灭共四骑士演讲之二:FBI局长雷哈德逊演讲全文(完整版)(2020.07.07)

新闻简述:2020年7月7日,美国联邦调查局局长克里斯托弗.雷(Christopher Wray)在哈德逊研究所发表演讲,全面阐述中共对美国经济和国家安全的威胁。

中英文对照演讲全文

China’s Attempt to Influence U.S. Institutions

《中国试图影响美国机构》

Christopher Wray, FBI Director

美国联邦调查局局长克里斯托弗.雷

Hudson Institute

哈德逊研究所

July 7, 2020

2020年7月7日

It’s the people of the United States who are the victims of what amounts to Chinese theft on a scale so massive that it represents one of the largest transfers of wealth in human history.

美国人民是中国盗窃活动的受害者,盗窃规模之大,已构成人类历史上最大的财富转移之一。

If you are an American adult, it is more likely than not that China has stolen your personal data.

如果你是一个美国成年人,中国很可能已经窃取过你的个人数据。

In 2017, the Chinese military conspired to hack Equifax and made off with the sensitive personal information of 150 million Americans—we’re talking nearly half of the American population and most American adults—and as I’ll discuss in a few moments, this was hardly a standalone incident.

2017年,中国军方密谋黑掉了信用评级公司艾可飞(Equifax)的数据库,盗取了1.5亿美国人的敏感个人信息——我们谈的是近一半美国人口和大多数成年人——正如我将在一会儿谈论到的,这不是一个独立的事件。

Our data isn’t the only thing at stake here—so are our health, our livelihoods, and our security.

并不只是我们的数据处于危险之中——我们的健康、生计和安全也同样如此。

We’ve now reached the point where the FBI is opening a new China-related counterintelligence case about every 10 hours. Of the nearly 5,000 active FBI counterintelligence cases currently underway across the country, almost half are related to China. And at this very moment, China is working to compromise American health care organizations, pharmaceutical companies, and academic institutions conducting essential COVID-19 research.

我们FBI现在已经到了每10个小时就会立案一个新的与中国有关的反间谍案件的地步。全美目前进行的近5000起FBI反间谍案件中,一半与CCP有关。此时此刻,CCP仍在致力于损害美国的医疗机构、制药公司以及进行新冠病毒重要研究的学术机构。

But before I go on, let me be clear: This is not about the Chinese people, and it’s certainly not about Chinese Americans. Every year, the United States welcomes more than 100,000 Chinese students and researchers into this country. For generations, people have journeyed from China to the United States to secure the blessings of liberty for themselves and their families—and our society is better for their contributions. So, when I speak of the threat from China, I mean the government of China and the Chinese Communist Party.

在继续下面的演讲之前,我得强调一下,这是CCP做的恶,与中国人民无关、与在美华人无关。每年,美国都欢迎超过10万名中国学生和研究人员进入美国。世世代代,人们从中国来到美国,为自己和家人争取自由之福,而我们的社会因他们的贡献而变得更好。所以,当我谈到来自中国的威胁时,我指的是中国政府和中国共产党。

The Chinese Regime and the Scope of Its Ambitions

中共政权及其野心

To understand this threat and how we must act to respond to it, the American people should remember three things.

为了理解这种威胁,以及怎样采取行动来应对它,美国人民应该记住三件事。

First: We need to be clear-eyed about the scope of the Chinese government’s ambition. China—the Chinese Communist Party—believes it is in a generational fight to surpass our country in economic and technological leadership.

第一:认清中共的野心。中国,就是中共,相信他们正处于一场在经济和技术上全面超越美国的世纪之战中。

That is sobering enough. But it’s waging this fight not through legitimate innovation, not through fair and lawful competition, and not by giving their citizens the freedom of thought and speech and creativity that we treasure here in the United States. Instead, China is engaged in a whole-of-state effort to become the world’s only superpower by any means necessary.

这足以令人警醒的了。但它打这场战争的方法不是通过合法创新,不是通过公平合法的竞争,也不是通过给予其公民思想、言论和创造力的自由,而这些正是我们在美国所珍视的。相反,中国正尽举国之力,不择手段地要成为世界上唯一的超级大国。

A Diverse and Multi-Layered Approach

多元化和多层面的战略

The second thing the American people need to understand is that China uses a diverse range of sophisticated techniques—everything from cyber intrusions to corrupting trusted insiders. They’ve even engaged in outright physical theft. And they’ve pioneered an expansive approach to stealing innovation through a wide range of actors—including not just Chinese intelligence services but state-owned enterprises, ostensibly private companies, certain kinds of graduate students and researchers, and a whole variety of other actors working on their behalf.

