the indignities and injustices that it believes China has suffered at the hands of the West — starting with the recovery of what the party asserts as the Chinese nation’s rightful rule over Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the South China Sea.

盡管中國共產黨堅定不移地表示忠於馬列主義的基本原則,但中國行為的決定性特征卻無法用嚴格的共產主義術語來解釋。中國共產黨決心向全國人民灌輸中國道德和制度優越性的極端理論,並不是從馬克思列寧主義的演義中得出的。 共產主義的目標是建立一個普遍的、無階級的國際秩序,而中共則試圖輸出中國的專制治理模式,在全世界的民族國家中制造對北京的經濟依賴。共產主義設想的是國家的最終消亡,而中國共產黨則把糾正它認為中國在西方國家手中遭受的侮辱和不公正作為國家的首要任務–從恢復該黨宣稱的中華民族對香港、臺灣和南中國海的合法統治開始。

These defining components of China’s conduct derive support from the CCP’s hyper-nationalist convictions.


The CCPs Chinese Nationalism


At no point in its long history has China embraced the idea — assumed by liberal democracies and affirmed by the United Nations — of sovereign equality among nations grounded in respect for rights inherent in all persons. Instead, traditional Chinese thinking about government encompasses a strategic outlook that asserts China’s right and responsibility to rule the world “under heaven” through its uniquely refined culture and institutions. This strategic outlook also comprises views about China’s proper position in world affairs, the flow of history, military strategy and tactics, economic power, and domestic political order.147

在其漫長的歷史中,中國從未接受過自由民主國家所假定的、聯合國所確認的、以尊重所有人固有權利為基礎的國家間主權平等的理念。相反,中國傳統的政府思維包含了一種戰略觀,主張中國有權利和責任通過其獨特的文化和制度來統治 “天下”。這種戰略觀還包括對中國在世界事務中的適當地位、歷史流變、軍事戰略和戰術、經濟實力和國內政治秩序的看法。

First, traditional Chinese thinking sees China as the “Middle Kingdom,” the central state surrounded by lesser states.

首先,中國傳統思想認為中國是 “中原”,中央國家被小國包圍。

Second, traditional Chinese thinking understands history cyclically. While the fortunes of particular Chinese dynastic empires wax and wane, China remains at the center and deserving of exalted status.


Third, traditional Chinese thinking is marked by a long view of military strategy and tactics. Military power should be accumulated, stored, and showcased publicly but only to the extent necessary to dissuade adversaries from compelling China to use it. Tactics revolve around the slow, incremental acquisition of positions so that opponents only grasp after it’s too late that they are surrounded and face overwhelming power with no reasonable choice but to submit. Sometimes an opponent will suffer a crisis that creates “an auspicious moment” for the landing of a decisive blow.

第三,中國傳統思維的特點是對軍事戰略和戰術有長遠的看法。軍事力量應該積累、儲存和公開展示,但只在必要的程度上勸阻對手不要強迫中國使用它。戰術圍繞著緩慢的、漸進式的陣地獲取,使對手只有在被包圍後,面對壓倒性的力量,沒有合理的選擇,只能屈服時,才會把握住。有時對手會遭遇危機,為決定性打擊的落地創造 “吉時”。

Fourth, traditional Chinese thinking views economic power as a primary component of imperial power. China should use its advantages in size and excellence to convey to partners in commerce the benefits of acquiescing to a China-dominated system.


Fifth, traditional Chinese thinking features authoritarian proclivities. It is characterized by a statism that directs economics and society. It is home to a legalism that employs a strict penal code to create the domestic stability that allows for the building of wealth and military might. And it sees political power as properly residing in an elite bureaucracy rather than springing from the people.


This is not to deny the depth and crosscutting complexity of Chinese tradition and the richness of the moral, philosophical, and religious ideas within it.148 Nor is it to suggest that freedom and democracy cannot flourish in China, as they do in Taiwan and South Korea, and did in Hong Kong. It is to observe, rather, that the CCP draws on certain prominent components of traditional Chinese thinking to bolster the conviction that authoritarian government undergirds China’s manifest superiority and inherent centrality. That conviction is as basic to the CCP’s self-understanding as is the communist dogma of intractable class conflict until capitalism’s demise.


All of the CCP’s paramount leaders, from Mao to Xi, have affirmed China’s nationalist  prerogatives, envisaging China as the “big country” or “major country,” which should not be resisted by “little countries.” In the early decades of CCP rule, however, China’s economy was relatively small and weak. Because of the need to modernize and accumulate wealth and power, Xi’s predecessors tended to balance Chinese assertiveness with accommodation and compromise. Deng famously counseled that China should “bide its time, and hide its capabilities.” Early in the post-Cold War era, the PRC’s growing engagement in regional and international institutions — from the ASEAN Regional Forum to the World Trade Organization — created an image of moderation that encouraged the belief that Beijing would play fair and sometime soon embrace the norms of freedom and democracy.

從毛澤東到習近平,中共的最高領導人都肯定了中國的民族主義特權,設想中國是 “大國 “或 “大國”,不應受到 “小國 “的抵制。但在中共執政初期的幾十年裏,中國的經濟規模相對較小,實力較弱。由於現代化和積累財富與權力的需要,習近平的前任們傾向於在中國的強硬與通融、妥協之間取得平衡。鄧小平有一個著名的忠告:中國應該 “韜光養晦”。在後冷戰時代的早期,中國越來越多地參與地區以及國際組織–從東盟地區論壇到世界貿易組織–創造了一個溫和的形象,促使人們相信北京會公平競爭,並在不久的將來接納自由和民主的規範準則。

