汤姆‧科顿议员报告(四)——《战胜中共国:针对性脱钩与经济持久战》

五月花写作组 | 翻译:风云九霄(文萧) | 校对:伞兵 | 编辑:jamie(文胤) | 美工、发稿:灭共小宇宙


往期链接:

汤姆‧科顿议员报告序言——《战胜中共国:针对性脱钩与经济持久战》

汤姆‧克顿议员报告(一)——《战胜中共国:针对性脱钩与经济持久战》

汤姆‧克顿议员报告(二)——《战胜中共国:针对性脱钩与经济持久战》

汤姆‧科顿议员报告(三)——《战胜中共国:针对性脱钩与经济持久战》


HOW ARE THE U.S. AND CHINESE ECONOMIES INTERTWINED? 

美中两国经济是如何交织在一起的?

Before outlining an economic strategy to beat China, we need to understand how precisely our economies are intertwined. 

在概述击败中共国的经济战略之前,我们需要了解下两国经济是多么紧密地交织在一起。

TRADE

贸易

The U.S. and Chinese economies remain deeply intertwined despite the recent trade war, leaving both countries vulnerable to the other. The early days of the coronavirus pandemic underscored the significance of this connection, when calls to restrict travel with China in the interest of public health elicited sharp criticism from groups whose fortunes are tied to China. Our dependence on Chinese producers for medicine, surgical masks, and other essential supplies became tragically clear later in the crisis.

尽管最近发生了贸易战,但美中经济仍然交织在一起,两国很容易相互影响。CCP病毒大流行的初期凸显了这种联系的显著性,当时出于公共卫生的利益而限制与中共国的旅行,这引起了与中共国有联系的团体的尖锐批评。疫情危机凸显了我们所需要的药品,口罩和其他基本用品极度依赖中共国生产商。

The United States buys far more from China than the other way around. In 2019, $634.8 billion in trade passed between the two. That trade consisted of $471.8 billion in U.S. imports from China and $163.0 billion in U.S. exports to China, for a bilateral trade deficit of $308.8 billion. 

美国从中共国购买的商品远多于其他方式。2019年,两国之间的贸易额为6348亿美元。该贸易额包括美国从中共国进口的4,718亿美元和美国对中共国的出口1,630亿美元,双边贸易逆差为3,088亿美元。

While U.S.-China trade is substantial, it accounts for only a small share of overall economic activity and growth in the United States. U.S. exports to all countries accounted for a mere 11.7 percent of U.S. GDP in 2019, after peaking at 13.5 percent in 2013. U.S. exports to China accounted for under one percent of U.S. GDP in 2019. 

美中贸易虽然很大,但只占美国总体经济活动和增长的一小部分。美国对所有国家的出口在2013年达到GDP的13.5%的峰值之后,在2019年仅占GDP的11.7%。美国对中共国的出口在2019年占美国GDP低于1%。

China is our single largest goods supplier, far surpassing key allies like the United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia.Eighteen percent of all U.S. imports by value came from China in 2019. And although China first entered our market by selling low-cost, low-quality consumer goods, today it occupies a higher position on the value chain, producing both high- and low-value manufactures.  China’s top exports to the United States by category in 2019 were electrical machinery ($125 billion), machinery ($92 billion), furniture and bedding ($27 billion), toys and sports equipment ($25 billion), and plastics ($18 billion).  

中共国是我们最大的商品供应国,远远超过了英国,日本和澳大利亚等主要盟国。2019年,按价值计算,美国所有进口商品的18%来自中共国。尽管中共国最初是通过出售低价低质的商品进入美国市场的,今天它在价值链上占据较高的位置,同时生产高价值和低价值的产品。按类别划分,2019年中共国对美国的最大出口商品是电机(1250亿美元),机械(920亿美元),家具和床上用品(270亿美元),玩具和运动器材(250亿美元)以及塑料(180亿美元)。

American exports to China also are sizeable, accounting for six percent of overall U.S. exports in 2019. Our exported goods consist mostly of high-end manufactures in areas where China has not developed cutting-edge capabilities. Top exports by category were electrical machinery ($14 billion), machinery ($14 billion), aircraft ($10 billion), optical and medical instruments ($9.7 billion), and vehicles ($9.1 billion), with an additional $14 billion of agricultural products such as soybeans, cotton, and pork. 