美国人民需要了解的第二件事是,中国使用五花八门的阴谋诡计——从网络入侵到蓝金黄内部人员,不一而足。他们甚至进行直接的实物偷窃。他们还采用了一种全民参与的方法窃取创新成果,不仅包括中国情报部门,还包括国有企业、表面上的私营公司、某些类型的研究生和研究人员,以及代表他们工作的其他各种各样的参与者。

Economic Espionage

经济间谍活动

To achieve its goals and surpass America, China recognizes it needs to make leaps in cutting-edge technologies. But the sad fact is that instead of engaging in the hard slog of innovation, China often steals American intellectual property and then uses it to compete against the very American companies it victimized—in effect, cheating twice over. They’re targeting research on everything from military equipment to wind turbines to rice and corn seeds.

为了实现自己的目标并超越美国,中国认识到它需要在尖端技术上实现飞跃。但可悲的事实是,中国没有进行艰苦的创新,而是经常窃取美国的知识产权,然后用它来与它受害的美国公司竞争,而此实质是双重欺骗。他们将目标重点锁定在从军事装备到风力涡轮机、水稻和玉米种子等各种研究上。

Through its talent recruitment programs, like the so-called Thousand Talents Program, the Chinese government tries to entice scientists to secretly bring our knowledge and innovation back to China—even if that means stealing proprietary information or violating our export controls and conflict-of-interest rules.

中国政府通过收买人才,如所谓的“千人计划”,诱使科学家们将我们的知识和创新秘密带回中国,即使这意味着窃取专利信息或违反我们的出口管制和利益冲突规则。

Take the case of scientist Hongjin Tan, for example, a Chinese national and American lawful permanent resident. He applied to China’s Thousand Talents Program and stole more than $1 billion—that’s with a “b”—worth of trade secrets from his former employer, an Oklahoma-based petroleum company, and got caught. A few months ago, he was convicted and sent to prison.

以科学家谭宏进为例,他就是一位中国公民和美国合法永久居民。他申请加入了“千人计划”,从他的前雇主那里窃取了价值超过10亿美元(注意,是“亿”元)的商业机密,于一家俄克拉荷马州的石油公司,然后被抓获。几个月前,他被判有罪,并被送进监狱。

Or there’s the case of Shan Shi, a Texas-based scientist, also sentenced to prison earlier this year. Shi stole trade secrets regarding syntactic foam, an important naval technology used in submarines. Shi, too, had applied to China’s Thousand Talents Program, and specifically pledged to “digest” and “absorb” the relevant technology in the United States. He did this on behalf of Chinese state-owned enterprises, which ultimately planned to put the American company out of business and take over the market.

或者另一个案例,位于德克萨斯州的科学家石山,今年早些时候也被判刑入狱。石山窃取了有关复合薄膜塑料技术的商业机密,这是一项应用于潜艇的重要海军技术。石山也申请了中国的“千人计划”,并特别承诺“消化”和“吸收”美国的相关技术。他这样做是代表着中国国有企业,而他们最终计划将美国公司淘汰出局,占领市场。

In one of the more galling and egregious aspects of the scheme, the conspirators actually patented in China the very manufacturing process they’d stolen, and then offered their victim American company a joint venture using its own stolen technology. We’re talking about an American company that spent years and millions of dollars developing that technology, and China couldn’t replicate it—so, instead, it paid to have it stolen.

该计谋的一个更骇人听闻和令人发指的方面,是共谋者甚至在中国将偷来的制造工艺申请专利,然后与被偷盗的美国公司成立一家合资企业,使用自己的被盗技术。我们说的是一家美国公司,它花了多年时间和数百万美元开发了这项技术,而中国无法复制它,所以就花钱把它偷走了。

And just two weeks ago, Hao Zhang was convicted of economic espionage, theft of trade secrets, and conspiracy for stealing proprietary information about wireless devices from two U.S. companies. One of those companies had spent over 20 years developing the technology Zhang stole.

