新闻简述：在司法部长实施 《中国倡议书》 两周年之际，司法部继续将重点放在倡议书的目标上，并宣布在过去的一年里，在破坏和遏制由中共国政府的政策和做法所带来的广泛的国家安全威胁方面取得了实质性进展。《中国倡议书》的成功并不能仅用刑事案件和行政行为来衡量，与企业和学术界的扩展对美国国家资产的自我保护也是至关重要的。
Department of Justice
Office of Public Affairs
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Monday, November 16, 2020
The China Initiative: Year-in-Review (2019-20)
On the two-year anniversary of the Attorney General’s China Initiative, the Department continues its significant focus on the Initiative’s goals and announced substantial progress during the past year in disrupting and deterring the wide range of national security threats posed by the policies and practices of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government.
“In the last year, the Department has made incredible strides in countering the systemic efforts by the PRC to enhance its economic and military strength at America’s expense,” said Attorney General William P. Barr. “While much work remains to be done, the Department is committed to holding to account those who would steal, or otherwise illicitly obtain, the U.S. intellectual capital that will propel the future.”
“The Chinese Communist Party’s theft of sensitive information and technology isn’t a rumor or a baseless accusation. It’s very real, and it’s part of a coordinated campaign by the Chinese government, which the China Initiative is helping to disrupt,” said FBI Director Christopher Wray. “The FBI opens a new China-related counterintelligence case nearly every 10 hours and we’ll continue our aggressive efforts to counter China’s criminal activity.”
“中国共产党窃取敏感信息和技术不是谣言或毫无根据的指控。 这是非常真实的，而且是中[共]国政府协调行动的一部分，而 《中国倡议书》有助于破坏这一行动。” 联邦调查局局长克里斯托弗·雷说， “联邦调查局几乎每10个小时就会立案一起新的与中共国有关的反间谍案件，我们将会继续积极努力打击中共国的犯罪活动。”
Established in November 2018, the Initiative identified a number of goals for the Department, ranging from increased focus on the investigation and prosecution of trade secret theft and economic espionage, to better countering threats posed by Chinese foreign investment and supply chain vulnerabilities.
Prioritize investigations of economic espionage and trade secret theft
The Initiative prioritizes use of the Department’s core tool, criminal investigation and prosecution, to counter economic espionage and other forms of trade secret theft. In the past year, the Department charged three economic espionage cases (in which the trade secret theft was intended to benefit the Chinese government), bringing the total to five since the China Initiative was first announced. Overall, since the Initiative was announced, we have charged more than 10 cases in which the trade secret theft had some alleged nexus to China, and we obtained guilty pleas of three defendants in those cases over the past year.
该倡议书优先使用司法部的核心工具，即刑事调查和起诉，以打击经济间谍活动和其他形式的商业秘密盗窃。 在过去的一年里，司法部起诉了三起经济间谍案（在这些案件中，窃取商业秘密的目的是为了使中[共]国政府获益），自 《中国倡议书》首次宣布以来的案件总数达到五起。 总的来说，自《中国倡议书》宣布以来，我们已经起诉了10多起涉嫌与中共国有某种关系的商业秘密盗窃案件，仅过去一年里，我们就获得了三名被告的认罪。
To take one example, the Department announced the China Initiative on the same day that it unsealed criminal charges against United Microelectronics (UMC), the Chinese state-owned enterprise Fujian Jinhua, and several individual defendants, for economic espionage that victimized Micron Technology, Inc., a leading U.S. semiconductor company.
“The United Microelectronics case is a glaring example of the PRC’s ‘rob, replicate, and replace’ strategy, in which it robs a U.S. institution of its intellectual capital, replicates the stolen technology, and then endeavors to replace the U.S. institution on the Chinese and then the global market,” said John Demers, Assistant Attorney General for National Security. “Thanks to the dedication and diligence of prosecutors and FBI agents, UMC pleaded guilty to criminal trade secret theft and agreed to pay a fine of $60 million, the second largest fine in a trade secret case, and to cooperate in the pending prosecution of its co-defendants.”
