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本节开始,进入《2021战略竞争法》的第4个标题。

本节要点:中共国正在推进一个反竞争的经济和产业政策的生态系统,包括:扭曲全球市场、限制创新、不公平地扶持中共国公司。中共国企业的补贴、知识产权盗窃和强制技术转让,是对全球经济最具破坏性的问题之一。中国共产党为了促进国家政治和经济目标,以反竞争的方式指导、胁迫和影响了企业的商业活动。通过破坏长期和普遍接受的、基于市场的公平竞争原则,扭曲全球市场经济导致了外国营企业进入和被迫退出市场的障碍,这种障碍不仅在中共国,而且存在于世界各地的市场。中共国在世界各地窃取关键技术和商业秘密,揭露中共国企业知识产权盗窃和大规模补贴的全部范围和规模,中共国的反竞争经济和产业政策破坏了几十年的全球增长和创新。

标题4——投资于我们的经济治国之道

第401节 国会关于中共国产业政策的调查结果和意识

(a)调查结果——国会作出以下调查结果:

(1)中共国在中国共产党的领导下,正在推进一个反竞争的经济和产业政策的生态系统 –
(A)扭曲全球市场;
(B)限制创新;
(C)以牺牲美国和其他外国公司为代价,不公平地扶持中共国公司;以及
(D)不公平和有害地损害消费者的选择。

(2)在中共国推行的广泛而系统的经济和产业政策中,对中共国企业的补贴、知识产权盗窃和强制技术转让,是对全球经济最具破坏性的问题之一。

(3)通过监管干预和直接财政补贴,中国共产党为了促进国家政治和经济目标,以反竞争的方式指导、胁迫和影响了企业的商业活动,这些企业受到国家的指导、资助、影响,或者说是控制,包括国有企业,以及表面上是独立和私营的中共国公司,例如战略部门的技术公司。

(4)中共国政府在国家和国家以下的各级,在电信、石油、电力、航空、银行和半导体等被指定为战略性行业的某些中共国公司,给予特殊特权或地位,企业从中国共产党获得了优惠贷款、免税和优惠土地使用权等国家的特殊优惠。

(5)第(3)和(4)款所述的对中共国公司的补贴 –
(A)使这些企业能够以低于市场价格的价格销售商品,企业利用其价格优势排挤市场上的竞争对手,从而在关键行业中占据全球的主导地位;
(B)通过破坏长期和普遍接受的、基于市场的公平竞争原则,扭曲全球市场经济导致了外国或私营企业进入和被迫退出市场的障碍,这种障碍不仅在中共国,而且存在于世界各地的市场;
(C)在关键领域建立政府赞助或支持的事实上的垄断、卡特尔(式垄断保护)以及其他反市场作法,限制或消除了其他公司的机会;以及
(D)由于(A)至(C)段所述的问题,导致外国和私营公司研发所需的利润和收入下降。

(6)中国共产党鼓励并授权中共国的行为者,从在中共国和世界各地运营的私人和外国竞争对手那里窃取关键技术和商业秘密,特别是在中国共产党认为对实现中共目标至关重要的领域。根据中国共产党的指示,中共国还继续实施反竞争法规、政策和做法,强迫外国企业将技术和其他相关性或敏感数据移交给国内企业,以换取进入中共国市场的机会。

(7)美国和外国的公司在世界第三国市场,要与享受国家保护和助力的国家补贴的中共国公司竞争。赋予了中共国公司的优势,加上进入中共国市场本身的重大限制,严重阻碍了美国和外国公司竞争、创新和追求为客户提供最佳价值的能力。结果是一个不平衡的竞争环境,这种不可持续的进程,如果不加以制止,随着时间的推移,将导致全球竞争低迷,机会减少,对生产者和消费者都造成伤害。

(8)正如2018年3月美国贸易代表根据《1974年贸易法》(the Trade Act of 1974)第301节(《美国法典》第19卷第2411节)对中共国贸易惯例进行的调查所述,“当美国公司在知识产权方面的投资被剥夺了公平回报时,他们就无法实现再投资创新所需的增长。从这个意义上说,中共国的技术转让制度直接给创新生态系统带来负担,而创新生态系统是美国和类似经济体经济增长的引擎。”

(9)除了本小节所述的强制技术外,美国贸易代表根据《1974年贸易法》(《美国法典》第19卷第2411节)对中共国进行的调查还认定,(中共国)要求外国公司以低于市场价值的价格(获得)许可产品,政府指导和政府补贴为战略目的收购的敏感技术,调查还确认了中共国的网络盗窃是其他不合理和不公正的关键技术获取和产业政策。这些政策使美国的知识产权、创新和技术发展以及数十个行业的就业面临风险。