就在两周前,张浩因从两家美国公司窃取无线设备的专有信息而被判处经济间谍罪、盗窃商业机密罪和共谋罪。其中一家公司花了20多年时间开发张浩所窃取的技术。

These cases were among more than a thousand investigations the FBI has into China’s actual and attempted theft of American technology—which is to say nothing of over a thousand more ongoing counterintelligence investigations of other kinds related to China. We’re conducting these kinds of investigations in all 56 of our field offices. And over the past decade, we’ve seen economic espionage cases with a link to China increase by approximately 1,300 percent.

这些案件是联邦调查局对中国实际和企图盗窃美国技术的一千多起调查中的一部分,更不用说还有一千多起与中国有关的其它类型的反情报调查正在进行中。我们的56个外地办事处都在进行此类调查。在过去十年里,我们看到与中国有关的经济间谍案件增加了大约1300%。

The stakes could not be higher, and the potential economic harm to American businesses and the economy as a whole almost defies calculation.

“千人计划”真是无本万利的赌注,其对美国企业和整个经济的潜在伤害,几乎无法计算。

Clandestine Efforts

秘密活动

As National Security Advisor O’Brien discussed in his June remarks, the Chinese government is also making liberal use of hacking to steal our corporate and personal data—and they’re using both military and non-state hackers to do it. The Equifax intrusion I mentioned just a few moments ago, which led to the indictment of Chinese military personnel, was hardly the only time China stole the sensitive personal information of huge numbers of the American public.

正如国家安全顾问奥布赖恩在6月份的讲话中所讨论的,中国政府也在随心所欲的利用黑客来窃取我们的公司和个人数据,而且他们利用军方和非国家黑客两种方式。我刚才提到的艾可飞(Equifax)入侵事件,导致中国军事人员被起诉,这根本不是中国唯一的一次窃取大量美国公众的敏感个人信息。

For example, did any of you have health insurance through Anthem or one of its associated insurers? In 2015, China’s hackers stole the personal data of 80 million of that company’s current and former customers.

例如,在场各位中有人购买了伟彭医疗网(Anthem)或其关联保险公司的医疗保险吗?2015 年,中国的黑客窃取了该公司8000万名现有和以前客户的个人数据。

Or maybe you’re a federal employee—or you used to be one, or you applied for a government job once, or a family member or roommate did. Well, in 2014, China’s hackers stole more than 21 million records from OPM, the federal government’s Office of Personnel Management.

或者你现在是一名联邦雇员,或者你曾经是一名联邦雇员,或者你曾经申请了一次政府工作,或者你的家庭成员或室友申请了。好吧,2014年,中国的黑客从联邦政府人事管理办公室(OPM)窃取了超过2100万条记录。

Why are they doing this? First, China has made becoming an artificial intelligence world leader a priority, and these kinds of thefts feed right into China’s development of artificial intelligence tools.

他们为什么要这么做?首先,中国已经把成为人工智能的世界领导者作为首要任务,这类盗窃行为正好为中国发展人工智能工具提供帮助。

Compounding the threat, the data China stole is of obvious value as they attempt to identify people for secret intelligence gathering. On that front, China is using social media platforms—the same ones Americans use to stay connected or find jobs—to identify people with access to our government’s sensitive information and then target those people to try to steal it.

使威胁雪上加霜的是,中国窃取的数据具有明显的战略价值,因为他们试图识别人们的身份以进行秘密情报收集。在这方面,中国正在利用社交媒体平台——那些美国人用来保持联络或寻找工作的平台——来识别能够接触我国政府敏感信息的人,然后针对这些人试图窃取这些信息。

Just to pick one example, a Chinese intelligence officer posing as a headhunter on a popular social media platform recently offered an American citizen a sizeable sum of money in exchange for so-called “consulting” services. That sounds benign enough until you realize those “consulting” services were related to sensitive information the American target had access to as a U.S. military intelligence specialist.

举一个例子,一位中国情报人员最近在一个流行的社交媒体平台上冒充猎头公司,向一位美国公民提供了一大笔钱,以换取所谓的“咨询”服务。这听起来很温和,直到你意识到这些“咨询”服务与这位作为美国军事情报专家的蓝金黄目标可以接触到的敏感信息有关。

Now that particular tale has a happy ending: The American citizen did the right thing and reported the suspicious contact, and the FBI, working together with our armed forces, took it from there. I wish I could say that all such incidents ended that way.