However, underneath PRC rhetoric lay the CCP’s steadfast belief in China’s status as the “big country” and the need to protect the nation’s sovereignty against foreign influence. In the 1990s, former PLA Navy Chief Liu Huaqing repeatedly told his American counterparts that the problem was not China, the big country, bullying the little countries, but the other way around — that is, the little countries bullying the big country.149 “China is a big country and other countries are little countries, and that’s just a fact,” China’s then-Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi explained to his Singapore counterpart in 2010.150 Although insisting that China would act benevolently toward “smaller countries” in the dispute over maritime claims in the South China Sea, PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated in March 2014 that “we will never accept unreasonable demands from little countries.”151 Similarly, China’s state-run media — most notably the jingoistic Global Times — justifies Beijing’s bellicosity toward its many neighbors as “punitive” actions undertaken to teach the little countries to submit to the big country.152

然而,在中國的華麗辭藻的掩蓋下,卻隱藏著中國 “大國”地位以及其國家主權不容受外國國家幹預的強烈理念。上世紀90年代,前解放軍海軍總司令劉華清曾多次對美國同行說,問題不是中國這個大國欺負小國,而是反過來,即小國欺負大國。”中國是大國,其他國家是小國,這只是一個事實。”2010年,中國時任外交部長楊潔篪向新加坡同行解釋。雖然堅持認為中國會在南海海洋權益爭端中對 “小國 “采取仁慈的行動,但中國外交部長王毅在2014年3月表示,”我們絕不會接受小國的無理要求”。 同樣,中國的國營媒體–最著名的戰狼外交媒體是《環球時報》–將北京對其眾多鄰國的好戰行為辯解為為了教導小國向大國屈服而采取的 “懲罰性 “行動。

Xi can be assertive because of the fruits of his predecessors’ patience and determination, and because of the failure of liberal democracies — for fear of damaging commercial relations with the PRC — to put pressure on Beijing for bad behavior. China’s size and recently developed strength enable Xi to energetically pursue “Big Country Diplomacy” (or “Major Country 34 Diplomacy”). Such diplomacy is bolstered by party propaganda and growing international influence,153 and champions the nationalist privileges and prerogatives to which the CCP remains dedicated.154

習近平之所以能夠自信,是因為他的前任們耐心和決心的成果,也因為自由民主國家–因為擔心損害與中國的商業關系–未能對北京的不良行為施加壓力。中國的規模和最近發展起來的實力使習近平能夠精力充沛地推行 “大國外交”(或 “主要國家34外交”)。這種外交得到了黨的宣傳和日益增長的國際影響力的支持,並宣揚了中共一直奉行的民族主義特權。

Even as the CCP proclaims China’s supremacy among nations and indoctrinates the people with a belief in the PRC’s paramount status, the party has for decades fostered in China an acute sense of historical victimhood and national shame. The CCP traces the nation’s grievances to the concessions the British imposed on China in the mid-19th-century Opium Wars. While seeing itself as the rightful heir of China’s ancient and storied civilization, the CCP resents the Qing dynasty’s failure to modernize, which it blames for China’s territorial losses and other disgraces at the hands of Western imperial powers during the so-called “century of humiliation” (1839-1949).155 Notwithstanding its destruction of major parts of China’s magnificent cultural heritage, the CCP stokes popular indignation by promulgating the belief that, for a protracted period, smaller and morally and intellectually inferior countries deprived the Middle Kingdom of its rightful status. The refusal of the United States to recognize China’s exalted position as the CCP understands it provides ammunition for the party’s narrative of China as a victim.

盡管中國共產黨宣稱中國在各國中至高無上,並向人民灌輸中華人民共和國至高無上的地位,但幾十年來,該黨在中國培養了一種強烈的歷史受害感和國恥感。中國共產黨將民族的不滿追溯到19世紀中葉鴉片戰爭中英國對中國的讓步。中國共產黨將自己視為中國古老而傳奇的文明的合法繼承人,但同時又對清朝未能實現現代化感到不滿,它將所謂的 “屈辱世紀”(1839-1949年)期間中國在西方帝國主義列強手中遭受的領土損失和其他恥辱歸咎於清朝。 盡管中共破壞了中國壯麗的文化遺產的主要部分,但它卻煽動民眾的憤慨,宣揚小國、道德和智力低下的國家長期以來剝奪了中原王朝的合法地位。美國拒絕承認中共所理解的中國的崇高地位,這為該黨將中國視為受害者的說法提供了彈藥。

For the CCP, pride in China’s inherent centrality and resentment at its mistreatment by the West reinforce one another. This potent mix of pride and resentment nourishes party members’ conviction that China is endowed with incontrovertible title to rule in a loose system in which other countries enjoy considerable autonomy provided they recognize their place and submit to China’s socialist norms. At the same time, the combination of pride and resentment weakens China’s inclination to compromise and cooperate. Built around defeat at the hands of the West, the CCP’s founding myth disposes China to dwell on settling old scores and righting historic wrongs.156


Xis Synthesis of Communism and Chinese Nationalism


All five Chinese Communist paramount leaders — Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping — have affirmed the fundamental tenets of Marxism-Leninism while adhering to an extreme interpretation of Chinese nationalism. A beneficiary of the massive modernization campaign launched by Deng and stewarded by Jiang and Hu, Xi has spoken most forcefully and openly about the union of communism and Chinese nationalism in service to the CCP’s ambitions for global preeminence.


