五月花写作组 | 翻译:jiasen | 校对:虹陵 | 编辑:jamie(文胤) | 美工、发稿:灭共小宇宙









Knowledge, innovation, and technology are force multipliers that allow a country of 330 million people to compete against a country of 1.4 billion people. The United States will be unable to compete against China over the long run if it doesn’t retain a decisive—and proprietary—edge in science, technology, innovation, and development. China understands the importance of knowledge in driving outcomes, which is why it has been working for decades to reach the cutting edge of scientific and technological disciplines—whether by innovation or theft. This campaign has yielded results. In some areas, including quantum computing, China has reached the frontier of technical knowledge, and is now pressing ahead of the pack as an innovator. 

知识,创新,和技术是力量倍增器,使3.3亿人口的国家与14亿人口的国家竞争。如果美国不能在科学,技术,创新和研发方面保持决定性和独有的优势,那么从长远来看,美国将无法与中共国竞争。中共国清楚知识对推动成果的重要性,这就是为什么数十年来,无论是通过创新还是盗窃,它一直致力于达到科学技术各个学科的最前沿。这一努力取得了成果。 在某些领域,包括量子计算,中共国已经到达了技术知识的前沿,并且正以创新者的身份努力处于领先地位。

The Chinese government prioritizes acquiring knowledge—specifically, American knowledge— in its economic, technological, and intelligence-gathering strategies. This priority is evident in China’s systematic and largely successful infiltration of American knowledge institutions, such as U.S. colleges and universities, research labs, and private companies. The United States must treat these institutions, and the knowledge they generate, as key national assets. America’s economic edge depends on it. 


Higher Education 


China acquires American technology and know-how prior to its commercialization and deployment by infiltrating the U.S. higher-education system and research laboratories. In 2018- 19, roughly 370,000 Chinese students studied in the United States, up from fewer than 100,000 a decade earlier. Nearly half of these students are enrolled in STEM courses, which are of special relevance to any nation’s technological and military advancement. U.S. universities trained some of the Chinese military’s top minds. One report found that the Chinese military sponsored more than 2,500 scientists and engineers to study abroad in the past decade, with an estimated 500 of these individuals conducting research in the United States. The American footprint in Chinese higher education is, by comparison, trivial. 


Unfortunately, American citizens and legal permanent residents are sometimes agents of Beijing’s economic espionage. The CCP has created over 200 foreign talent recruitment programs that offer salaries, research funding, and lab space, among other incentives, to entice U.S.-based scientists and engineers to turn over the fruits of their research. The Department of Justice has charged a number of American scientists for lying about their ties to the Thousand Talents Program, China’s most prominent foreign talent initiative. For example, Charles Lieber, chair of Harvard’s chemistry department and a world-renowned leader in the field of nanoscale electronics, signed on to be a “strategic scientist” at China’s Wuhan University of Technology. For his participation, the CCP allegedly gave Lieber $50,000 a month, a $150,000 annual stipend, and a laboratory in Wuhan worth more than $1.5 million. Lieber now faces federal charges for hiding the full scale of his financial ties to China. U.S. officials announced Lieber’s charges on the same day as charges against another Harvard researcher, Zaosong Zheng, who was caught attempting to transport 21 stolen vials of cells to China. 

不幸的是,有些时候,中共国经济间谍活动的代理人是美国公民和合法永久居民。中共已经建立了200多个外国人才招聘计划,以提供薪水,研究经费,实验室空间,以及其他激励措施,来吸引美国的科学家和工程师将研究成果交给中共。许多美国的科学家因在解释与中国最著名的外国人才计划,即“千人计划”之间的关系时说谎,而受到司法部的指控。例如,哈佛大学化学系主任,纳米级电子领域的世界知名专家查尔斯·利伯(Charles Lieber)曾经签约成为中共国武汉理工大学的“战略科学家”。据称,中共为吸引利伯的参与,为他提供了以下条件:每月5万美元的工资,每年15万美元的津贴,以及位于武汉超过150万美元的实验室。利伯目前因隐藏与中共国的全部金融关系而面临联邦指控。美国官员在宣布对利伯的指控的同一天,宣布了对另一名哈佛研究员郑灶松的指控,而郑灶松试图将盗走的21小瓶细胞带回中共国。

National security officials have warned repeatedly of the threat posed by Beijing’s “non traditional collectors” on U.S. college campuses. In July 2020, the FBI announced it was investigating almost 2,500 cases of Chinese espionage and intellectual property theft. Such cases occupied the time and resources of every FBI field office and comprised roughly half of the FBI’s counterintelligence cases.59 These warnings have largely fallen on deaf ears in academia.  


The CCP’s penetration of American higher education has encountered little resistance from American faculty and administrators who depend on full-freight tuition payments of international students. Take a recent case at Boston University, where a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officer embedded within a laboratory conducting cutting-edge artificial intelligence research with a renowned physicist. When authorities uncovered the plot in January 2020, the physicist stated he was “not interested in politics…If a person anywhere in the world wants to come to my group, and they have the money to come, I say why not?” According to that physicist’s resume, roughly 75 of the more than 200 research associates and visiting scientists that worked in his labs were from China.

