汤姆‧科顿议员报告(七)——《战胜中共国:针对性脱钩与经济持久战》

五月花写作组 | 翻译:文萧 | 校对:虹陵 | 编辑、美工、发稿:灭共小宇宙

往期链接:

汤姆‧科顿议员报告序言——《战胜中共国:针对性脱钩与经济持久战》

汤姆‧克顿议员报告(一)——《战胜中共国:针对性脱钩与经济持久战》

汤姆‧克顿议员报告(二)——《战胜中共国:针对性脱钩与经济持久战》

汤姆‧科顿议员报告(三)——《战胜中共国:针对性脱钩与经济持久战》

汤姆‧科顿议员报告(四)——《战胜中共国:针对性脱钩与经济持久战》

汤姆‧科顿议员报告(五)——《战胜中共国:针对性脱钩与经济持久战》

汤姆‧科顿议员报告(六)——《战胜中共国:针对性脱钩与经济持久战》


SECTION TWO: Targeted Decoupling 

第二节:有针对性的脱钩

The United States has entered a phase of open and mutual antagonism with China, yet the failed dream of engagement haunts our economic policy. We must identify and disentangle strategically important economic sectors while thwarting China’s parasitic approach to global trade and commerce. 

美国与中共国已经进入了开放和相互对抗的阶段,然而合作梦想的失败还困扰着我们的经济政策。我们必须确定和理顺具有战略意义的重要经济部门,同时制止中共国对全球贸易和商业的寄生方式。

Such a task requires a focus on broad areas of concern such as trade and investment, higher education, entertainment, and advanced technologies and essential supplies for which reliance on China is unacceptable. This section examines a selection of these technologies and essential supplies in greater detail, including semiconductors, telecommunications, rare-earth elements and critical minerals, medical supplies and equipment, and artificial intelligence and quantum computing. 

这项任务需要关注广泛领域,例如贸易和投资、高等教育、娱乐、先进技术和基本用品,这些领域对中共国的依赖是不可接受的。本节更详细地研究了这些技术和基本供应品的选择,包括半导体,电信,稀土元素和关键矿产,医疗用品和设备,以及人工智能和量子计算。

This section is not an exhaustive list of areas where decoupling from China is advisable. No doubt some of the technologies and fields that will shape the future strategic landscape are unknown to or underappreciated by today’s policymakers. Rather, this list identifies sectors of urgent concern to the United States right now. China is already a world leader in some of these sectors and is targeting all of them through massive investment and espionage—including espionage that masquerades as investment. The United States must end its reliance on China in sectors that will affect the relative strength of nations in the future.

本节并不是和中共国脱钩领域的详尽建议清单。毫无疑问,影响未来战略前景的某些技术和领域对于当今的决策者来说,是未知的或未被重视的。确切地说,本列表标识了当前美国急需关注的领域。中共国已经是其中一些行业的世界领导者,并且正在通过大量投资和间谍活动,包括伪装成投资的间谍活动,来针对这些领域。美国必须结束这些领域对中共国的依赖,这将影响到国家未来的相对实力。

OBJECTIVES AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR TARGETED DECOUPLING 

针对性脱钩的目标和注意事项

RESTORE SECURE, SCALABLE, DOMESTIC PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY IN AREAS CRITICAL TO NATIONAL SECURITY 

对国家安全至关重要的领域恢复安全,可规模化的国内生产能力

The most basic obligation of the federal government is to provide for the common defense. Yet today, key sectors of the economy rely heavily on Chinese suppliers and manufacturing. The United States cannot be fully free or safe if its access to essential supplies is subject to the whims of the CCP. America must therefore restore secure, scalable, and domestic productive capacity in strategic areas. Private industry, finance, and the government have roles to play in regenerating manufacturing that has been lost to China.  

联邦政府的最基本义务是提供共同防御。时至今日,经济的关键部门严重依赖中共国供应商和制造业。如果美国的基本物资受到中共随心所欲的控制,它就不能获得完全自由或安全。因此,美国必须在战略领域恢复安全,可规模化的国内生产能力。私营工业,金融和政府在那些已经流失给中共国的制造业再生中可以发挥作用。

American industry has declined, in part, because of China’s 2001 accession to the WTO and the related decision to grant China Permanent Normal Trade Relations status. In 2004, the United States was the world’s dominant manufacturer, producing approximately $1.61 trillion in value-added manufacturing (22.3% of global output) to China’s $625 billion (8.7% of global output). By 2019, the United States produced $2.35 trillion (16.8% of global output) in value-added manufacturing while China produced $4 trillion (28.7% of global output).125 The nation that brought manufacturing technology to maturity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been overtaken by its number-one rival in the twenty-first century.  