At the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, the CCP amended its Party Constitution to enshrine Xi’s concept of “the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation.”157 Xi emphasized the fidelity of his synthesis of Chinese communism and Chinese nationalism to the party’s fundamental teachings: “At its founding,” he said, “the Communist Party of China made realizing communism its highest ideal and its ultimate goal, and shouldered the historic mission of national rejuvenation.”158

在2017年10月的黨的十九大上,中共修改黨章,將習近平的 “民族復興的中國夢 “理念寫入其中。習近平強調,1他對中國共產主義和中國民族主義的綜合,忠實於黨的基本教導。”他說:”中國共產黨在成立之初,就把實現共產主義作為自己的最高理想和最終目標,肩負著民族復興的歷史使命。”

The flourishing of the individual, according to the party, flows from the flourishing of the nation. History shows that the future and destiny of each and every one of us are closely linked to those of our country and nation,” Xi said in a 2012 speech. “One can do well only when one’s country and nation do well. Achieving the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is both a glorious and an arduous mission that requires the dedicated efforts of the Chinese people one generation after another. Empty talk harms the country, while hard work makes it flourish.”159


Individual and national flourishing, Xi emphasized in a 2019 speech, are indissolubly bound up with the triumph of communism and socialism: “In today’s China, the essence of patriotism is the complete combination of our devotion to the country, to the Chinese Communist Party and to socialism.”160 The patriotic work of national rejuvenation, as Xi explains it, culminates with China’s dominance of a globe-spanning socialist order.161  

習近平在2019年的講話中強調,個人和國家的興旺發達,與共產主義和社會主義的勝利密不可分:”在今天的中國,愛國主義的本質是我們對國家、對中國共產黨、對社會主義奉獻的完整結合。”  習近平解釋說,民族復興的愛國主義工作,隨著中國主導全球的社會主義秩序而達到高潮。

The party’s Constitution contains a passage known as the “basic line” that summarizes the goal for national rejuvenation:

黨章中有一段話被稱為 “基本路線”,概括了民族復興的目標:

The basic line of the Communist Party of China in the primary stage of socialism is to lead all the people of China together in a self-reliant and pioneering effort, making economic development the central task, upholding the Four Cardinal Principles, and remaining committed to reform and opening up, so as to see China become a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful.162


Notwithstanding its brevity and seemingly anodyne language, the “basic line” captures the mingling of communism and Chinese nationalism in the service of the CCP’s ambition to prevail in great-power rivalry with the United States. Such terms as “democratic,” “harmonious,” and “beautiful” appear compatible with government that protects rights, and which is grounded in the consent of the people. However, the words reflect the CCP’s autocratic intentions, alluding to Mao’s concept of “the people’s democratic dictatorship” as well as to the party’s comprehensive control of society and the CCP’s unyielding conviction that the United States heads an international capitalist conspiracy to prevent socialist China from achieving global dominance.

盡管 “基本路線 “言簡意賅,看似平淡無奇,但它卻抓住了共產主義和中國民族主義的交融,為中共在與美國的大國競爭中獲勝的野心服務。諸如 “民主”、”和諧”、”美好 “等詞匯,似乎與保護權利、以人民的同意為基礎的政府相適應。但是,這些詞語反映了中共的專制意圖,暗指毛澤東的 “人民民主專政 “概念,也暗指黨對社會的全面控制,以及中共堅信美國領導著國際資本主義陰謀,阻止社會主義中國取得全球主導地位的不屈信念。

In short, the “basic line” points to the CCP’s quest to make the Chinese nation the world’s greatest power.163 The CCP set a deadline of 2049 — the PRC’s 100-year anniversary — for achieving this national rejuvenation,164 and has identified several steps to accomplish it.

總之,”基本路線 “指向了中共追求使中華民族成為世界上最偉大的強國。中共將實現這一民族復興的最後期限定為2049年–中國成立100周年,並確定了實現這一目標的幾個步驟。

First, China must complete the project of modernization by developing a world-leading economy and world-class military. The economic, social, and political order necessary to achieving this objective, according to the CCP, is socialism.


Second, China must overcome its “century of humiliation” by recovering what the CCP views as lost territory and as its full maritime claims over littoral waters. The CCP’s 2017 Constitution states that the party “shall work continuously to strengthen the unity of all the Chinese people, including compatriots in the Hong Kong and Macao special administrative regions and in Taiwan as well as overseas Chinese.” It will also achieve “the reunification of the motherland” — a euphemism for recovery of Taiwan — “in conformity with the principle of ‘one country, two systems.’”165 In his address to the 19th Party Congress, Xi explicitly identifies “achieving China’s reunification” as “essential to realizing national rejuvenation.”166

其次,中國必須克服 “百年屈辱”,收復中共認為是失去的領土和對沿岸水域的全部海洋要求。中共2017年黨章指出,黨 “要不斷努力加強包括香港、澳門特別行政區同胞和臺灣同胞以及海外華人在內的全體中國人民的團結”。還將按照’一國兩制’的原則,”實現 “祖國統一”–收復臺灣的委婉說法。”  習近平在黨的十九大上的講話中,明確將 “實現中國的統一 “作為 “實現民族復興的根本”。

Third, China must lead the struggle to institute socialism globally. “In this long period of cooperation and conflict, socialism must learn from the boons that capitalism has brought to civilization,” Xi instructed the CCP in 2013. “Most importantly, we must concentrate our efforts on bettering our own affairs, continually broadening our comprehensive national power, improving the lives of our people, building a socialism that is superior to capitalism, and laying the foundation for a future where we will win the initiative and have the dominant position.”167 To win the initiative and have the dominant position, China must displace the United States as the world’s foremost power. Xi plans for China by 2049 to complete its emergence as “a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence.”168

第三,中國必須領導在全球範圍內推行社會主義的鬥爭。”在這個長期的合作與沖突中,社會主義必須學習資本主義給文明帶來的恩惠。”2013年,習近平對中共中央作出指示。”最重要的是,我們要集中力量辦好自己的事情,不斷擴大綜合國力,改善人民生活,建設優於資本主義的社會主義,為將來贏得主動、掌握主導權奠定基礎。”  中國要贏得主動權,擁有主導地位,就必須取代美國成為世界最主要的大國。習近平計劃到2049年,中國要完成 “綜合國力和國際影響力全球領先 “的崛起。

