美国国防部非常规战争手册(二)

翻译:波士顿五月花   xxmy

往期链接:

美国国防部非常规战争手册(一)

(接上文)

Central Idea

中心思想 

The Department must institutionalize irregular warfare as a core competency for both conventional and special operations forces, sustaining the ability to impose costs and create dilemmas for our adversaries across the full spectrum of competition and conflict. To accomplish this vision, the Department will:

无论是常规部队还是特种作战部队,国防部必须将非常规战争做为核心竞争力而使其制度化,在全方位的竞争和冲突中,我们必须保持让对手增加成本及给对手制造困境的能力。为了达到这个目标,国防部将要:

Break the reactive cycle of investment in IW capabilities by institutionalizing lessons learned from past conflicts, and preserving a baseline of IW-focused expertise and capabilities;

对于为增加非常规战争应战能力所做的投资, 要打破目前的消极应对方式,从过去的冲突中吸取的经验教训,保留一定程度的专门应对非常规战争的专家及应对能力;

Sustain IW as a core competency for the entire Joint Force, not just Special Operations Forces;

将应对非常规战争作为整个联合部队的核心竞争力,而不仅仅是特种作战部队的能力;

Ensure widespread understanding and sufficient expertise in IW;

确保我们对非常规战争有广泛的了解,并拥有足够的专家;

Ensure its approach to IW becomes more agile and cost-informed by developing and employing resource-sustainable IW capabilities;

为了能持续拥有应对非常规战争的能力,我们要确保研发项目更加灵活,并更加了解研发项目及相关人员的成本;

Seize the initiative and use IW capabilities proactively to expand the competitive space, defeat our adversaries’ competitive strategies, and prepare for an escalation to conflict, if required; and

采取主动出击,将我们拥有的非常规战争的能力扩展至竞争激烈的太空领域,打败我们对手的竞争战略,并在需要时为冲突升级做好准备;并且

Organize to foster and sustain unified action in IW with interagency partners as well as key allies and partners.

针对非常规战争,组织,促进并保持机构之间,盟友及合作伙伴之间的统一行动

RECENT LESSONS GUIDE OUR APPROACH

用近期的经验教训指导我们行动方案

The United States has deep experience conducting irregular warfare, beginning with the first major American overseas expedition against the Barbary Pirates in the early 1800s, and continuing through the campaign to degrade the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. We have generated countless lessons from our history of irregular war. However, we often struggle to consolidate our tactical successes and military gains into enduring strategic outcomes and adapt our capabilities for great power competition. In periods of emphasis on great power competition, we must not discard the ability to employ our IW capabilities and mindset proactively against irregular threats from state and non-state actors.

美国拥有丰富的非常规战争经验,始于1800 年代早期第一个针对巴巴里海盗的海外远征作战,并通过一次次的行动不断削弱伊朗和叙利亚的伊斯兰国的武装力量。我们已经从我们自己的非常规战争的历史中积累了无数教训。然而,我们常常难以将自己的战术成功和军事成果加以运用,巩固为持久的战略并增强竞争力。在这个强调大国竞争的时期,我们绝不能放弃主动使用非常规战争手段,并要从心态上主动抗击那些来自国家的及非国家的非常规威胁。

We Remain Underprepared for Irregular War

我们仍旧对非常规战争准备不足

Our adversaries seek to undercut our global influence, degrade our relationships with key allies and partners, and shape the global environment to their advantage without provoking a U.S. conventional response. As we reorient the Department towards great power competition, we do not have the luxury of discarding our wellhoned ability to wage irregular war as we have done in the past. 

我们的对手试图削弱我们的全球影响力,削弱我们与重要盟友和伙伴的关系,并在不引发美国常规反应的条件下形成对他们有利的国际环境。 在国防部重新转向大国竞争这个方向之时,我们无法承受像过去那样,忽视我们良好的非常规战争能力,而去发动战争。

For example, the United States entered irregular wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq unprepared to conduct the major counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns and counterterrorism campaigns that followed.

例如,美国在越南、阿富汗和伊拉克进行了非常规战争,但没有准备好进行随后的平叛 (COIN) 及反恐行动。

Most Military Capabilities Can Be Applied in an Irregular Context

大多数军事能力可以在不规则的环境中应用

Successful military contributions to irregular warfare require a deliberate and sustained integration of conventional and special operations capabilities. Our experience in the Cold War suggests that longstanding traditional military activities—force movements, partner engagements, public affairs, partner logistical support, security force assistance, intelligence and counterintelligence activities, and training—complement and mutually support irregular mission objectives such as competing for influence and legitimacy, the foreign internal defense of allied states, and preparations for unconventional warfare.

