美國《2021戰略競爭法》第五、六節摘譯

俄羅斯莫斯科喀秋莎農場 仰望七星

編輯上傳 水星

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本節要點

鼓勵盟國和夥伴發揮更大的作用,制止中共國的侵略和強勢行為。

每個聯邦部門和機構的負責人應指定一名副部長或以上級別的高級官員,協調該部門或機構與中共國的戰略競爭政策。

如果我們的注意力一再轉移到與美國經濟和國家安全利益無關的挑戰上,美國執行與中共國戰略競爭戰略的能力將受到損害。

美國必須阻止中共國在印度洋-太平洋建立區域霸權,以及中共在全世界推進其獨裁的政治、經濟和外交政策為目標(的野心)。

美國必須確保聯邦預算與中共國競爭的戰略要務保持適當的一致。

美國必須確保所有聯邦部門和機構的組織,以反映與中共國的戰略競爭是美國外交政策的最高優先事項,包括通過美國對政府人員的任務委派和人員增派。

欲了解更多的內容,請看本兩節全文(僅供參考)。

第5節 國會意識

國會認為,執行第4(b)節所述政策需要採取以下行動:

(1)與中共國的戰略競爭需要美國-
(A)提升持續的政治意願,保護其切身利益,促進其價值觀,推動其未來幾十年的經濟和國家安全目標
(B)為了實現這一持久的政治意願,說服美國人民和美國的盟友和夥伴-
(i)(認清)中共國提出的挑戰
(ii)需要長期競爭來捍衛共同的利益和價值觀

(2)美國必須與盟國和夥伴密切協調,以有效地與中共國競爭,包括鼓勵盟國和夥伴在適當情況下發揮更大的作用,平衡和製止中共國的侵略和強勢行為。

(3)美國總統必須領導和指導整個行政部門,將中共國視為美國外交政策面臨的最大地緣政治和地緣經濟挑戰,在執行外交政策時,增加與中共國和美國在印太地區更廣泛利益的戰略競爭的優先次序,並確保分配適當的資源以應對挑戰。

(4)每個聯邦部門和機構的負責人應指定一名副部長或以上級別的高級官員,協調該部門或機構與中共國的戰略競爭政策。

(5)如果我們的注意力一再轉移到與美國經濟和國家安全利益無關的挑戰上,美國執行與中共國戰略競爭戰略的能力將受到損害。

(6)在未來幾十年,美國必須阻止中共國-
(A)在印度洋-太平洋建立區域霸權
(B)利用這一立場在全世界達到其獨裁的政治、經濟和外交政策的目的

(7)美國必須確保聯邦預算與中共國競爭的戰略要務保持適當的一致,通過-
(A)確保為美國國家力量的所有工具提供足夠的資金
(B)連貫地優先考慮如何使用這些資金

(8)持續優先處理中共國提出的挑戰需要-
(A)國會內部的兩黨合作
(B)行政部門和國會之間經常、持續和有意義的合作與協商

(9)美國必須確保經濟和外國政策制定者、私營部門、民間社會、大學和學術機構,以及受中共國挑戰影響的自由和開放社會中的其他相關行動者,進行緊密的結合,使這些行動者能夠-
(A)合作促進共同利益
(B)確定適當的政策-
(i)加強美國及其盟國
(ii)提升令人嚮往的自由和開放秩序的願景
(iii)抵制中共的有害政策

(10)美國必須確保所有聯邦部門和機構的組織,以反映與中共國的戰略競爭是美國外交政策的最高優先事項,包括通過美國對政府人員的任務委派和人員增派;利用-
(A)在印度洋-太平洋地區、世界各地和華盛頓特區投入更多的人員,優先考慮推進與中共國的競爭
(B)在印度洋-太平洋地區增加外國服務人員、國際發展專業人員、外國商業服務人員、情報專業人員和其他美國政府人員
(C)確保該員工,無論是文職人員還是軍隊,都具備在語言、技術技能和其他能力方面的培訓,以促進與中共國的成功競爭戰略

(11)美國必須再次強調加強非軍事手段,包括外交、信息、技術、經濟、外國援助和發展金融、商業、情報和執法,這對於應對中共國獨有的經濟、政治和意識形態挑戰至關重要。

(12)美國必須繼續為太平洋威懾倡議提供資源,這項倡議應符合《亞洲放心倡議法》(公共法律115-409)中闡明的總體政治和外交目標,必須優先考慮實現美國在印度洋-太平洋地區政治目標所需的軍事投資,包括:
(A)促進印度洋-太平洋地區的區域安全
(B)在保護盟國和夥伴免受脅迫的同時,安慰他們
(C)制止與中共國的衝突

(13)與中共國的競爭要求美國熟練地適應21世紀的信息環境,美國公共外交和信息傳遞努力必須有效地-
(A)促進與美國的伙伴關係的價值觀
(B)突出與中共國建立聯繫的風險和成本
(C)反中共宣傳和製造謠言

第6節 規則解釋

(a)對援助外國安全部隊的現有限制的適用性。 -本法的任何內容均不得解釋為根據1961年《外國援助法》(22 USC2378d)第620M節,或者《美國法典》標題10第362節,來減少、取代或以其他方式限製或阻止美國政府的責任。

( b)沒有使用武力的授權 -本法的任何規定不得解釋為授權使用武力。

(第5、6節完)

中共應該膽顫了,為了落實、協調本法案的實施,法案要求每個部或機構指定專人負責,級別是副部長或相同級別的要員,且從人力、財力給予了最大的優先權。邪共,你死期已到!