美国工业的下滑,部分是由于中共国于2001年加入世界贸易组织(WTO)以及授予中共国永久正常贸易关系地位的决定。2004年,美国是世界主要制造国,其增值制造业的产值约为1.61万亿美元(占全球总产值的22.3%),而中共国为6,250亿美元(占全球总产值的8.7%)。到2019年,美国的增值制造业产值达到2.35万亿美元(占全球总产值的16.8%),而中共国达到4万亿美元(占全球总产值的28.7%)。在19和20世纪使制造技术成熟的这个国家在21世纪被其第一大竞争对手超越。

The health of the manufacturing sector thus is not simply a commercial concern, but also a national-security imperative. Domestic manufacturers—and to some extent those of allies and trusted partners—provide the foundation and expertise for the nation to arm itself in wartime.  Under present conditions, it is unclear if the United States would be able to organize the kind of rapid, large-scale industrial mobilization that contributed decisively to Allied victory in World War II. This mobilization was possible because the United States already had a deep industrial base and pool of skilled engineers and laborers.126 Disturbingly, China may be better positioned to play the role of World War II-era America in any major conflict today, given its strong industrial base and deep pool of engineering talent. This must change.  

因此,制造业的健康不是简单的商业问题,而是国家安全的当务之急。国内制造商,和那些在某种程度上的盟国和可信赖的伙伴,为国家在战时武装自己提供了基础和专业知识。在目前条件下,还不清楚美国是否能像在第二次世界大战一样,有能力组织迅速的、大规模的工业资源调动,这种调动对盟军的胜利起到了决定性的作用。当时之所以能够动员起来,是因为美国已经拥有深厚的工业基础,和熟练的工程师和劳工资源。令人不安的是,鉴于中共国的强大工业基础和丰富的工程人才储备,它可能在当今的任何重大冲突中都能更好地扮演第二次世界大战时期美国的角色。这必须改变。

A strong industrial base not only supports vital national-security goals, it lays the groundwork for future innovation.127 The process knowledge and human capital gained through manufacturing leads to improvements in the production process itself. Robust industrial initiatives can thus spark virtuous cycles of expansion, reinvestment, and innovation. By contrast, a lack of investment today could jeopardize American prosperity and safety tomorrow.  

强大的工业基础不仅支撑重要的国家安全目标,而且为未来的创新奠定了基础。通过制造获得的工艺知识和人力资本可改善生产过程本身。因此,强有力的产业计划有助于扩张,再投资和创新的良性循环。相比之下,今天投资的缺乏可能会损害明天的美国繁荣与安全。

MAINTAIN TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE OVER CHINA IN STRATEGIC AREAS 

在战略领域保持对中共国的主要技术优势

Outnumbered more than four to one in population, the United States must maintain decisive advantages in technology and per-capita productivity to compete with China. This objective requires accelerating the development of advanced technologies and implementing safeguards so that China cannot steal our technological breakthroughs. 

中共国人口是美国的四倍多,美国必须在技术和人均生产率上保持决定性优势,才能与中共国竞争。实现这一目标需要加快先进技术的发展并实施保障措施,以使中共国无法窃取我们的技术突破。

Current investment in R&D is inadequate to this task. The federal government spent $164  billion, or 0.7 percent of GDP, on R&D in 2020.128 By comparison, it spent between one and  1.5 percent of GDP on R&D during much of the Cold War, when the United States faced a  less populous and affluent competitor.129 Overall R&D spending in the United States has been  buoyed by the private sector, which increased R&D spending more than fourfold between 1980  and 2016.130 In 2018, U.S. firms invested more than $5 in R&D for every $1 spent by Chinese  companies.131 However, private-sector R&D often focuses on incremental improvements to  existing products with clear, short-term commercial applications. It is not optimized for the long-term, theoretical, or risky development projects that lead to breakthroughs and technology revolutions.  

当前在研发上的投资不足以完成这项任务。2020年,联邦政府在研发方面的支出为1,640亿美元,占GDP的0.7%。相比之下,在冷战期间的大部分时间里,美国面对的是人口较少且不那么富裕的竞争对手,联邦政府在研发方面的支出占GDP的1%至1.5%。美国的整体研发支出受到了私营部门的提振,1980-2016年间,研发支出增长了四倍以上。2018年,中共国公司在研发上每支出1美元,美国公司则投入了5美元以上。然而,私营研发通常侧重于通过清晰的短期商业应用对现有产品进行逐步改进。它并未对可以带来突破和技术革命的那些长期的、理论的或有风险的开发项目进行优化。

Federal support for technological development must be paired with policies to protect the fruits of that research. Otherwise, China will continue to benefit from American investment through theft. Spending large sums of taxpayer money to develop leap-ahead technology without implementing controls to stop China from stealing that technology could, in effect, be worse than doing nothing.  

联邦对技术发展的支持必须与保护该研究成果的政策相匹配。否则,中共国将继续通过盗窃从美国投资中受益。花费大量纳税人的钱来开发超前技术,而不实施控制来阻止中共国窃取该技术,实际上,可能比什么都不开发更糟。

(未完待续)


原文链接:

Beat China: Targeted Decoupling and the Economic Long War


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