(10)中共国产业政策生态系统中损害创新和扭曲全球市场的其他因素包括 –
(A)推动鼓励本地生产而非进口的政策;
(B)继续推行有利于中共国企业采用独特技术标准,而非全球公认标准的政策,这往往迫使外国企业改变其产品和制造链以进行竞争;
(C)要求外国公司披露专有信息,以便有资格在中共国国内市场采用其标准;以及
(D)维持封闭的采购流程,限制外国公司的参与,包括制定条款,要求外国公司使用国内供应商,向中共国公司转让专有技术,并披露专有信息。

(11)在“一带一路”倡议和相关行业的具体努力,如数字丝绸之路,是推动中共国重商主义政策和实践在全球的关键载体,由此带来的挑战不仅影响到美国公司,欧洲商会在2020年1月的一份报告中指出,对中共国有企业的优惠贷款、不透明的采购和投标流程、封闭的数字标准,其他因素严重限制了欧洲和其他国家对“一带一路”倡议的参与,使得“在第三国市场(与中共国公司)的竞争极具挑战性”。这突出了“一带一路”倡议的一个关键目标,即确保基础设施、数字技术和其他重要商品依赖于中共国的供应链和技术标准。

(b)国会意识 – 国会认为 –

(1)像中共国这样的非市场经济体,在全球经济交流中占有如此大的份额,所带来的挑战在许多方面都是前所未有的,需要充分提升和持续的长期关注和警惕;

(2)为了真正解决中共主导的重商主义经济战略中最有害的方面,美国必须采取 –
(A)揭露中共国企业知识产权盗窃和大规模补贴的全部范围和规模,以及由此对美国、外国市场和全球经济造成的危害;
(B)确保中共国公司面临反竞争行为的成本和后果;
(C)为受影响的美国人提供解决方案和应对不合理和歧视性产业政策的选择;以及
(D)加强对关键技术和敏感数据的保护,同时营造鼓励创新和竞争的环境;

(3)美国必须通过经济合作与发展组织(OECD)、世界贸易组织(WTO)以及其他场所和论坛与盟友和伙伴合作 –
(A)加强长期以来公认的公平竞争和市场行为原则,解决中共国的反竞争经济和产业政策,这些政策破坏了几十年的全球增长和创新;
(B)确保中共国在停止实施法律、法规、政策和惯例之前,不享有与自由市场经济同等的待遇,这些法律、法规、政策和惯例只为促进实现本国目标,对中共国企业提供不公平的利益保护,对以市场为基础的国际贸易施加不合理、歧视性和非法的负担;
(C)调整政策,限制国家对私营部门的补贴,例如倡导有关透明度和坚持诚信的全球规则,包括通过美国、日本和欧洲联盟目前正在进行的努力;以及

(4)美国及其盟国和伙伴必须合作,鼓励各自的公司在以下领域进行合作 –
(A)倡导保护世界各地市场的知识产权;
(B)培养开放的技术标准;以及
(C)加大对海外市场的联合投资。
(本节完)

原文链接:

https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DAV21598%20-%20Strategic%20Competition%20Act%20of%202021.pdf

文字整理:

TITLE IV—INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

SEC. 401. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PRC’S INDUSTRIAL POLICY.

(a) FINDINGS —Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The People’s Republic of China, at the direction of the Chinese Communist Party, is advancing an ecosystem of anticompetitive economic and industrial policies that—

(A) distort global markets;

(B) limit innovation;

(C) unfairly advantage PRC firms at the expense of the United States and other foreign firms; and

(D) unfairly and harmfully prejudice consumer choice.

(2) Of the extensive and systemic economic and industrial policies pursued by the PRC, the mass

subsidization of Chinese firms, intellectual property theft, and forced technology transfer are among the most damaging to the global economy.

(3) Through regulatory interventions and direct financial subsidies, the CCP, for the purposes of advancing national political and economic objectives, directs, coerces, and influences in anti-competitive ways the commercial activities of firms that are directed, financed, influenced, or otherwise controlled by the state, including state-owned enterprises, and ostensibly independent and private Chinese companies, such as technology firms in strategic sectors.

(4) The PRC Government, at the national and subnational levels, grants special privileges or status to certain PRC firms in key sectors designated as strategic, such as telecommunications, oil, power, aviation, banking, and semiconductors. Enterprises receive special state preferences in the form of favorable loans, tax exemptions, and preferential land access from the CCP.

(5) The subsidization of PRC companies, as described in paragraphs (3) and (4) —

(A) enables these companies to sell goods below market prices, allowing them to outbid and crowd out market-based competitors and thereby pursue global dominance of key sectors;

(B) distorts the global market economy by undermining longstanding and generally accepted market-based principles of fair competition, leading to barriers to entry and forced exit from the market for foreign or private firms, not only in the PRC, but in markets around the world;

(C) creates government-sponsored or supported de facto monopolies, cartels, and other anti-market arrangements in key sectors, limiting or removing opportunities for other firms; and

(D) leads to, as a result of the issues described in paragraphs (A) through (C), declines in profits and revenue needed by foreign and private firms for research and development.

