美國國防部非常規戰爭手冊(二)

翻譯:波士頓五月花 xxmy

往期鏈接:
美國國防部非常規戰爭手冊(一)

(接上文)

Central Idea
中心思想

The Department must institutionalize irregular warfare as a core competency for both conventional and special operations forces, sustaining the ability to impose costs and create dilemmas for our adversaries across the full spectrum of competition and conflict. To accomplish this vision, the Department will:
無論是常規部隊還是特種作戰部隊,國防部必須將非常規戰爭做為核心競爭力而使其制度化,在全方位的競爭和沖突中,我們必須保持讓對手增加成本及給對手製造困境的能力。為了達到這個目標,國防部將要:

Break the reactive cycle of investment in IW capabilities by institutionalizing lessons learned from past conflicts, and preserving a baseline of IW-focused expertise and capabilities;
對於為增加非常規戰爭應戰能力所做的投資, 要打破目前的消極應對方式,從過去的沖突中吸取的經驗教訓,保留一定程度的專門應對非常規戰爭的專家及應對能力;

Sustain IW as a core competency for the entire Joint Force, not just Special Operations Forces;
將應對非常規戰爭作為整個聯合部隊的核心競爭力,而不僅僅是特種作戰部隊的能力;

Ensure widespread understanding and sufficient expertise in IW;
確保我們對非常規戰爭有廣泛的瞭解,並擁有足夠的專家;

Ensure its approach to IW becomes more agile and cost-informed by developing and employing resource-sustainable IW capabilities;
為了能持續擁有應對非常規戰爭的能力,我們要確保研發項目更加靈活,並更加瞭解研發項目及相關人員的成本;
Seize the initiative and use IW capabilities proactively to expand the competitive space, defeat our adversaries’ competitive strategies, and prepare for an escalation to conflict, if required; and
採取主動出擊,將我們擁有的非常規戰爭的能力擴展至競爭激烈的太空領域,打敗我們對手的競爭戰略,並在需要時為沖突升級做好準備;並且

Organize to foster and sustain unified action in IW with interagency partners as well as key allies and partners.
針對非常規戰爭,組織,促進並保持機構之間,盟友及合作夥伴之間的統一行動

RECENT LESSONS GUIDE OUR APPROACH
用近期的經驗教訓指導我們行動方案

The United States has deep experience conducting irregular warfare, beginning with the first major American overseas expedition against the Barbary Pirates in the early 1800s, and continuing through the campaign to degrade the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. We have generated countless lessons from our history of irregular war. However, we often struggle to consolidate our tactical successes and military gains into enduring strategic outcomes and adapt our capabilities for great power competition. In periods of emphasis on great power competition, we must not discard the ability to employ our IW capabilities and mindset proactively against irregular threats from state and non-state actors.
美國擁有豐富的非常規戰爭經驗,始於1800 年代早期第一個針對巴巴裡海盜的海外遠徵作戰,並通過一次次的行動不斷削弱伊朗和敘利亞的伊斯蘭國的武裝力量。我們已經從我們自己的非常規戰爭的歷史中積累了無數教訓。然而,我們常常難以將自己的戰術成功和軍事成果加以運用,鞏固為持久的戰略並增強競爭力。在這個強調大國競爭的時期,我們絕不能放棄主動使用非常規戰爭手段,並要從心態上主動抗擊那些來自國家的及非國家的非常規威脅。

We Remain Underprepared for Irregular War
我們仍舊對非常規戰爭準備不足

Our adversaries seek to undercut our global influence, degrade our relationships with key allies and partners, and shape the global environment to their advantage without provoking a U.S. conventional response. As we reorient the Department towards great power competition, we do not have the luxury of discarding our wellhoned ability to wage irregular war as we have done in the past.
我們的對手試圖削弱我們的全球影響力,削弱我們與重要盟友和夥伴的關系,並在不引發美國常規反應的條件下形成對他們有利的國際環境。 在國防部重新轉向大國競爭這個方向之時,我們無法承受像過去那樣,忽視我們良好的非常規戰爭能力,而去發動戰爭。

For example, the United States entered irregular wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq unprepared to conduct the major counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns and counterterrorism campaigns that followed.
例如,美國在越南、阿富汗和伊拉克進行了非常規戰爭,但沒有準備好進行隨後的平叛 (COIN) 及反恐行動。

Most Military Capabilities Can Be Applied in an Irregular Context
大多數軍事能力可以在不規則的環境中應用