现在,这个奇特的故事有了一个圆满的结局:这位美国公民做了正确的事,举报了可疑的接触,联邦调查局,连同我们的武装部队,继而接手案件。我但愿所有这类的事件都能有这样的结局。

Threats to Academia

对学术界的威胁

It’s a troublingly similar story in academia.

这是学术界中令人不安的似曾相识的故事。

Through talent recruitment programs like the Thousand Talents Program I mentioned just a few moments ago, China pays scientists at American universities to secretly bring our knowledge and innovation back to China—including valuable, federally funded research. To put it bluntly, this means American taxpayers are effectively footing the bill for China’s own technological development. China then leverages its ill-gotten gains to undercut U.S. research institutions and companies, blunting our nation’s advancement and costing American jobs. And we are seeing more and more of these cases.

通过我刚才提到的“千人计划”类似项目,中国收买美国科学家和大学,偷偷地将我们的知识和创新带回中国——包括宝贵的、由联邦政府资助的研究。说白了,这意味着美国纳税人正在为中国自身的技术发展买单。然后,中国利用其不义之财削弱美国研究机构和公司,阻碍我们国家的进步,并造成美国就业机会的减少。而我们看到越来越多的此类案例。

In May alone, we arrested both Qing Wang, a former researcher with the Cleveland Clinic who worked on molecular medicine and the genetics of cardiovascular disease, and Simon Saw-Teong Ang, a University of Arkansas scientist doing research for NASA. Both of these guys were allegedly committing fraud by concealing their participation in Chinese talent recruitment programs while accepting millions of dollars in American federal grant funding.

仅在5月份,我们就逮捕了在克利夫兰诊所从事分子医学和心血管疾病遗传学研究的前研究员王擎,和为美国宇航局(NASA)做研究的阿肯色大学科学家西蒙·洪。这两人都涉嫌欺诈,他们隐瞒自己参与中国人才收买项目,同时接受数百万美元的美国联邦研究拨款。

That same month, former Emory University professor Xiao-Jiang Li pled guilty to filing a false tax return for failing to report the income he’d received through China’s Thousand Talents Program. Our investigation found that while Li was researching Huntington’s disease at Emory, he was also pocketing half a million unreported dollars from China.

同月,前埃默里大学教授李晓江因提交虚假纳税申报表,以瞒报通过中国“千人计划”获得的收入而认罪。我们的调查发现,在埃默里大学研究亨廷顿症的同时,还将来自中国未申报的50万美元收入囊中。

In a similar vein, Charles Lieber, chair of Harvard’s Department of Chemistry and Chemical Biology, was indicted just last month for making false statements to federal authorities about his Thousand Talents participation. The United States has alleged that Lieber concealed from both Harvard and the NIH his position as a strategic scientist at a Chinese university—and the fact that the Chinese government was paying him, through the Wuhan Institute of Technology, a $50,000 monthly stipend, more than $150,000 in living expenses, and more than $1.5 million to establish a laboratory back in China.

同样,哈佛大学化学与化学生物学系主席查尔斯·利伯(Charles Lieber)上月因向联邦当局谎报他的“千人计划”参而被起诉。美国指控利伯向哈佛大学和卫生研究院(NIH)隐瞒了他在中国一所大学的战略科学家地位,以及中国政府通过武汉理工大学,向他支付每月5万美元的津贴、超过15万美元的生活费用和150多万美元在中国建立实验室的费用。

Malign Foreign Influence

恶意对外影响

There’s more. Another tool China and the Chinese Communist Party use to manipulate Americans is what we call malign foreign influence.

不止如此。中国操纵美国人的另一个工具,是恶意对外影响运动。

Now, traditional foreign influence is a normal, legal diplomatic activity typically conducted through diplomatic channels. But malign foreign influence efforts are subversive, undeclared, criminal, or coercive attempts to sway our government’s policies, distort our country’s public discourse, and undermine confidence in our democratic processes and values.

如今,传统的对外影响是一种正常的、合法的外交活动,一般通过外交渠道进行。但是,恶意的对外影响则是颠覆性的、未声明的、犯罪的或胁迫性的企图,目的是左右我国政府的政策,歪曲我国的公共舆论,破坏对我们民主进程和价值观的信心。

China is engaged in a highly sophisticated malign foreign influence campaign, and its methods include bribery, blackmail, and covert deals. Chinese diplomats also use both open, naked economic pressure and seemingly independent middlemen to push China’s preferences on American officials.