(6) The CCP incentivizes and empowers Chinese actors to steal critical technologies and trade secrets from private and foreign competitors operating in the PRC and around the world, particularly in areas that the CCP has identified as critical to advancing PRC objectives. The PRC, as directed by the CCP, also continues to implement anti-competitive regulations, policies, and practices that coerce the handover of technology and other propriety or sensitive data from foreign enterprises to domestic

firms in exchange for access to the PRC market.

(7) Companies in the United States and in foreign countries compete with state-subsidized PRC

companies that enjoy the protection and power of the state in third-country markets around the world. The advantages granted to PRC firms, combined with significant restrictions to accessing the PRC market itself, severely hamper the ability of United States and foreign firms to compete, innovate, and pursue the provision of best value to customers. The result is an unbalanced playing field. Such an unsustainable course, if not checked, will over time lead to depressed competition around the world, reduced opportunity, and harm to both producers and consumers.

(8) As stated in the United States Trade Representative’s investigation of the PRC’s trade practices under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411), conducted in March 2018, ‘‘When U.S. companies are deprived of fair returns on their investment in IP, they are unable to achieve the growth necessary to reinvest in innovation. In this sense, China’s technology transfer regime directly burdens the innovation ecosystem that is an engine of economic growth in the United States and similarly- situated economies.’’

(9) In addition to forced technology described in this subsection, the United States Trade Representative’s investigation of the PRC under section of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411) also identified requirements that foreign firms license products at less than market value, government-directed and government-subsidized acquisition of sensitive technology for strategic purposes, and cyber theft as other key PRC technology and industrial policies that are unreasonable and discriminatory. These policies place at risk United States intellectual property rights, innovation and technological development, and jobs in dozens of industries.

(10) Other elements of the PRC’s ecosystem of industrial policies that harm innovation and distort global markets include—

(A) advancement of policies that encourage local production over imports;

(B) continuation of policies that favor unique technical standards in use by Chinese firms rather than globally accepted standards, which often force foreign firms to alter their products and manufacturing chains to compete;

(C) requirements that foreign companies disclose proprietary information to qualify for the adoption of their standards for use in the PRC domestic market; and

(D) maintenance of closed procurement processes, which limit participation by foreign firms, including by setting terms that require such firms to use domestic suppliers, transfer know-how to firms in the PRC, and disclose proprietary information.

(11) The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and associated industry-specific efforts under this initiative, such as the Digital Silk Road, are key vectors to advance the PRC’s mercantilist policies and practices globally. The resulting challenges do not only affect United States firms. As the European Chamber of Commerce reported in a January 2020 report, the combination of concessional lending to Chinese state-owned enterprises, nontransparent procurement and bidding processes, closed digital standards, and other factors severely limit European and other participation in BRI and make ‘‘competition [with Chinese companies] in third-country markets extremely challenging’’. This underscores a key objective of BRI, which is to ensure the reliance of infrastructure, digital technologies, and other important goods on PRC supply chains and technical standards.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS. — It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the challenges presented by a nonmarket economy like the PRC’s economy, which has captured such a large share of global economic exchange, are in many ways unprecedented and require sufficiently elevated and sustained long-term focus and engagement;

(2) in order to truly address the most detrimental aspects of CCP-directed mercantilist economic strategy, the United States must adopt policies that—

(A) expose the full scope and scale of intellectual property theft and mass subsidization of Chinese firms, and the resulting harm to the United States, foreign markets, and the global economy;

(B) ensure that PRC companies face costs and consequences for anticompetitive behavior;

(C) provide options for affected United States persons to address and respond to unreasonable and discriminatory CCP-directed industrial policies; and

(D) strengthen the protection of critical technology and sensitive data, while still fostering an environment that provides incentives for innovation and competition;

(3) the United States must work with its allies and partners through the Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization, and other venues and fora—(A) to reinforce long-standing generally accepted principles of fair competition and market behavior and address the PRC’s anticompetitive economic and industrial policies that undermine decades of global growth and innovation;

(B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted the same treatment as that of a free-market economy until it ceases the implementation of laws, regulations, policies, and practices that provide unfair advantage on PRC firms in furtherance of national objectives and impose unreasonable, discriminatory, and illegal burdens on market-based international commerce; and

(C) to align policies with respect to curbing state-directed subsidization of the private sector, such as advocating for global rules related to transparency and adherence to notification requirements, including through the efforts currently being advanced by the United States, Japan, and the European Union; and

(4) the United States and its allies and partners must collaborate to provide incentives to their respective companies to cooperate in areas such as—

(A) advocating for protection of intellectual property rights in markets around the world;

(B) fostering open technical standards; And

(C) increasing joint investments in overseas markets.