Fourth, socialism must culminate in the unification of humanity under Chinese leadership. In his address to the 19th Party Congress, Xi refers several times to a “community of common destiny for mankind.”169 This notion figures extensively in China’s far-reaching efforts under Xi to extend its global influence. In August 2018, top diplomat Yang Jiechi, director of the CCP’s Office of Foreign Affairs Commission and a Politburo member, went so far as to assert, “Building a community of common destiny for mankind is the overall goal of China’s foreign affairs work in the new era” and requires a “new type of international relations.”170  Xi’s community of common destiny for mankind would replace the established international order grounded in free and sovereign nation-states with a unity of nations in shared deference to the CCP’s interpretation of international socialism.171

第四,社會主義必須最終實現中共國領導下的人類統一。習近平在黨的十九大上的講話中,多次提到 “人類命運共同體”。 這一理念廣泛地出現在習近平領導下的中共國擴大全球影響力的深遠努力中。2018年8月,中共外事委員會辦公室主任、政治局委員、最高外交官楊潔篪甚至斷言:”構建人類共同命運共同體是新時代中國外交工作的總目標”,需要建立”新型國際關系”。習近平的人類命運共同體,將以共同遵守中共對國際社會主義的解釋的國家統一取代以自由主權民族國家為基礎的既有國際秩序。

In a 2016 speech to a Politburo collective study session on global governance, Xi stressed the need to “improve our ability to participate in global governance, and in particular, our ability to make rules, set agendas, and carry out publicity and coordination.”172 Accordingly, Xi exhorts PRC diplomats to “take an active part in leading the reform of the global governance system.”173 Xi, however, does not envisage improvements in democratic accountability, impartial administration, and fidelity to human rights. To the contrary, those essentials of individual freedom and human equality must be defeated by implanting socialism’s norms, standards, and goals in international organizations.

習近平在2016年政治局集體學習會議上關於全球治理的講話中強調,要 “提高我們參與全球治理的能力,特別是提高我們制定規則、制定議程、開展宣傳協調的能力”。 據此,習近平勉勵中國外交官 “積極參與引領全球治理體系改革”。 然而,習近平並沒有設想在民主問責、公正行政和忠於人權方面有所改善。相反,必須通過在國際組織中植入社會主義的規範、標準和目標來擊敗這些個人自由和人類平等的基本要素。

The difference of opinion about the reform of world order between the United States and China is stark. For the United States — and for fellow liberal democracies — the aim is to preserve the freedom and sovereignty of nation-states by fortifying the established order, which is grounded in respect for human rights and in fidelity to the rule of law, understood as the impartial application of publicly disclosed, settled, and binding rules. For China, the objective is to transform world order. The CCP seeks to reconfigure the community of nations by placing China at the center while subordinating freedom, national sovereignty, human rights, and the rule of law to socialism with Chinese characteristics.



結  論

China’s conduct flows from a distinctive blend of Marxism-Leninism and of the party’s  extreme version of Chinese nationalism. Viewing the conduct in the context of the ideas that inspire and shape it dispels the starry-eyed optimism about the PRC that has distorted U.S. policy. It also encourages sobriety in cooperating with, containing, and deterring the CCP. Grasping China’s conduct in light of the CCP’s governing ideas, moreover, illuminates the vulnerabilities that afflict China’s authoritarian regime, and clarifies the tasks the United States must undertake to secure freedom.


IV. Chinas Vulnerabilities


After Mao Zedong’s disastrous Great Leap Forward (1958-1962) and bloody Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the Chinese Communist Party presided over great increases in China’s industrial and technological capabilities, economic prosperity, and military power. The PRC’s global reach and international influence have expanded accordingly. Notwithstanding its progress in pursuit of national rejuvenation and the transformation of the international order, the PRC’s vulnerabilities have also grown under the CCP’s watch.


Some of China’s vulnerabilities derive from the nature of autocracy.174 For want of freedom, autocracies tend to struggle to maintain economies that over the long term can adapt, innovate, and grow. Because of their imperial ambitions and disdain for international norms and standards, autocracies make poor friends and are prone to estranging allies and partners. And because of the need to repress their own citizens, autocracies typically must divert resources from military affairs abroad to the preservation of order at home.

中國的一些脆弱性來自於專制的本質。 由於缺乏自由,專制國家往往難以維持能夠長期適應、創新和增長的經濟。由於其帝國主義的野心和對國際規範和標準的蔑視,專制國家的朋友不多,容易疏遠盟友和夥伴。而且由於需要鎮壓自己的公民,專制國家通常必須將國外軍事事務的資源轉用於維護國內秩序

In addition to the vulnerabilities that inhere in all autocracies, the CCP’s blend of communism and hyper-nationalism along with the country’s particular circumstances expose China to a variety of specific vulnerabilities.


First, China’s economy faces significant difficulties. Although China is a global manufacturing and technological powerhouse, Premier of the State Council Li Keqiang conceded in May 2020, “There are still some 600 million people earning a medium or low income, or even less…. Their monthly income is barely 1,000 yuan (about $142), not even enough to rent a room in a medium-tier Chinese city.”175 The pandemic has compounded the problem by increasing unemployment. Before the COVID-19 crisis, moreover, social unrest in the PRC percolated as the economy experienced its lowest growth rate in 30 years.176 The new reality compels the CCP to adopt more stringent measures to control the population.177

首先,中國經濟面臨重大困難。雖然中國是全球制造業和科技強國,但國務院總理李克強在2020年5月承認,”目前仍有約6億人收入處於中低收入,甚至更少….。他們的月收入勉強達到1000元人民幣(約合142美元),甚至不夠在中國中等城市租房。” 疫情加劇了失業率,使問題更加嚴重。此外,在COVID-19危機之前,隨著中國經濟經歷了30年來的最低增速,中國的社會動蕩也在不斷滲透。新的現實迫使中共采取更嚴格的措施來控制人口。