中国正在进行一场环环相扣的恶性对外影响运动,其手段包括贿赂、勒索和秘密交易。中国外交官还利用公开的、赤裸裸的经济压力,和利用貌似独立实则受CCP控制的中间人,向美国官员推销他们的观点。

Just take one all-too-common illustration: Let’s say China gets wind that some American official is planning to travel to Taiwan—think a governor, a state senator, a member of Congress. China does not want that to happen, because that travel might appear to legitimize Taiwanese independence from China—and legitimizing Taiwan would, of course, be contrary to China’s “One China” policy.

就拿一个很常见的例子来说吧:比方说中国得到风声说某位美国官员计划前往台湾,比如一位州长、州参议员或国会议员。中国不希望这种情况发生,因为它担心这种访问会推动台湾独立合法化,而使台湾合法化当然会违背中国的所谓“一中”政策。

So what does China do? Well, China has leverage over the American official’s constituents—American companies, academics, and members of the media all have legitimate and understandable reasons to want access to Chinese partners and markets. And because of the authoritarian nature of the Chinese Communist Party, China has immense power over those same partners and markets. So, China will sometimes start by trying to influence the American official overtly and directly. China might openly warn that if the American official goes ahead and takes that trip to Taiwan, China will take it out on a company from that official’s home state by withholding the company’s license to manufacture in China. That could be economically ruinous for the company, would directly pressure the American official to alter his travel plans, and the official would know that China was trying to influence him.

那么,中国会怎么做呢?好吧,中国对美国官员的选民们有影响力,因为美国公司、学者和媒体成员都有合法和可以理解的理由希望获得中国的合作伙伴和市场。由于中国共产党的专制本质,中国对这些合作伙伴和市场拥有巨大的控制力。因此,中国有时会试图从公开和直接地影响美国官员下手。中国可能会公开警告,如果这位美国官员继续前往台湾,中国将对该官员所在州的一家公司发泄,扣押该公司在中国的生产许可证。这可能会给公司带来经济上毁灭性的损失,直接迫使该美国官员改变其旅行计划,而这位官员也会知道中国正试图影响他。

That would be bad enough. But the Chinese Communist Party often doesn’t stop there; it can’t stop there if it wants to stay in power—so it uses its leverage even more perniciously. If China’s more direct, overt influence campaign doesn’t do the trick, they sometimes turn to indirect, covert, deceptive influence efforts.

那原已经够糟了。但中共往往不止于此;如果它想继续掌权,就不能止步于此,所以它甚至会采取更加歹毒的手段。如果中国采取更直接、公开的干预行动无法奏效,他们有时会转而采取间接、隐蔽以及欺骗性的方式。

To continue with the illustration of the American official with travel plans that the Chinese Communist Party doesn’t like, China will work relentlessly to identify the people closest to that official—the people that official trusts most. China will then work to influence those people to act on China’s behalf as middlemen to influence the official. The co-opted middlemen may then whisper in the official’s ear and try to sway the official’s travel plans or public positions on Chinese policy. These intermediaries, of course, aren’t telling the American official that they’re Chinese Communist Party pawns—and worse still, some of these intermediaries may not even realize they’re being used as pawns, because they, too, have been deceived.

继续举例:当美国官员的行动计划是中共不喜欢时,中国将不遗余力地找出与该官员(官方最信任的人)最亲近的人。然后,中国将努力让这些人以中间人的名义,实为维护中国的利益来影响这位官员。然后,被拉拢的中间人可能会在该官员耳边窃窃私语并试图左右官员的出行计划或对华政策的公开立场。当然,这些中间人并没有告诉美国官员他们是中共的棋子——更糟糕的是,这些中间人甚至并未意识到他们正被当成棋子,因为他们被蒙骗了。

Ultimately, China doesn’t hesitate to use smoke, mirrors, and misdirection to influence Americans.

归根结底,中国毫不犹豫地使用欺骗信息和误导信息来影响美国人。

Similarly, China often pushes academics and journalists to self-censor if they want to travel into China. And we’ve seen the Chinese Communist Party pressure American media and sporting giants to ignore or suppress criticism of China’s ambitions regarding Hong Kong or Taiwan. This kind of thing is happening over and over, across the United States.