成功的非常规战争,需要有意识地和持续地整合常规和特种作战能力。我们在冷战中的经验表明,长期的传统军事活动——例如部队调动、合作伙伴的参与、公共事务、合作伙伴的后勤支持、安全部队的援助、情报和反情报活动,以及培训——补充并支持了非常规战争的任务目标,诸如争夺影响力及合法性、盟国间的维和行动,以及对非常规战争的准备。

Conventional forces have executed, can execute, and even lead most IW missions. Conventional forces have supported or led counterinsurgency campaigns in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan; stabilization missions in Bosnia and Somalia; and other irregular campaigns. Even when special operations forces (SOF) have taken the lead in unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense missions, they are heavily enabled by conventional forces. As we shift towards great power competition, our conventional forces must not lose the ability to wage irregular war.

常规部队已经执行过、可以执行,甚至能够领导大多数非常规使命。 常规部队支持了或者领导了越南、伊拉克和阿富汗的平叛行动;波斯尼亚及索马里的维和行动;以及其他非常规任务。即便是特种部队领导的非常规战争,反恐,以及维和行动,他们都需要常规部队的大力支持。随着我们转向大国竞争,我们的常规力量必须不能失去发动非常规战争的能力。

神话:非常规战争即是反恐——反恐即是特种部队—— 特种部队即是非常规战争

事实:常规力量一直,也永远会在各种非常规使命及军事行动中发挥作用

Conventional Overmatch Encourages Adversaries to Pursue Indirect Approaches

超强的常规力量鼓励对手另辟蹊径

As we seek to rebuild our own lethality in traditional warfare, our adversaries will become more likely to emphasize irregular approaches in their competitive strategies to negate our advantages and exploit our disadvantages. Their intent will be to achieve their objectives without resorting to direct armed conflict against the United States, or buy time until they are better postured to challenge us directly. The purpose of competition is not only to gain military advantages, but also to defeat adversaries’ strategies, shape their perceptions, and deny their strategic objectives in the pursuit of national interests.

当我们寻求在传统战争中重建我们的杀伤力时,我们的对手将愈发强调运用非常规手段来和我们做战略竞争,以否定我们的优势并利用我们的劣势。他们期望的是,在不与美国产生直接武装冲突的前提下实现他们的目标, 或是尽量争取时间,直到拥有直接挑战我们的能力。此次竞争的目的不仅在于获得军事优势,而且在于击败对手的战略,塑造他们的观念,并否认他们追求国家利益的战略目标。

Irregular War Requires Unified Action

非常规战争需要统一行动

The successful conduct of IW relies upon unified action with our U.S. interagency and multinational partners. Our competitors have operationalized clandestine criminal activity and predatory economic behavior as components of their own approach to irregular warfare. However, structural divisions limit our ability to respond to non-military aspects of adversarial competition. No single U.S. Government department or agency has primacy in the prosecution of irregular conflict or adversarial competition. We cannot assume unified action will occur on its own. We must pursue it deliberately.

非常规战争的成功需要依赖我们美国各机构之间及跨国合作伙伴间的统一行动。我们的竞争对手将秘密犯罪活动和掠夺性经济行为作为他们非常规战争操作的组成部分。 然而,对我们而言,机构的划分限制了我们对敌方非军事行动的反应能力。美国政府没有一个部门或机构的主要任务是起诉非常规冲突或是对抗性竞争。我们不能假设统一动作会自动发生。 我们必须刻意而为之。

Recent Operations Set a Standard for an Enduring Approach

最近的行动为持久方法设定了标准

Recent experience suggests there are more effective and less costly ways to achieve strategic success in IW. Since 2014, conventional and special operations forces have worked closely together in Iraq and Syria to improve the longstanding “by, with, and through” approach to IW. These operations have proven to be more cost-effective than doing it ourselves. We have a model, but institutionalization of these lessons requires an enduring, whole-of-Department approach.

最近的经验表明,有更有效及成本更低的方法来实现非常规战争的战略成功。自 2014 年以来,常规部队及特种作战部队在伊拉克和叙利亚密切合作,不断改进非常规战争中长期存在的“by-with-through”作战方法。这些行动证明了by-with-through 方法比我们自己运作更加节省成本。我们有模型,但是这些经验教训的制度化需要持久的,整个国防部的共同努力。

(未完待续)

原文链接:

Irregular-Warfare-Annex-to-the-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.PDF

(文章仅代表作者本人观点,与Gnews 无关)


校对:冲天一怒

编辑:jamie(文胤)

封面:霹雳鼠年

发布:吐纳

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