Several forms of dependence could hinder the sustained and substantial economic growth that supports the CCP’s popular legitimacy. The CCP plans to overcome its reliance on exports by bringing the 600 million or so Chinese who live on modest wages into the middle class. Nevertheless, in the short term Beijing must export manufactured goods to consumers in the United States and other advanced industrial nations to keep factories running and people working even as, particularly in the wake of the global pandemic, the United States and others seek to reduce reliance on Chinese manufacturing.178 Notwithstanding the CCP’s lagging efforts to establish the yuan as a global reserve currency, China depends on the American dollar to settle many international transactions. And China’s advanced manufacturing uses sophisticated microchips and other high-value technological goods from the United States and other advanced industrial nations.179 This leaves critical sectors of China’s economy vulnerable to temporary disruption by foreign governments’ imposition of export controls.180

幾種形式的依賴可能會阻礙支持中共民眾合法性的持續和大幅度的經濟增長。中共計劃通過將靠微薄工資生活的6億左右中國人帶入中產階級來克服對出口的依賴。然而,在短期內,北京必須向美國和其他先進工業國家的消費者出口制成品,以維持工廠的運轉和人們的工作,即使在全球大流行病之後,美國和其他國家尋求減少對中國制造業的依賴。盡管中共將人民幣確立為全球儲備貨幣的努力滯後,但中國在許多國際交易中仍依賴美元結算。而中國的先進制造業使用來自美國和其他先進工業國家的精密微芯片和其他高價值技術產品。 這使得中國經濟的關鍵部門容易受到外國政府實施出口管制的暫時幹擾。

Furthermore, while the extent in China of the economic contraction caused by COVID­19 is uncertain, the pandemic’s consequences are bound to exceed what Beijing endured in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Stimulus measures stretching across more than a decade have taken their toll on China’s corporate sector while saddling the government with immense debt.181 In response, China has imposed strict lending standards on its banks, the efficacy of which is to be determined.182 While many Chinese companies depend on capital markets in the United States, Britain, and other countries, some use secondary listings in Hong Kong or Shanghai to insulate themselves from limitations on access to foreign capital markets.183 Meanwhile, China’s manufacturing sector is likely to keep contracting due to sharp drops in consumer demand at home and abroad. Declining manufacturing, diminished consumption, and limited stimulus tools would depress GDP and increase unemployment,184 yielding further dissatisfaction and social unrest.185


A booming Chinese economy creates its own vulnerabilities. While the last several decades show that greater economic freedom does not guarantee political liberalization, China’s powerful economic engine, combining choice with state command and control, may still encourage a frame of mind within the middle and upper-middle class that is at odds with authoritarian government. The opportunity to choose that a growing economy fosters and the prosperity it unleashes tend to produce a taste for more freedom. Making decisions about work and property can increase citizens’ expectations for choice in other realms while producing greater affluence. Choice and affluence, moreover, tend to heighten the demand for the protection of the fruits of one’s labor through property rights and laws that are settled, public, and fairly applied. Alternatively, as some have argued, middle- and upper-middle-class urbanites may continue to support the CCP because of the comfort and wealth they have achieved under the party’s dominion even while dissatisfaction mounts among the hundreds of millions of rural citizens whom economic development has left behind.186 Either way, continued economic growth as much as economic stagnation could spur a destabilizing demand in China for government accountability and for greater protection for basic rights and fundamental freedoms.

蓬勃發展的中國經濟帶來了自身的脆弱性。雖然過去幾十年的經驗表明,更大的經濟自由並不能保證政治自由化,但中國強大的經濟引擎,將選擇權與國家的命令和控制結合起來,仍可能鼓勵中上階層形成一種與專制政府相悖的心態。增長的經濟所培養的選擇機會和它所釋放的繁榮,往往會產生一種對更多自由的體會。對工作和財產進行決策,可以增加公民對其他領域選擇的期望,同時產生更大的富裕。此外,選擇和富裕往往會提高人們對通過產權和法律來保護自己的勞動成果的要求,而這些權利和法律是確定的、公開的、公平適用的。或者,正如一些人所言,城市中上層人士可能會因為在黨的統治下獲得的舒適和財富而繼續支持中國共產黨,即使在經濟發展所留下的數以億計的農村公民中,不滿情緒也在不斷上升。 無論哪種情況,持續的經濟增長和經濟停滯都會刺激中國對政府問責制以及對基本權利和基本自由的更大保護的不穩定需求。

Second, China suffers from worsening demographic conditions. The size of the population is on track to peak in the coming decade and then gradually decline. To make matters worse, Beijing is about to experience an explosion of those 65 and above while its working-age population shrinks sharply. The absence in China of a modern social-safety net will impose strains as workers struggle to support a steadily growing retiree population. In addition, as a consequence of China’s one-child policy — abolished in 2016 but with consequences that will reverberate for generations — China’s working-age population will suffer from a prolonged gender imbalance (the 2010 census reported 120 males for every 100 females).187


Third, China’s accelerated economic development has severely degraded the environment. The PRC has been for more than a decade and remains the world’s largest source of carbon emissions. Pollution produces dystopian conditions in many of China’s major cities while reducing the country’s arable land and clean water. As a consequence, life expectancy in China has been falling.188A recent Lancet study found that every year 1.1 million people in China die prematurely due to air pollution.189


Fourth, corruption — at the local level as well as in the party’s upper echelons — creates risks for the CCP. Many members of the elite have enriched themselves at the expense of the people. Along with uneven economic growth and demographic and environmental problems, repression and land expropriation exacerbate discontent, provoking more than 130,000 protests of varying types annually. Such protests are likely to shake the system for years to come.190