“联华电子案是中共国 ‘抢夺、复制、替代’ 战略的一个典型例子。在这一战略中，中国掠夺了一家美国机构的智力资本，复制了被盗的技术，然后努力在中国和全球市场上取代美国机构。”，国家安全助理司法部长约翰·德默斯说， “感谢检察官和FBI探员的努力和勤奋，联华电子承认了其商业机密盗窃罪，并同意支付6千万美元的罚款，这是商业机密案件中第二高的罚款，并配合对其他共同被告的待定起诉。”
The National Counterintelligence Task Force, co-led by the FBI, launched its first major campaign in 2020, devoted to protecting U.S. technology and research from the Chinese government and its proxies. This is a further step in the FBI’s and Department’s efforts to enlist all appropriate partners in ensuring integrity in government-funded programs and defeating economic espionage and theft of trade secrets.
国家反间谍特别工作组和美国联邦调查局共同主导下，在2020年发起了首个重大战役，旨在保护美国技术和研究不受中国政府及其代理的侵害。 这是 FBI 和司法部进一步争取所有适当的合作伙伴，以确保政府资助项目的诚信，并打击经济间谍活动和窃取商业机密的行为。
Develop an enforcement strategy for non-traditional collectors
At the outset, the Department identified academia as one of our most vulnerable sectors, because its traditions of openness, and the importance of international exchanges to the free flow of ideas, leave it vulnerable to PRC exploitation. The Department has pursued a two-pronged strategy of raising awareness on campuses of the threats posed by China (and the importance of implementing a security program to detect them) and prosecuting researchers who have deliberately deceived authorities about their ties to China, which deprives institutions of the ability to screen for conflicts of interest and commitment, or otherwise exploited their access.
For example, the PRC has used talent programs to encourage the transfer of technical expertise from the United States, and elsewhere in the world, to benefit the PRC’s economic and military development. Talent recruits generally sign contracts with the PRC sponsor-entity that obligate them to produce scientific outputs; to publish the results of their work in the name of the PRC beneficiary; to allow the PRC beneficiary to assert intellectual property rights over their outputs; and to recruit other researchers into the programs, among other obligations.
In exchange, the talent recruits may receive lucrative compensation packages, prestigious titles, and custom-built laboratories.
“While membership in these talent programs is not per se illegal, and the research itself may not always be protected as a trade secret, we know the PRC uses these plans, such as the well-known Thousand Talents Program, as a vehicle to recruit individuals with access to U.S. government-funded research to work in the interest of the Chinese Communist Party,” said Adam S. Hickey, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division.
国家安全部副助理司法部长亚当·希基说：“虽然加入这些人才计划本身并不是非法的，研究本身也不一定总是作为商业机密受到保护，但我们知道中[共]国利用这些计划 （比如著名的 “千人计划”）作为工具来招募那些有权得到美国政府资助的研究的个人，来为中共国谋利。”
The Initiative brings together resources from across the Department, including the National Security, Criminal, Tax, and the Civil Divisions to address this unique challenge fairly and effectively. In the past year, Department prosecutors have brought fraud, false statements, tax, smuggling and other charges against ten academics affiliated with research institutions across the country. To date, prosecutors have obtained convictions in three of those cases.
该倡议汇集了整个司法部的资源，包括国家安全司、刑事司、税务司和民事司，以公平有效地应对这一独特挑战。 在过去一年里，司法部检察官们已对全国各地研究机构下属的10名学者提出了欺诈、虚假陈述、税务、走私和其他指控。 迄今为止，检察官们已对其中三起案件中定罪。
This year, the FBI and Department prosecutors also exposed six individuals, studying in the United States, found to be connected to People’s Liberation Army military institutes, who concealed their affiliations from the State Department when applying for research visas to study at U.S. universities. In one of those cases, the Department alleged that a PLA officer was being tasked by superiors in the PRC to obtain information that would benefit PLA operations. In another case, a PLA medical researcher stands accused of following orders to observe lab operations at a U.S. university, which received funding from the U.S. government, in order to replicate those operations in the PRC.