原文鏈接:

https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DAV21598%20-%20Strategic%20Competition%20Act%20of%202021.pdf

文字整理:

SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the policy described in section 4(b) requires the following actions:

(1) Strategic competition with the PRC will require the United States –

(A) to marshal sustained political will to protect its vital interests, promote its values, and advance its economic and national security objectives for decades to come; and

(B) to achieve this sustained political will, persuade the American people and United States allies and partners of –

(i) the challenges posed by the PRC; and

(ii) the need for long-term competition to defend shared interests and values.

(2) The United States must coordinate closely with allies and partners to compete effectively with the PRC, including to encourage allies and partners to assume, as appropriate, greater roles in balancing and checking the aggressive and assertive behavior of the PRC.

(3) The President of the United States must 8 lead and direct the entire executive branch to make the People’s Republic of China as the greatest geopolitical and geoeconomic challenge for United States foreign policy, increasing the prioritization of strategic competition with the PRC and broader United States interests in the Indo-Pacific region in the conduct of foreign policy and assuring the allocation of appropriate resources adequate to the challenge.

(4) The head of every Federal department and agency should designate a senior official at the level of Under Secretary or above to coordinate the department’s or agency’s policies with respect to strategic competition with the PRC.

(5) The ability of the United States to execute a strategy of strategic competition with the PRC will be undermined if our attention is repeatedly diverted to challenges that are not vital to United States economic and national security interests.

(6) In the coming decades, the United States must prevent the PRC from –

(A) establishing regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific; and

(B) using that position to advance its assertive political, economic, and foreign policy goals around the world.

(7) The United States must ensure that the Federal budget is properly aligned with the strategic imperative to compete with the PRC by –

(A) ensuring sufficient levels of funding to resource all instruments of United States national power; and

(B) coherently prioritizing how such funds are used.

(8) Sustained prioritization of the challenge posed by the PRC requires –

(A) bipartisan cooperation within Congress; and

(B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful collaboration and consultation between the executive branch and Congress.

(9) The United States must ensure close integration among economic and foreign policymakers, the private sector, civil society, universities and academic institutions, and other relevant actors in free and open societies affected by the challenges posed by the PRC to enable such actors –

(A) to collaborate to advance common interests; and

(B) to identify appropriate policies –

(i) to strengthen the United States and its allies;

(ii) to promote a compelling vision of a free and open order; and

(iii) to push back against detrimental policies pursued by the CCP.

(10) The United States must ensure that all Federal departments and agencies are organized to reflect the fact that strategic competition with the PRC is the United States top foreign policy priority, including through the assigned missions and location of United States Government personnel, by –

(A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo Pacific region, at posts around the world, and in Washington DC, with priorities directly relevant to advancing competition with the People’s Republic of China;

(B) placing greater numbers of foreign service officers, international development professionals, members of the foreign commercial service, intelligence professionals, and other United States Government personnel in the Indo-Pacific region; and

(C) ensuring that this workforce, both civilian and military, has the training in language, technical skills, and other competencies required to advance a successful competitive strategy with the PRC.

(11) The United States must place renewed emphasis on strengthening the nonmilitary instruments of national power, including diplomacy, information, technology, economics, foreign assistance and development finance, commerce, intelligence, and law enforcement, which are crucial for addressing the unique economic, political, and ideological challenges posed by the PRC.

(12) The United States must sustain resourcing for a Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which shall be aligned with the overarching political and diplomatic objectives articulated in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (Public Law 115-409), and must prioritize the military investments necessary to achieve United States political objectives in the Indo-Pacific, including –

(A) promoting regional security in the Indo-Pacific;

(B) reassuring allies and partners while protecting them from coercion; and

(C) deterring conflict with the PRC.

(13) Competition with the PRC requires the United States skillful adaptation to the information environment of the 21st century. United States public diplomacy and messaging efforts must effectively –

(A) promote the value of partnership with the United States;

(B) highlight the risks and costs of enmeshment with the PRC; and

(C) counter CCP propaganda and disinformation.

SEC. 6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.

(a) APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES. -Nothing in this Act shall be construed to diminish, supplant, supersede, or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities of the United States Government under section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or section 362 of title 10, United States Code.

(b) NO AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE. – Nothing in this Act may be construed as authorizing the use of military force.

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