Fifth, the CCP devotes considerable resources to the repression of ethnic and religious minorities. In gross violation of the principles set forth in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the CCP maintains a military occupation of Tibet that dates to the 1950s, conducts a brutal program in Xinjiang to “re-educate” Uyghurs and millions of other Turkic Muslims, oppresses ethnic Mongolians in China’s Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, and imposes onerous regulations on China’s Christians, who number around 70 million.191  

第五,中共將大量資源用於鎮壓少數民族和宗教少數群體。中共嚴重違反1948年《世界人權宣言》規定的各項原則,自1950年代以來一直對西藏實行軍事占領,在新疆實施殘酷的計劃,對維吾爾族和其他數百萬突厥穆斯林進行 “再教育”,壓迫中國內蒙古自治區的蒙古族人,並對中國約7 000萬基督教徒實行嚴厲的管制。

Sixth, Beijing allocates extraordinary sums to internal security. The PRC refers to these expenses, which include central-government and regional-level costs, as “national domestic security spending.” One open-source analysis suggests that China directs approximately 18% more to internal security than to external defense.192 PRC spending on national domestic security grew from 348.6 billion RMB ($57.2 billion) in 2007 to 1.24 trillion RMB in 2017 ($197 billion in nominal dollars). These estimates “exclude billions of dollars spent on security-related urban-management and surveillance initiatives” even as China’s lower wages and costs “render Chinese security capabilities much higher per dollar spent” than U.S. security spending.193

第六,中國政府為國內安全劃撥了非常多的資金。中國將這些包括中央政府和地區一級的費用在內的支出稱為 “國家國內安全支出”。一項公開來源的分析表明,中國用於國內安全的支出比用於對外防禦的支出多出約18%。中國在國家國內安全方面的支出從2007年的3486億元人民幣(572億美元)增長到2017年的1.24萬億元人民幣(名義美元為1970億美元)。這些估算 “不包括用於安全相關的城市管理和監控舉措的數十億美元”,即使中國較低的工資和成本 “使中國安全能力的每美元支出遠高於 “美國的安全支出。

Seventh, China’s military lacks popular legitimacy. The PLA’s purpose is to fight for the CCP, not the people. Consistent with Mao’s motto, “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,” the party presides over military decision-making. Nevertheless, as the PLA has modernized, ideological conviction within the ranks has declined while corruption has increased. Xi has sought to restore party allegiance — more specifically, allegiance to him — by reinstituting mandatory ideological training and purging the military’s most senior generals.194 The “re-redding” that the PLA must frequently undergo highlights the tension between the party’s need for a professional military and its demand for unquestioned loyalty.195

第七,中國的軍隊缺乏民眾的合法性。解放軍的目的是為中共而不是為人民而戰。根據毛澤東的座右銘 “槍桿子裏出政權”,黨主持軍事決策。然而,隨著解放軍的現代化,隊伍內部的思想信念下降,而腐敗卻在增加。習近平試圖通過恢復強制性的意識形態培訓和清洗軍方最高級將領來恢復黨的忠誠–更具體地說,是對他的忠誠。 解放軍必須經常接受的 “再培訓 “凸顯了黨對職業化軍隊的需求和對毫無疑問的忠誠的要求之間的緊張關系。

Eighth, the CCP faces questions about leadership succession. Uncertainty surrounds the person who will follow Xi Jinping as China’s paramount leader. The party’s practices under Xi have diverged from the CCP’s norms for leadership succession established after Deng Xiaoping. Whereas in the past, the party would have given some indication at this point in the paramount leader’s tenure as to his successor, that question remains under Xi shrouded in mystery.196


Ninth, China’s conduct of foreign affairs generates distrust abroad. According to an October 2020 Pew Research Center survey, “Views of China have grown more negative in recent years across many advanced economies, and unfavorable opinion has soared over the past year.”197 Before the global pandemic, Beijing faced a backlash from foreign capitals springing from its authoritarian schemes of economic co-optation and coercion, intellectual-property theft, rejection of reciprocal treatment, lack of transparency, and egregious human rights abuses. The global pandemic has amplified international discontent with the PRC. The new coronavirus that emerged in Wuhan in late 2019 quickly spread to peoples and nations around the globe, in part because China concealed the outbreak from the world. Beijing further damaged its reputation through its international campaign of disinformation, and its “wolf warrior” diplomacy to deflect responsibility for the pandemic. The CCP’s shameful misconduct — major factors in producing a known worldwide death toll that has surpassed one million with ruinous consequences for societies and economies around the world — has given rise to international demands for accountability over the spread of COVID-19.198

第九,中國的外交行為在國外產生不信任。根據2020年10月皮尤研究中心的調查,”近年來,在許多發達經濟體中,對中國的看法變得更加負面,不利的意見在過去一年中急劇上升。”  在全球大流行之前,北京面臨著來自外國首都的反擊,這種反擊來自於其經濟合作與脅迫的專制計劃、知識產權盜竊、拒絕對等待遇、缺乏透明度以及令人震驚的人權侵犯行為。全球性的疫情擴大了國際社會對中國的不滿。2019年底在武漢出現的新型冠狀病毒迅速蔓延到全球各國人民和國家,部分原因是中國向世界隱瞞了疫情。北京通過國際上的造謠運動,以及 “戰狼 “外交來轉移疫情責任,進一步損害了自己的聲譽。中共可恥的錯誤行為是造成已知的全球死亡人數超過100萬的主要因素,給全世界的社會和經濟帶來了災難性的後果,這使得國際社會要求對COVID-19的傳播負責。


結  論

The CCP confronts a classic dilemma of authoritarian government: the more the party employs repressive means to perpetuate its monopoly on state power, the more it risks driving a wedge between itself and the people. At the same time, and even as hundreds of millions in China remain mired in poverty, hundreds of millions have attained middle-class affluence under the CCP. To what extent the delivery of economic growth, the manipulation of nationalist sentiments, and the generation of fear and submission by a totalitarian surveillance state will enable the CCP to retain its hold on power remains to be seen.