同样,如果学者和记者想进入中国,中国经常会强迫他们进行自我审查。我们看到中共向美国媒体和体育巨头施压,要求他们无视或压制对中国涉足香港或台湾问题的批评言论。这种事在美国各地一而再再而三地发生。

And I will note that the pandemic has unfortunately not stopped any of this—in fact, we have heard from federal, state, and even local officials that Chinese diplomats are aggressively urging support for China’s handling of the COVID-19 crisis. Yes, this is happening at both the federal and state levels. Not that long ago, we had a state senator who was recently even asked to introduce a resolution supporting China’s response to the pandemic.

我要指出很不幸的是这种情况在疫情大流行期间也丝毫没有改变——事实上,我们从联邦、州甚至地方官员那里听说:中国外交官正极具攻击性地敦促各方支持中国处理新冠肺炎危机。是的,该情况正在联邦和州两级中发生。不久前,我们有一位州参议员,他甚至被要求提出一项支持中国应对流行病的决议。

The punchline is this: All of these seemingly inconsequential pressures add up to a policymaking environment in which Americans find themselves held over a barrel by the Chinese Communist Party.

关键点在于:所有这些看似无关紧要的压力相结合就促成了一种政策制定环境,即美国人发现他们自己已任中共摆布了。

Threats to the Rule of Law

对法治的威胁

All the while, China’s government and Communist Party have brazenly violated well-settled norms and the rule of law.

中国政府和共产党始终在厚颜无耻地公然违反制定好的准则和法律法规。

Since 2014, Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping has spearheaded a program known as “Fox Hunt.” Now, China describes Fox Hunt as some kind of international anti-corruption campaign—it is not. Instead, Fox Hunt is a sweeping bid by General Secretary Xi to target Chinese nationals whom he sees as threats and who live outside China, across the world. We’re talking about political rivals, dissidents, and critics seeking to expose China’s extensive human rights violations.

自2014年以来,中国总书记习近平带头启动了一项”猎狐”的计划。如今,中国将猎狐行动描述为某种国际反腐败运动——事实并非如此。相反,猎狐行动是由习总书记开展的意在针对具有威胁并聚居海外的中国公民的清剿行动。这些被其视为有威胁人的包括:政治对手、异议分子以及试图揭露中国大量侵犯人权行为的批评者。

Hundreds of the Fox Hunt victims that they target live right here in the United States, and many are American citizens or green card holders. The Chinese government wants to force them to return to China, and China’s tactics to accomplish that are shocking. For example, when it couldn’t locate one Fox Hunt target, the Chinese government sent an emissary to visit the target’s family here in the United States. The message they said to pass on? The target had two options: return to China promptly, or commit suicide. And what happens when Fox Hunt targets refuse to return to China? In the past, their family members both here in the United States and in China have been threatened and coerced, and those back in China have even been arrested for leverage.

其中数百名猎狐行动的受害者就生活在美国,他们中有许多已成为美国公民或持有美国绿卡。中国政府想将他们强制遣送回国,同时他们为达目的所采取的策略令人发指。比如说,当它(中共)无法定位猎狐名单人员时,中国政府就会派遣间谍来美国拜访他的家人。他们(间谍)要传递的信息是什么呢?名单中的人只有两个选择:立即回中国或者自杀。如果猎狐行动目标人员拒绝回国将会发生何事?从过往来看,他们在美国和中国的家人都要受到威胁和胁迫,在中国的家人甚至会遭到逮捕而成为威胁的筹码。

I’ll take this opportunity to note that if you believe the Chinese government is targeting you—that you’re a potential Fox Hunt victim—please reach out to your local FBI field office.

我要借此机会提醒:如果你认为中国政府正盯上你——你可能成为猎狐行动受害者——请与当地FBI联系。

Exploiting Our Openness

利用我们的开放

Understanding how a nation could engage in these tactics brings me to the third thing the American people need to remember: that China has a fundamentally different system than ours—and it’s doing all it can to exploit the openness of ours while taking advantage of its own closed system.

了解一个国家如何使用这些策略,让我想到美国人民需要记住的第三件事:中国有一个与我们的完全不同的体系,它正倾其所有地利用我们的开放性,同时也在利用他们的封闭体制。

Many of the distinctions that mean a lot here in the United States are blurry or almost nonexistent in China—I’m talking about distinctions between the government and the Chinese Communist Party, between the civilian and military sectors, and between the state and the “private” sector.