中共对美国高等教育的渗透几乎没有受到任何来自美国教职和管理人员的阻力,美国高校依赖国际学生的全额学费。以波士顿大学最近的一个案例为例,一名人民解放军(PLA)官员隐藏在一个实验室中,该实验室与一位著名的物理学家进行着尖端的人工智能研究。当局于2020年1月发现该阴谋时,这位物理学家表示他“对政治不感兴趣……如果世界上任何地方的人想加入我的团队,而他们有钱带来,我说,为什么不?” 该物理学家的简历显示,在他实验室工作的200多名研究人员和访问科学家中,大约有75名来自中共国。

These cases are the tip of the iceberg. China’s dark money permeates U.S. higher education. The Department of Education opened investigations into both Harvard and Yale in February 2020 as part of a review that indicates U.S. universities had not reported at least $6.5 billion in foreign funding, including funding from China.These investigations followed similar inquiries into Georgetown University, Cornell University, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

这些案例只是冰山一角。 中共国的黑钱渗入了美国的高等教育界。教育部于2020年2月对哈佛和耶鲁进行了调查,这是一项审查的一部分,该审查表明美国大学没有报告的外国资金至少有65亿美元,包括来自中共国的资金。针对乔治敦大学,康奈尔大学和麻省理工学院,也有类似的调查。

Corporate and National Laboratories 


China’s drive to infiltrate U.S. research institutions extends to our most sensitive laboratories.  The Department of Energy (DOE), which oversees 17 national laboratories and the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, is fighting Chinese efforts to recruit its researchers. Investigators have exposed evidence of Chinese recruitment and penetration within the government. In May 2019, for instance, a former scientist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory was indicted for making false statements about his alleged involvement in a Chinese recruitment program. This came after an employee of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration pleaded guilty to illegally accepting money from a Chinese recruitment program.


The Thousand Talents Program also recruits through professional associations for Chinese engineers such as the Silicon Valley Chinese Engineers, the Hua Yuan Science & Technology Association (HYSTA), and the China Association for Science and Technology (CAST). According to one analysis, Silicon Valley is “ground [zero] for…legal, illegal and quasi-legal practices that fall just below the thresholds set by U.S. law.”  


China has made infiltrating, manipulating, and exploiting U.S. research organs a central plank of its economic and military strategy. Today, China wields immense, if hidden, power within American higher education and the U.S. research-innovation complex. The full depth and breadth of this influence is unknown. However, the CCP has publicly pledged more than $2 trillion to acquire top talent in support of its strategy to dominate key emerging technologies. This figure provides a sense of the scope, scale, and seriousness of the CCP’s science and technology efforts.  


Labor Force 


Chinese nationals play an outsized role at U.S. technology firms such as Apple, Amazon, Google, and Facebook, in part because of their access to U.S. higher-education institutions and focus on STEM education. In FY2019, the U.S. government issued 50,609 H-1B visas to specialized Chinese workers, making China the second-most represented country after India.  Sixty-six percent of H-1B visas granted in FY2019 were for computer-related fields.  

中共国公民在苹果、亚马逊、谷歌和脸书等美国科技公司中扮演着举足轻重的角色,部分原因是他们可以进入美国高等教育机构并专注于STEM教育。2019财年,美国政府向中共国专业工人发放了50,609份H-1B签证,使中共国成为仅次于印度的第二大代表性国家。  2019财年批准的H-1B签证中有66%是计算机相关领域。

The United States relies heavily on foreign workers in high-technology sectors, partly due to the crisis in STEM education in America. The number of U.S. citizens enrolled in upper level science and engineering programs is in steady decline. The United States ranked 18th in science and 37th in math out of 77 countries on the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) in 2018. The United States places 13th in science and 31st in math within the 37-state Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).


The unique risk of espionage posed by Chinese nationals must be acknowledged when evaluating the cost and benefit of accepting foreign workers. From 2011-18, 90 percent of the Department of Justice’s cases alleging economic espionage involving a state actor concerned China, as did more than two-thirds of its cases alleging theft of trade secrets. Economic espionage cases with a connection to China have increased by roughly 1,300 percent over the past decade. While some of these cases involve China’s relentless cyberespionage, a significant portion involve physical theft by workers operating on U.S. soil. Recent examples of this practice include a Chinese scientist who stole hundreds of genetically engineered rice seeds with direct pharmaceutical applications from a U.S. research facility and a Chinese born employee at Raytheon who was caught smuggling top-secret missile-defense technology to China.


In the words of a recent White House report, “Law enforcement efforts alone cannot keep up with (or adequately deter) a state sponsored campaign of theft.” The United States must take more aggressive action to limit the number of Chinese nationals working in sensitive positions in U.S. laboratories and companies. 

用白宫最近的一份报告的话来说,“仅靠执法不能跟上(或充分阻止)一个国家资助的盗窃活动。” 美国必须采取更加积极的行动来限制中共国公民在美国实验室和公司中的敏感职位的数量。


Beat China: Targeted Decoupling and the Economic Long War




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