It also remains to be seen to what extent the CCP can address effectively the variety of specific vulnerabilities China confronts. The party’s discipline and ruthlessness have enabled it to marshal vast resources and patiently pursue the production of wealth at home and the acquisition of power and influence abroad. At the same time, the CCP’s authoritarianism, which eradicates dissent, constrains the party’s ability to recognize the regime’s weaknesses, correct errors, and adjust to changing circumstances.199


Along with knowledge of China’s conduct and its intellectual sources, understanding of the CCP’s vulnerabilities — not least the limitations of its ability to address its vulnerabilities — must inform U.S. efforts to meet the China challenge.


V. Securing Freedom


Following the Chinese Communist Party’s massacre of civilians that ended the six-week Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 and Beijing’s subsequent imposition of harsh restrictions on freedom of speech and press, U.S. administrations of both parties doubled down on a China policy focused on engagement. That policy had its justifications and brought its benefits. However, rapid modernization, prodigious economic growth, substantial progress toward building a world-class military, and integration into the world economy have not inclined China to join, let alone play its part in maintaining, the community of nations dedicated to an international order grounded in freedom, democracy, national sovereignty, human rights, and the rule of law.


To the contrary, having survived the 1989 protests, the CCP proceeded to build a hyper-modern police state based on repression and indoctrination at home and committed to predatory schemes of international trade, investment, construction, surveillance, and disinformation. Rather than yielding political liberalization, China’s outsized economic development and acquisition of international influence have given new life among the party’s faithful to the objective of forging a socialist world order with Chinese characteristics. Xi Jinping’s resolute pursuit of “the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation” has intensified the great-power competition launched by the CCP.

相反,在經歷了1989年的抗議之後,中國共產黨在國內建立了一個以鎮壓和灌輸為基礎的超現代警察國家,並致力於掠奪性的國際貿易、投資、建設、監視和造謠計劃。中國經濟的超大規模發展和國際影響力的獲得,非但沒有屈服於政治自由化,反而使黨的信徒們對打造中國特色社會主義世界秩序的目標產生了新的生機。習近平對 “民族復興的中國夢 “的堅定追求,加劇了中共發起的大國競爭。

In one crucial respect, the China challenge resembles the one presented by the Soviet Union to the free world. Soviet authoritarianism combined communism and traditional Russian nationalism.200 The Soviet synthesis governed the USSR’s quest to construct a worldwide socialist order with Moscow at the center. Similarly, Chinese authoritarianism combines communism and a hyper-nationalist interpretation of China’s status and destiny. The CCP synthesis governs China’s quest to construct a worldwide socialist order with Beijing at the center.

在一個關鍵的方面,中國的挑戰與蘇聯向自由世界提出的挑戰很相似。蘇聯專制主義結合了共產主義和傳統的俄羅斯民族主義。 蘇聯的綜合體支配著蘇聯尋求構建一個以莫斯科為中心的世界性社會主義秩序。同樣,中國的專制主義結合了共產主義和對中國地位和命運的超民族主義解釋。中國共產黨的綜合體支配著中國尋求構建以北京為中心的世界性社會主義秩序的努力。

In another crucial respect, however, the China challenge differs from the Soviet challenge. The Soviet Union primarily enlarged its dominions and sought to impose its will through military coercion. For almost fifty years, the USSR ruled over half of Europe through force of arms and extended its global influence by means of weapons sales, security expertise, troop deployments, proxy fighting forces, and the installation and propping up of Marxist regimes. In contrast, the China challenge is not in the first place a military struggle. China’s saber rattling in the South China Sea and gradual acquisition of positions, its crushing of freedom in Hong Kong, and its menacing statements about and behavior toward Taiwan are of major concern. The CCP’s conventional military is a force to be reckoned with. And Beijing’s nuclear, cyber, and space capabilities pose substantial threats. Nevertheless, China primarily  pursues the reconfiguration of world affairs through a kind and quantity of economic power of which the Soviets could only have dreamed.


The harsh reality is that to advance vital U.S. interests and defend cherished American principles, the United States must maintain cooperative relations with a great power whose economy represents a hefty component of world commerce but whose systematic conduct deprives its own people of freedom and threatens the freedom of nations around the world. The China challenge, so understood, is likely to dominate American foreign policy across many administrations.


Meeting a challenge of such urgency, scope, and complexity requires the United States to return to the fundamentals. To secure freedom, America must refashion foreign policy in light of ten tasks.


First, the United States must secure freedom at home. The nation must preserve the constitutional order, which is grounded in respect for individual rights, democratic self-government, and national sovereignty. The nation must also foster a growing economy based on a free market that rewards hard work and entrepreneurship and ensures equal opportunity while both making accommodations for those hit hardest by globalization’s disruptions and devising incentives to equip individuals to prosper in industries crucial to U.S. security. And the country must cultivate a vibrant civil society that enables people to care for their families, safeguard their communities, and form associations of all sorts. Fidelity to America’s traditions of individual freedom and democratic self-government will produce the prosperity and restore the civic concord that have always been essential to meeting the nation’s challenges abroad.


Second, the United States must maintain the world’s most powerful, agile, and technologically sophisticated military while enhancing security cooperation, grounded in common interests and shared responsibility, with allies and partners. A strong military depends on a strong economy — to provide the resources to train and maintain troops, to purchase the best equipment, and to conduct the research and development to produce the next generation of state-of-the-art weapons. At the same time, a strong economy depends on a strong military — to ensure the open seas, safe skies, and secure communications networks that enable international commerce to thrive. For the sake of security and prosperity, moreover, the United States must rededicate itself to preserving its status as the world’s leader in technological innovation. Since neither security nor prosperity can be achieved by one country alone, the United States must regard the cultivation of allies and partners with whom it can share responsibilities as a strategic imperative.