今年，联邦调查局和司法部检察官还揭露了6名在美国学习的人，他们被发现与中国人民解放军军事学院有关联，他们在申请美国大学的研究签证时向国务院隐瞒了自己的隶属关系。 在其中一起案件中，司法部称一名解放军军官受中国上级指派获取有利于解放军行动的信息。 在另一起案件中，一名解放军医学研究人员被指控奉命观察一所美国大学的实验室运作，该大学接受美国政府的资助，以便在中国复制这些业务。
In each of the cases, the defendants are accused of concealing their PLA affiliations in order to obtain visas that allowed them to travel to the United States. After the FBI conducted interviews this summer that led to charges in those cases and the State Department closed the PRC’s Houston Consulate, a large number of undeclared, PLA-affiliated Chinese researchers fled the United States.
Those six examples are just part of the interagency effort to protect academia and taxpayer-funded research. The FBI and Department have been collaborating with federal grant-making agencies, the Joint Committee on the Research Environment, the major academic associations, the Academic Security and Counter Exploitation working group, and other appropriate entities, as well as hundreds of individual universities nationwide.
Counter malicious cyber activity
The Department continues to expose and disrupt efforts by the PRC government to steal our intellectual property and our personally identifiable information (PII) through computer intrusions. During the past year, we charged hackers working for the People’s Liberation Army with the 2017 Equifax intrusion and others associated with the Ministry of State Security (MSS) in relation to global computer intrusion campaigns targeting biomedical companies conducting COVID-19-related research, engineering firms, and software makers. One such MSS case resulted in the arrest of two conspirators in Malaysia. Two of these cases highlighted China’s development into a safe harbor for criminal hackers who also work for the PRC. The Department disrupted these cyber threats in coordination with the private sector, using legal process to seize control of hacking infrastructure while the private sector removed other infrastructure from their platforms.
司法部继续揭露和瓦解中[共]国政府通过计算机入侵来窃取我们的知识产权和个人身份信息（PII）的努力。 在过去的一年里，我们指控了为人民解放军工作的黑客，他们在 2017 年入侵了 Equifax，以及与国家安全部（MSS）有关的其他人员。这些黑客参与了针对从事 COVID-19 相关研究的生物医学公司、工程公司和软件制造商的全球计算机入侵活动。其中一起案件导致两名共谋者在马来西亚被捕。 其中两起案件凸显了中[共]国已发展成为黑客犯罪分子的安全港，而这些黑客就是为中共国工作的。 司法部与私营部门协调，利用法律程序获得对黑客基础设施的控制，同时私营部门从其平台上清除其他基础设施，从而瓦解了这些网络威胁。
In May, the FBI, in conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, also issued a public announcement to raise awareness of the threat to COVID-19 research by PRC-affiliated cyber actors and offer advice on better protecting that research from thefts.
今年5月，美国联邦调查局与国土安全局的网络安全部门和基础设施安全部门联合发布了一份公告，以提高人们对与中[共]国隶属的网络行为者对 COVID-19 研究威胁的认识，并就如何更好地保护这些研究不被盗提供建议。
Counter malign foreign influence
The Department has used the Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”), which requires those acting to influence public policy and opinion on behalf of a foreign individual or entity, to improve transparency and expose China’s foreign influence efforts. Over the past year, the Department opened a record number of FARA investigations overall and doubled the number of new registrants and new foreign principals registering annually as of 2016. That includes obtaining a record number of registrations from Chinese media companies. The Department also notified a registered Chinese media company that its filings were deficient because they failed to fully disclose its activity in the United States and failed to properly label its informational materials. The media entity remedied those deficiencies shortly thereafter.