在美国,有许多意义重大差别在中国却是模糊不清或几乎相同的——我指的是政府与中国共产党之间、民事和军事部门之间、公有与“私营”之间的区别。

For one thing, an awful lot of large Chinese businesses are state-owned enterprises—literally owned by the government, and thus the Party. And even if they aren’t, China’s laws allow its government to compel any Chinese company to provide any information it requests—including American citizens’ data.

首先,很多大型中国企业都是国有企业—实为政府所有,因此也属于党。即使并非如此,中国的法律赋予中国政府权力能强迫任何中国公司提供他们所需要的任何信息,包括美国公民的数据。

On top of that, Chinese companies of any real size are legally required to have Communist Party “cells” inside them to keep them in line. Even more alarmingly, Communist Party cells have reportedly been established in some American companies operating in China as a cost of doing business there.

除此之外,任何实具规模的中国公司都被合法地要求设立党支部以让他们循规蹈矩。更令人震惊的是,传闻某些美国公司以成立党支部为代价在中国从事经营活动。

These kinds of features should give U.S. companies pause when they consider working with Chinese corporations like Huawei—and should give all Americans pause, too, when relying on such a company’s devices and networks. As the world’s largest telecommunications equipment manufacturer, Huawei has broad access to much that American companies do in China. It’s also been charged in the United States with racketeering conspiracy and has, as alleged in the indictment, repeatedly stolen intellectual property from U.S. companies, obstructed justice, and lied to the U.S. government and its commercial partners, including banks.

当美国公司考虑与华为这样的中国公司合作时,这些特征应该让美国公司三思,在使用中国公司的设备和网络时,所有美国人也应该三思而后行。作为全球最大的电信设备制造商,华为与美国公司在中国拥有广泛的业务往来。该公司还在美国被控参与敲诈勒索,如起诉书所述,它多次窃取美国公司的知识产权,妨碍司法公正,并对美国政府及其包括银行在内的商业伙伴撒谎。

The allegations are clear: Huawei is a serial intellectual property thief, with a pattern and practice of disregarding both the rule of law and the rights of its victims. I have to tell you, it certainly caught my attention to read a recent article describing the words of Huawei’s founder, Ren Zhengfei, about the company’s mindset. At a Huawei research and development center, he reportedly told employees that to ensure the company’s survival, they need to—and I quote—“surge forward, killing as you go, to blaze us a trail of blood.” He’s also reportedly told employees that Huawei has entered, to quote, “a state of war.” I certainly hope he couldn’t have meant that literally, but it’s hardly an encouraging tone, given the company’s repeated criminal behavior.

这些指控非常明确:华为是一个多次参与知识产权盗窃的窃贼,其行为模式不仅无视法治也不尊重受害者的权利。我不得不告诉你们,最近有一篇文章引起了我的关注,该文章描述了华为创始人任正非关于公司思维模式的言论。据报道,他在华为的一个研发中心告诉员工:为了确保公司生存,他们需要(我引用他的话)“激流勇进,挡我则死,杀出一条血路”。据说他还告诉员工说华为已经进入“战争状态”。我当然希望他的真意并非如此, 但考虑到公司一再的犯罪行为, 这可不是什么鼓舞人心的语气。

In our modern world, there is perhaps no more ominous prospect than a hostile foreign government’s ability to compromise our country’s infrastructure and devices. If Chinese companies like Huawei are given unfettered access to our telecommunications infrastructure, they could collect any of your information that traverses their devices or networks. Worse still: They’d have no choice but to hand it over to the Chinese government if asked—the privacy and due process protections that are sacrosanct in the United States are simply non-existent in China.

在我们的现代世界,与敌对的外国政府破坏我国基础设施和设备的能力相比,没有什么比这更可怕了。如果像华为这样的中国公司能够不受限制地参与我们的电信基础设施建设,他们就可以通过他们的设备和网络收集你们的所有信息。更糟的是:如果中国政府需要,他们别无选择,只能将其上交——在美国神圣不可侵犯的隐私和正当程序保护在中国根本不存在。

Responding Effectively to the Threat

有效应对威胁

The Chinese government is engaged in a broad, diverse campaign of theft and malign influence, and it can execute that campaign with authoritarian efficiency. They’re calculating. They’re persistent. They’re patient. And they’re not subject to the righteous constraints of an open, democratic society or the rule of law.