美国对中共国的出口也相当可观,占2019年美国总出口的6%。我们的出口商品主要是高端产品,那些中共国尚未掌握的尖端产能。出口最多的类别是电机(140亿美元),机械(140亿美元),飞机(100亿美元),光学和医疗仪器(97亿美元)和车辆(91亿美元),另外还有140亿美元的农产品,例如大豆,棉花和猪肉。

China exported $20.1 billion in services to the United States in 2019, principally in categories related to transportation, travel, and R&D. U.S. provision of services to China was much higher in 2019, reaching $56.5 billion.

中共国在2019年向美国出口了201亿美元的服务,主要类别与运输,旅行和研发有关。2019年美国对华服务的金额更高,达到565亿美元。

CAPITAL 

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 

资本

外商直接投资(FDI

The United States and China invest billions of dollars in each other’s countries. These financial flows have slowed in recent years due to investor uncertainty about the trade war, capital controls imposed by the Chinese government, tougher scrutiny of Chinese acquisitions by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), and, most recently, the pandemic.  

美国和中共国相互投资数十亿美元。近年来,这些资金流动近年来有所减缓,由于投资者对贸易战的不确定性,中共国政府施加的资本控制,美国外国投资委员会(CFIUS)对中共国收购的严格审查,以及最近的CCP病毒疫情。

Chinese FDI in the United States peaked in 2016 at $46.5 billion. That same year, U.S. FDI into China was $12.9 billion, down from a high of $20 billion in 2008. Yet by the end of 2019, Chinese FDI into the United States had plummeted to less than $4.8 billion, a 90 percent decline from 2016. U.S. FDI into China remained relatively constant at $13.3 billion in 2019. 

中共国在美国的外国直接投资在2016年达到465亿美元的峰值。同年,美国对华直接投资额为129亿美元,低于2008年的200亿美元。然而,到2019年底,中共国对美直接投资已降至48亿美元以下,较2016年下降了90%;美国对华直接投资则相对稳定,为133亿美元。

While foreign investment is typically a good thing for the recipient country, the details matter. Foreign investment can build factories, warehouses, plants, and other physical infrastructure in the recipient country. It also can license a country’s most valuable technology and intellectual property.  Licensing is profitable in the short term for the lawful owners of intellectual property, but it can also facilitate the development of foreign competitors. 

虽然外国投资对接受国通常是一件好事,但投资细节很重要。外国投资可以在接受国建造厂房,仓库,工厂和其他有形基础设施。它还可以授予一国最有价值的技术和知识产权的许可。对于合法的知识产权所有者而言,授权许可在短期内是有利可图的,但它也可以促进外国竞争者的发展。

Roughly two-thirds—over $170 billion—of American investment in China over the last 30 years funded ‘greenfield’ projects to expand China’s industrial base and productive capacity. By contrast, Chinese entities devoted eight percent of their investment in the United States to building new physical infrastructure. The other 92 percent of Chinese investment funded acquisitions of American companies and intellectual property. 

在过去的30年中,美国对华投资中约有三分之二(超过1,700亿美元)用于“绿地”项目,以扩大中共国的工业基础和生产能力。相比之下,中共国实体将其在美国投资的8%用于建立新的基础设施,另外的92%用来对美国公司和知识产权的收购。

Until recently, Chinese venture capital and private equity have been active in U.S. biotech, health, technology, and other sectors. These financial relationships, which have historically not always been captured in foreign-investment figures, have acted as a Chinese gateway to sensitive American technology. 

直到最近,中共国的风险投资和私募股权都一直活跃在美国的生物技术,健康,技术和其他领域。这些投资关系构成了敏感美国技术进入中共国的入口,一直以来外国投资数据中都未曾捕捉到这一点。

The CCP has directed Chinese firms to acquire stakes in American companies in order to obtain cutting-edge technology in strategically important areas. Between 2013 and 2016, Chinese firms spent $37 billion in an attempt to acquire or invest in at least 27 American semiconductor firms.  Chinese firms also invested in at least 51 American AI startups between 2010-16. Over the past decade, one Chinese defense contractor has purchased at least seven U.S. general aviation companies. Due to state involvement, Chinese acquisitions are not made on a purely commercial basis. Chinese firms can thus offer patient capital to firms with promising technology, while profit seeking investors operating on shorter timeframes pass over those same firms. 