美国司法部已实施《外国代理人注册法》（“FARA”），该法案要求对那些代表外国个人或实体影响公共政策和舆论的人提高透明度，来揭露中[共]国作为外国势力所施加的影响。在过去一年，司法部的 FARA 调查总数创历史新高，新注册人数和新外国委托人数量比 2016 年翻了一番。这包含从中[共]国媒体公司获得的登记记录数量。并且司法部已通知一个已登记的中国媒体公司其提供的文件不足，皆因其拒绝全面透漏它在美国的活动及未能准确标示其信息材料。此媒体实体后来已补足所缺少的内容。
Through its outreach efforts to universities, the Department has highlighted the need to protect foreign students studying in the United States from coercive efforts by the Communist Party to censor the freedom of thought and expression that all students here should enjoy.
In late 2019, the FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force formally established a new unit devoted specifically to understanding and defeating the malign foreign influence threat from the Chinese government and its proxies.
Counter foreign intelligence activities
The Department has achieved a number of successes in the last year in countering China’s foreign intelligence activities. China has been targeting former members of the U.S. intelligence community for recruitment, and the Department has been holding accountable individuals who succumb to their efforts. In November 2019, a former CIA case officer was sentenced to 19 years in prison for conspiring to deliver national defense information to the PRC. In August 2020, another former CIA officer who had been tasked by the PRC was arrested on the same charge — the fourth former intelligence officer charged in the last three years for similar conduct.
The Department is particularly focused on disrupting the PRC government from using career networking and social media sites to target Americans, as well as holding those accountable who hide behind fake profiles to co-opt individuals on behalf of the PRC. As one part of this effort, the FBI, in partnership with the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, created an educational film, “The Nevernight Connection,” which was released online in September 2020 to educate the public about the Chinese intelligence services’ use of social media to spot and recruit persons of interest, especially current or former security clearance holders.
In March 2020, Xuehua (Edward) Peng was sentenced to 48 months in prison, and ordered to pay a $30,000 fine, for acting as an agent of the PRC’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) in connection with a scheme to conduct pickups known as “dead drops” and transport Secure Digital cards containing classified information from a source in the United States to the MSS operatives in China.
2020年3月，彭雪华（Edward）被判 48 个月监禁并需支付3万美元罚款。彭是中[共]国家安全部间谍，罪名是参与了一个名为“死亡投递”（dead drops）的皮卡的接送计划，并将源自美国的含有机密信息的安全数码卡运送给在中[共]国的国家安全部特工。
In October 2020, Jun Wei Yeo was sentenced to 14 months in prison for acting within the United States as an agent of the MSS recruiting Americans, including U.S. military and government employees with high-level clearances. Yeo concealed his MSS affiliation from his American targets and used career networking sites and a false consulting firm to lure them to write papers which he ultimately passed to his MSS handlers.
In October 2020, eight defendants were charged with conspiring to act in the United States as illegal agents of the PRC, six of whom also face related charges of conspiring to commit interstate and international stalking. According to the complaint, the defendants participated in an international campaign to threaten, harass, surveil and intimidate a resident of New Jersey and his family in order to force them to return to the PRC as part of an international effort by the PRC government known as “Operation Fox Hunt” and “Operation Skynet.”
In furtherance of the operation, the PRC government targets Chinese individuals living in foreign countries that the PRC government alleges have committed crimes under PRC law and seeks to repatriate them to the PRC to face charges, rather than rely upon proper forms of international law enforcement cooperation.
Foreign investment reviews and telecommunications security
Beyond criminal enforcement, the Department worked to protect our national assets from national security risks posed by entities, subject to PRC influence, that seek to invest in U.S. companies or integrate into our supply chains.
In April, the Department assumed the permanent chair of the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector, established by the President through Executive Order (EO), in 2020. This organization, also known as “Team Telecom,” is an interagency group that reviews telecommunications, submarine cable landing, wireless, broadcast license, and other applications referred by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), to identify and address risks to national security and law enforcement. In the first 90 days after the Executive Order, the Department led Team Telecom to resolve more than half of the cases then pending review.