Successful military contributions to irregular warfare require a deliberate and sustained integration of conventional and special operations capabilities. Our experience in the Cold War suggests that longstanding traditional military activities—force movements, partner engagements, public affairs, partner logistical support, security force assistance, intelligence and counterintelligence activities, and training—complement and mutually support irregular mission objectives such as competing for influence and legitimacy, the foreign internal defense of allied states, and preparations for unconventional warfare.
成功的非常規戰爭,需要有意識地和持續地整合常規和特種作戰能力。我們在冷戰中的經驗表明,長期的傳統軍事活動——例如部隊調動、合作夥伴的參與、公共事務、合作夥伴的後勤支持、安全部隊的援助、情報和反情報活動,以及培訓——補充並支持了非常規戰爭的任務目標,諸如爭奪影響力及合法性、盟國間的維和行動,以及對非常規戰爭的準備。

Conventional forces have executed, can execute, and even lead most IW missions. Conventional forces have supported or led counterinsurgency campaigns in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan; stabilization missions in Bosnia and Somalia; and other irregular campaigns. Even when special operations forces (SOF) have taken the lead in unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense missions, they are heavily enabled by conventional forces. As we shift towards great power competition, our conventional forces must not lose the ability to wage irregular war.
常規部隊已經執行過、可以執行,甚至能夠領導大多數非常規使命。 常規部隊支持了或者領導了越南、伊拉克和阿富汗的平叛行動;波斯尼亞及索馬利亞的維和行動;以及其他非常規任務。即便是特種部隊領導的非常規戰爭,反恐,以及維和行動,他們都需要常規部隊的大力支持。隨著我們轉向大國競爭,我們的常規力量必須不能失去發動非常規戰爭的能力。

神話:非常規戰爭即是反恐——反恐即是特種部隊—— 特種部隊即是非常規戰爭
事實:常規力量一直,也永遠會在各種非常規使命及軍事行動中發揮作用

Conventional Overmatch Encourages Adversaries to Pursue Indirect Approaches
超強的常規力量鼓勵對手另闢蹊徑

As we seek to rebuild our own lethality in traditional warfare, our adversaries will become more likely to emphasize irregular approaches in their competitive strategies to negate our advantages and exploit our disadvantages. Their intent will be to achieve their objectives without resorting to direct armed conflict against the United States, or buy time until they are better postured to challenge us directly. The purpose of competition is not only to gain military advantages, but also to defeat adversaries’ strategies, shape their perceptions, and deny their strategic objectives in the pursuit of national interests.
當我們尋求在傳統戰爭中重建我們的殺傷力時,我們的對手將愈發強調運用非常規手段來和我們做戰略競爭,以否定我們的優勢並利用我們的劣勢。他們期望的是,在不與美國產生直接武裝沖突的前提下實現他們的目標, 或是盡量爭取時間,直到擁有直接挑戰我們的能力。此次競爭的目的不僅在於獲得軍事優勢,而且在於擊敗對手的戰略,塑造他們的觀念,並否認他們追求國家利益的戰略目標。

Irregular War Requires Unified Action
非常規戰爭需要統一行動

The successful conduct of IW relies upon unified action with our U.S. interagency and multinational partners. Our competitors have operationalized clandestine criminal activity and predatory economic behavior as components of their own approach to irregular warfare. However, structural divisions limit our ability to respond to non-military aspects of adversarial competition. No single U.S. Government department or agency has primacy in the prosecution of irregular conflict or adversarial competition. We cannot assume unified action will occur on its own. We must pursue it deliberately.
非常規戰爭的成功需要依賴我們美國各機構之間及跨國合作夥伴間的統一行動。我們的競爭對手將秘密犯罪活動和掠奪性經濟行為作為他們非常規戰爭操作的組成部分。 然而,對我們而言,機構的劃分限制了我們對敵方非軍事行動的反應能力。美國政府沒有一個部門或機構的主要任務是起訴非常規沖突或是對抗性競爭。我們不能假設統一動作會自動發生。 我們必須刻意而為之。

Recent Operations Set a Standard for an Enduring Approach
最近的行動為持久方法設定了標準

Recent experience suggests there are more effective and less costly ways to achieve strategic success in IW. Since 2014, conventional and special operations forces have worked closely together in Iraq and Syria to improve the longstanding “by, with, and through” approach to IW. These operations have proven to be more cost-effective than doing it ourselves. We have a model, but institutionalization of these lessons requires an enduring, whole-of-Department approach.
最近的經驗表明,有更有效及成本更低的方法來實現非常規戰爭的戰略成功。自 2014 年以來,常規部隊及特種作戰部隊在伊拉克和敘利亞密切合作,不斷改進非常規戰爭中長期存在的“by-with-through”作戰方法。這些行動證明瞭by-with-through 方法比我們自己運作更加節省成本。我們有模型,但是這些經驗教訓的制度化需要持久的,整個國防部的共同努力。

(未完待續)

原文鏈接:
Irregular-Warfare-Annex-to-the-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.PDF

(文章僅代表作者本人觀點,與Gnews 無關)

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校對:沖天一怒
編輯:jamie(文胤)
封面:霹靂鼠年
發布:吐納

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