中共指示中国公司收购美国公司的股份,以便在具有战略意义的领域获得尖端技术。 2013-2016年,中共国公司花费了370亿美元,试图收购或投资至少27家美国半导体公司。在2010-2016年之间,中共国公司还投资了至少51家美国AI初创公司。在过去的十年中,一家中共国国防承包商至少购买了7家美国通用航空公司。由于国家的介入,中共国的并购并非纯粹出于商业目的。因此,中共国公司可以为有技术前途的公司提供长期资本,而寻求利润的投资者则可以通过较短时间的运营超越同类公司。

Chinese VC investments, while harder to trace, have followed a similar model. They target firms in areas that the government prioritizes, such as AI, autonomous vehicles, virtual reality, robotics, and blockchain technologies.Chinese investors targeted advanced technologies in more than three-quarters of the funding rounds they participated in between 2000 and mid-2018.

中共国的风险投资虽然较难追寻,但却遵循了类似的模式。他们将投资目标对准了政府优先考虑的领域,例如人工智能,自动驾驶汽车,虚拟现实,机器人技术和区块链技术。在2000年至2018年年中,中共国投资者参与的融资中有四分之三瞄准了先进技术。

China also has exploited Joint Ventures (JV) by forcing foreign companies to hand over proprietary technology as a condition for producing or selling goods in the Chinese market. Technology transferred from foreign firms is often the Chinese partners’ most advanced technology. These forced transfers give Chinese firms a shortcut in the innovation process, allowing them to reverse engineer the technology and spur future domestic innovation. 

中共国还利用合资企业(JV)迫使外国公司交出专有技术,作为其在中共国市场生产或销售商品的条件。外国公司转让的技术通常是中共国合作伙伴最先进的技术。这些强制性转让为中共国的企业提供了创新过程中的捷径,使他们能够对技术进行逆向工程并刺激未来的国内创新。

Debt 

债务

U.S. sovereign debt surpassed $27 trillion at the end of October 2020. China (including Hong Kong but not Taiwan) held $1.28 trillion of that debt in U.S. Treasury securities, making it the United States’ largest foreign creditor, barely ahead of Japan. 

到2020年10月底,美国主权债务超过27万亿美元。中共国(包括香港但不包括台湾)持有的1.28万亿美元美国国债,使其成为美国最大的外国债权国,稍高于日本。

Despite this large sum, China’s appetite for U.S. debt has waned. Mainland China in October 2020 held only five percent of U.S. outstanding public debt, down from a high of 14 percent in 2011. Beijing appears to be exploring alternatives to the U.S. dollar as a long-term store of value. In January 2020, China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), which manages China’s foreign reserves, announced plans to diversify its holdings.  

尽管有巨额资金,但中共国对美国债务的胃口有所减弱。到2020年10月,中共国大陆仅持有美国未偿付公共债务的5%,低于2011年的14%。中共国似乎正在探索替代美元的长期价值存储货币。 2020年1月,负责管理中共国外汇储备的中国国家外汇管理局(SAFE)宣布了多元化其持有股份的计划。

China’s long-term goal is to develop an alternative to the U.S. dollar trading system. In 2005, U.S. dollar assets comprised 79 percent of China’s foreign reserves. By 2019, this figure fell to an estimated 59 percent. China has tried to develop alternative cross-border trading mechanisms to the ubiquitous, U.S.-dependent SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) clearing system, such as the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS). As early as 2009, China called for a global currency to replace the dollar trading system. 

中共国的长期目标是开发一种替代美元交易系统的方案。2005年,美元资产占中共国外汇储备的79%,2019年,这一数字下降到大约59%。中共国试图开发跨境交易机制,来替代无处不在的,依赖美国的SWIFT(环球银行金融电信协会)结算系统,例如跨境银行间支付系统(CIPS)。早在2009年,中共国就呼吁使用全球货币取代美元交易系统。


原文链接:

Beat China: Targeted Decoupling and the Economic Long War


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