Third, the United States must fortify the free, open, and rules-based international order — which it led in creating after World War II — composed of sovereign nation-states and based on respect for human rights and the rule of law. Such an order reflects American principles and serves American interests.


Fourth, the United States must reevaluate its alliance system and the panoply of international organizations in which it participates to determine where they fortify the free, open, and rules-based international order and where they fall short. A thorough assessment is long overdue.


Fifth, in light of that assessment, the United States must strengthen its alliance system by more effectively sharing responsibilities with friends and partners and by forming a variety of groupings and coalitions to address specific threats to freedom. At the same time, in cooperation with the world’s democracies and other like-minded partners, the United States must reform international organizations where possible and, where necessary, build new ones rooted in the underlying principles of the established international order. To those ends, the United States must not only share responsibility for peace and security but also must work with friends and partners to reconfigure supply chains to eliminate dependence on China for critical materials and goods; to devise common standards for trade, technology, communications, travel, and health; and, building on such initiatives as the International Development Finance Corporation and the emerging Blue Dot Network, to invest in friendly nations’ physical and digital infrastructure and commercial ventures, especially in the Indo-

Pacific region, the countries of which China most immediately threatens.


Sixth, the United States must promote American interests by looking for opportunities to cooperate with Beijing subject to norms of fairness and reciprocity, constraining and deterring the PRC when circumstances require, and supporting those in China who seek freedom.


Strategic competition with China requires delicate balancing: The United States must engage with Beijing cautiously and creatively while countering its economic imperialism and military adventurism and firmly opposing the brazen violations of the rule of law and the gross human rights abuses that seem to be inseparable from CCP rule.


Seventh, the United States must educate American citizens about the scope and implications of the China challenge. Only an informed citizenry can be expected to back the complex mix of demanding policies that will enable the United States to secure freedom. Executive-branch officials and members of Congress must address the public regularly and forthrightly about China’s conduct and intentions, and about the policies the U.S. government must implement to secure freedom at home and preserve the established international order. In addition, the State Department, Congress, think tanks, and private sector organizations must work together to ensure that government officials as well as the public have access to English-language translations of CCP officials’ major speeches and writings along with  important publications and broadcasts from China’s state-run media, scholarly community, and worldwide propaganda machine.


Eighth, the United States must train the rising generation of government officials and public-policy thinkers to navigate the new era of threats and opportunities. Not only diplomats but also military strategists, economists, technologists, political theorists and more who deal with China must be well-versed in the country’s language, culture (including moral, philosophical, and religious traditions), and history (including politics, economics, and war). The same goes for the training of the next generation in the languages, cultures, and histories of other strategic competitors, as well as of friends and potential friends across the globe. It is not enough to acquire a passing familiarity with critical languages or even a working knowledge. The pressing and intricate problems of world politics require the U.S. government to recruit and cultivate officials who have mastered critical languages — that it, who are capable of reading documents, giving talks, and conducting the affairs of state in the languages spoken by strategic rivals as well as by friends and partners. The State Department has recently expanded programs that promote the serious study of Mandarin. It must also make a priority of accelerating training in Russian, Hindi, Persian, Arabic, and other languages. At the same time, Congress must create new programs to encourage students of all ages to achieve fluency in critical languages and to use their skills in public service.


Ninth, the United States must reform American education to enable students to shoulder the enduring responsibilities of citizenship in a free and democratic society and to meet the special demands of a complex, globalized, information-age economy. Sinister efforts from abroad seek to sow discord in the United States. And America’s grade schools, middle schools, high schools, and colleges and universities have to a dismaying degree abandoned well-rounded presentations of America’s founding ideas and constitutional traditions in favor of propaganda aimed at vilifying the nation. In the face of these polarizing forces, the United States must reclaim its own legacy of liberty. That begins with renewing appreciation of the enduring principles enshrined in the Declaration of Independence — that all are endowed with unalienable rights, that the principal purpose of government is to secure those rights, and that all legitimate political power springs from the consent of the governed. It also depends on serious study of the history of America’s efforts down to the present day to live up to those principles, not least through the establishment and preservation of a constitution of limited powers. This will enable American citizens to grasp the nation’s interest in maintaining an international order that favors free and sovereign nation-states. At the same time, the United States must rededicate itself to the promotion of excellence in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. Rather than directing the economy in the manner of authoritarian regimes, the United States government must supercharge the economy in the spirit of freedom and opportunity by funding a variety of educational programs that promote mastery of STEM subjects so that 21st-century America leads the world in innovation, entrepreneurship, and production.


Tenth, the United States must champion the principles of freedom — principles that are at once universal and at the heart of the American national spirit — through example; speeches; educational initiatives; public diplomacy; foreign assistance and investment; sanctions in more difficult circumstances as well as other forms of non-military pressure; and, where the nation’s vital interests are at stake and all else has failed, military force.

第十,美國必須通過以下方式捍衛自由原則 — — 這些原則既具有普遍性,又是美國民族精神的核心 — — 以身作則;演講;教育倡議;公共外交;對外援助和投資;在更困難的情況下實施制裁以及其他形式的非軍事壓力;以及在國家的重大利益受到威脅而所有其他方式都失敗的情況下,使用軍事力量。

Grounded in the nation’s founding principles and constitutional traditions; invigorated by a bustling economy; undergirded by the world’s best-trained and best-equipped military; served by government officials who understand the American people and the American political system, recognize the diversity and common humanity of the peoples and nations of the world, and appreciate the complex interplay of ideas and interests in foreign affairs; and fortified by an informed and engaged citizenry — this multi-pronged approach will enable the United States to secure freedom.





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