中国政府正在从事一场广泛而多样化的盗窃和具有恶意影响的运动,它能以独裁的效率执行这场运动。他们深谋远虑、坚持不懈、富有耐心。他们完全不受开放民主社会或法治的正义约束。

China, as led by the Chinese Communist Party, is going to continue to try to misappropriate our ideas, influence our policymakers, manipulate our public opinion, and steal our data. They will use an all-tools and all-sectors approach—and that demands our own all-tools and all-sectors approach in response.

由中共领导的中国一直在试图侵占我们的想法,影响我们的决策者,操纵我们的公众舆论以及窃取我们的数据。他们使用一切工具,发动所有部门来达到目的,这就要求我们要做出全面回应。

Our folks at the FBI are working their tails off every day to protect our nation’s companies, our universities, our computer networks, and our ideas and innovation. To do that, we’re using a broad set of techniques—from our traditional law enforcement authorities to our intelligence capabilities.

我们FBI的同事们每天都在竭尽全力地保护我们国家的公司、高校、计算机网络以及我们的想法和创新。从传统的执法部门到我们的情报部门都在使用一系列广泛的技术来达到此保护目的。

And I will briefly note that we’re having real success. With the help of our many foreign partners, we’ve arrested targets all over the globe. Our investigations and the resulting prosecutions have exposed the tradecraft and techniques the Chinese use, raising awareness of the threat and our industries’ defenses. They also show our resolve and our ability to attribute these crimes to those responsible. It’s one thing to make assertions—but in our justice system, when a person, or a corporation, is investigated and then charged with a crime, we have to prove the truth of the allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. The truth matters—and so, these criminal indictments matter. And we’ve seen how our criminal indictments have rallied other nations to our cause—which is crucial to persuading the Chinese government to change its behavior.

我将扼要地指出我们取得了实质性的成功。在许多外国合作伙伴的帮助下,我们在全球范围逮捕目标人物。我们的调查和由此产生的检举揭发暴露了中国使用的间谍情报技术和手段,同时也提高了人们对威胁和行业防御意识。它们也显示出我们要将罪犯绳之以法的决心和能力。指控是一回事,但在我们的司法体系里,当一个人或一家公司被调查而后被指控犯罪时,我们必须毫无疑问地证明指控的真实性。所以,这些刑事起诉很重要。同时,我们看到这些刑事起诉是如何将其他国家联合起来支持我们的——这对于说服中国政府改变其行为至关重要。

We’re also working more closely than ever with partner agencies here in the U.S. and our partners abroad. We can’t do it on our own; we need a whole-of-society response. That’s why we in the intelligence and law enforcement communities are working harder than ever to give companies, universities, and the American people themselves the information they need to make their own informed decisions and protect their most valuable assets.

我们现在比以往任何时候都更紧密地与美国国内、国外的伙伴合作。靠着我们自己无法做到,我们需要全社会的响应。这就是为何我们的情报界和执法界要比以往任何时候都更加努力地工作,来为公司、大学和美国人民提供他们需要的信息,以便他们能做出明智决定和保护他们最宝贵的资产。

Confronting this threat effectively does not mean we shouldn’t do business with the Chinese. It does not mean we shouldn’t host Chinese visitors. It does not mean we shouldn’t welcome Chinese students or coexist with China on the world stage. But it does mean that when China violates our criminal laws and international norms, we are not going to tolerate it, much less enable it. The FBI and our partners throughout the U.S. government will hold China accountable and protect our nation’s innovation, ideas, and way of life—with the help and vigilance of the American people.

有效地应对威胁并不意味着我们不应与中国人做生意,不意味着我们不应接待中国游客、不意味着我们不应欢迎中国学生或在世界舞台上与中国共存。但它确实意味着当中国违反我们的刑法和国际准则时,我们将不会容忍它,更不会允许它。美国联邦调查局和我们在政府中的合作伙伴将追究中国的责任,并在美国人民的帮助和警惕下保护我们国家的创新、理念以及生活方式。

Thank you for having me here today.

谢谢你们今天邀请我到这里。

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翻译:【Dlrow】【重生者】校对:【EricLiu】字幕:【Naomi (文花开)】【相机过热啊】

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joop12345
7 月 之前

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Himalaya Rose Garden Team

“but those who hope in the Lord will renew their strength. They will soar on wings like eagles; they will run and not grow weary, they will walk and not be faint” 【Isaiah 40:31】 7月 29日