今年4月，司法部担任美国电信服务部门外国参与评估委员会的常任主席，这是由总统通过行政命令（EO）在 2020 年成立的。该组织也被称为“电信团队”，是一个跨部门组织负责审查电信、海底电缆着陆、无线网络、广播执照以及由联邦通信委员（FCC）提交的其他应用程序，以识别和解决国家安全和执法方面的风险。在行政令颁布后的首个 90 天，司法部领导电信团队解决一半以上的案件，尚待审查。
Team Telecom recommended that the FCC revoke and terminate the international telecommunications licenses held by the U.S. subsidiary of a PRC state-owned telecommunications company, China Telecom, the first revocation ever recommended by Team Telecom on national security grounds. Team Telecom also recommended that the FCC partially deny a submarine cable application, to the extent it sought a direct connection between the United States and Hong Kong.
Following the President’s 2019 Executive Order on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, the Department has worked with the Commerce Department to develop regulations implementing the EO and has identified vulnerable areas of critical infrastructure that are ripe for investigation under the EO.
The Department also worked to implement the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), which improved the authorities of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). During the previous year, the Department co-led a record number of significant CFIUS matters, on an annualized basis, including the investigation of the acquisition of a U.S. hotel management software company by a Chinese company, which the President prohibited, for just the sixth time in CFIUS history. Under FIRRMA, the FBI continued to provide analytical assistance to support CFIUS’s decision-making and identify high-risk non-notified transactions.
With its increased resources, NSD has played a significant role in CFIUS enforcement, leading the Committee to assess just the second penalty in its history, for failing to secure sensitive personal data in violation of a 2018 interim CFIUS order. NSD also dedicated personnel to identify transactions of concern that were not voluntarily filed with CFIUS and developed a program to identify bankruptcy cases that could implicate national security concerns. The bankruptcy program helps to protect U.S. assets from predatory acquisitions, including PRC acquisitions that could impact our national security, which is particularly important in light of the economic impact of COVID-19.
随着资源增加，NSD在美国外国投资委员会执法中发挥了重要的作用，并导致了委员会评估了其历史上的第二次处罚，因其未能保护敏感个人信息而违反2018年美国外国投资委员会临时令。美国外国投资委员同时引用专职人员识别未自愿向 CFIUS 提交的关注交易，并开发了一套程序以识别可能牵涉国家安全问题的破产案例。此程序有助于保护美国资产免遭掠夺性收购，包括中[共]国的收购项目可能危及我们国家安全，考虑到 COVID-19 对经济的影响这一点尤为重要。
Education and outreach
The success of the China Initiative is not measured by criminal cases and administrative actions alone, however. Outreach to businesses and academia is critical to helping America’s national assets better protect themselves. For that reason, the Department disseminated outreach presentations for use by U.S. Attorneys in their Districts, which have been deployed at various events. The FBI sustained its engagement with the private sector through various programs, and it developed and disseminated an innovative Academia Field Guide to support focused outreach by its academic outreach coordinators in all 56 field offices. In the coming year, the Department, through the FBI and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, will continue to expand our partnerships outside the federal government, because the support of the American people is critical to our success. All of our efforts are on their behalf.
然而，《中国倡议书》的成功并不能仅用刑事案件和行政行为来衡量。与企业和学术界的扩展对美国国家资产的自我保护是至关重要的。出于这个原因，司法部广传拓展演讲，供美国检察官在他们的所在地使用，它们已被部署在不同活动中。联邦调查局通过各种计划维持了与私营部门的接触，并制定和发布了创新的《学术界实地指南》，以支持其在所有 56 个实地办事处的学术外联协调员进行重点联络。在来年，司法部，通过 FBI 和美国检察官办公室会继续拓展联邦政府以外的合作关系，因为美国人民的支持对我们的胜利是至关重要的。我们所有的努力都是为了美国人民。
The Attorney General commends the professionals throughout the Department, including those who work at Main Justice, the FBI, and U.S. Attorney’s Offices around the country, who are committed to meeting the goals of the China Initiative and encourage them to redouble their efforts in the upcoming year.
All defendants, in the cases mentioned herein, are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
翻译：【文所未闻】【V%】 校对：【重生】【沙漠红蚂蚁】 编辑：【Isaiah4031】