俄羅斯莫斯科喀秋莎農場 仰望七星

編輯上傳 水星

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本節進入“副標題C——應對中共國的區域戰略”的“第二部分——跨大西洋聯盟”,從第255節開始。

本節要點:美國、歐盟和歐洲國家是親密的伙伴,它們有著基於民主、人權、透明度和二戰後建立的、以規則為基礎的國際秩序的共同價值觀。如果沒有美國、歐洲各國的共同努力,中共國將繼續增加其在歐洲的經濟、政治和安全的影響力。美國、歐盟和日本應繼續三方的努力,應對中共國提出的經濟挑戰。美國、歐洲各國應加強合作,打擊中共國的造謠、影響行動和宣傳工作。美國和歐洲國家對中共國政府支持和執行的鎮壓表示嚴重關切,並應繼續採取措施解決中共國政府在​​西藏、香港和新疆的特別侵害,並應建立聯合機制和方案,防止中共國威權治理模式向世界各國輸出。中共國在世界各地的基礎設施投資,特別是在5G電信技術和港口基礎設施方面的投資,可能威脅整個歐洲的民主和關鍵國家的國家安全。

第二部分——跨大西洋聯盟

第255節 跨大西洋的國會意識

國會認為 –
(1)美國、歐盟和歐洲國家是親密的伙伴,它們有著基於民主、人權、透明度和二戰後建立的以規則為基礎的國際秩序的共同價值觀;

(2)如果沒有美國、歐盟和歐洲各國在互聯互通、貿易、跨國問題以及支持民主和人權方面的共同做法,中共國將繼續增加其在歐洲的經濟、政治和安全的影響力;

(3)在中共病毒疫情爆發後,中共國向歐洲國家提供援助,顯示了一種強制性的援助方式,但也突顯了歐洲與中共國深厚的經濟聯繫;

(4)在歐洲各國尋求從中共病毒疫情造成的經濟損失恢復之際,美國必須與歐洲結成夥伴關係,支持我們的集體經濟復甦,加強我們的集體國家安全,捍衛這些共同價值觀;

(5)美國、歐盟和其他歐洲國家應就聯合戰略進行協調,使對中共國以外供應鏈的依賴多樣化,特別是在醫療和製藥部門;

(6)美國、歐盟、英國和歐洲各國應利用各自的經濟創新能力,支持全球經濟從中共病毒的衰退中復蘇,與中共國的中央集權經濟截然不同;

(7)美國和歐盟應加快努力緩和貿易爭端,包括談判達成一項有利於美國和歐盟工人,以及更廣泛經濟的、美國-歐盟貿易協定;

(8)美國、歐盟和日本應繼續三方的努力,應對中共國提出的經濟挑戰;

(9)美國、歐盟和歐洲各國應加強合作,打擊中共國的造謠、影響行動和宣傳工作;

(10)美國和歐洲國家對中共國政府支持和執行的鎮壓表示嚴重關切,並應繼續採取措施解決中共國政府在​​西藏、香港和新疆的特別侵害,並應建立聯合機制和方案,防止中共國威權治理模式向世界各國輸出;

(11)美國和歐洲國家應該在共同的價值觀上保持一致,反對恐怖主義中共國政府試圖在聯合國和其他多邊組織,推動破壞《世界人權宣言》(the Universal Declaration of Human Rights)的努力,如“人類共同未來共同體”和“國際關係民主化”;

(12)中共國在世界各地的基礎設施投資,特別是在5G電信技術和港口基礎設施方面的投資,可能威脅整個歐洲的民主和關鍵國家的國家安全;

(13)美國應酌情與歐洲盟國和夥伴分享有關華為5G能力的情報,以及中共國政府在​​歐洲5G擴張的意圖;

(14)歐盟投資篩選條例於2020年10月生效,這是一個可喜的發展,成員國應通過自己的國家投資篩選措施,嚴格審查中共國在本國的投資;

(15)總統應積極與歐盟接觸,執行《出口管制改革法》(the Export Control Reform Act)條例,並努力使該法條例與歐盟的優先事項保持一致;

(16)總統應大力提倡根據瓦森納安排(the Wassenaar Arrangement),將更多的物品和技術列入清單,以限制向中共國出口國家安全及以上級別管制的軍民兩用物品和技術;

(17)美國應對建立一個類似於多邊出口管制協調委員會(CoCom)機構的價值進行探討和評估,這個機構將專門協調美國和歐盟對中共國敏感技術的出口;以及

(18)美國應該與歐洲的同行合作,以-
(A)評估美國和歐洲對中共國商品的過度依賴,包括在醫療和製藥領域,並製定聯合戰略,使供應鏈多樣化;
(B)反擊中共國利用中共病毒相關援助,作為脅迫性工具向發展中國家施壓的努力,提供美國和歐洲的相關專門的知識和援助;以及
(C)利用美國和歐洲的私營部門推動後中共病毒時期的經濟復甦。
(本節完)

原文鏈接:

https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DAV21598%20-%20Strategic%20Competition%20Act%20of%202021.pdf

文字整理:

PART II—TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE

SEC. 255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE TRANSATLANTICALLIANCE.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the United States, the European Union, and countries of Europe are close partners, sharing values grounded in democracy, human rights, transparency, and the rules-based international order established after World War II;

(2) without a common approach by the United States, European Union, and countries of Europe on connectivity, trade, transnational problems, and support for democracy and human rights, the People’s Republic of China will continue to increase its economic, political and security leverage in Europe;

(3) the People’s Republic of China’s deployment of assistance to European countries following the COVID–19 outbreak showcased a coercive approach to aid, but it also highlighted Europe’s deep economic ties to China;

(4) as European states seek to recover from the economic toll of the COVID–19 outbreak, the United States must stand in partnership with Europe to support our collective economic recovery and reinforce our collective national security and defend these shared values;

(5) the United States, European Union, and other European countries should coordinate on joint strategies to diversify reliance on supply chains away from the People’s Republic of China, especially in the medical and pharmaceutical sectors;

(6) the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, and the countries of Europe should lever age their respective economic innovation capabilities to support the global economic recovery from the COVID–19 recession and draw a contrast with the centralized economy of the People’s Republic of

China;

(7) the United States and European Union should accelerate efforts to de-escalate their trade disputes, including negotiating a United States-European Union trade agreement that benefits workers and the broader economy in both the United States and European Union;

(8) the United States, European Union, and Japan should continue trilateral efforts to address economic challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China;

(9) the United States, European Union, and countries of Europe should enhance cooperation to counter Chinese disinformation, influence operations, and propaganda efforts;

(10) the United States and European nations share serious concerns with the repressions being supported and executed by the Government of China, and should continue implementing measures to address the Government of China’s specific abuses in Tibet, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang, and should build joint mechanisms and programs to prevent the export of China’s authoritarian governance model to countries around the world;

(11) the United States and European nations should remain united in their shared values against

attempts by the Government of China at the United Nations and other multilateral organizations to promote efforts that erode the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, like the ‘‘community of a shared future for mankind’’ and ‘‘democratization of international relations’’;

(12) the People’s Republic of China’s infrastructure investments around the world, particularly in 5G telecommunications technology and port infrastructure, could threaten democracy across Europe and the national security of key countries;

(13) as appropriate, the United States should share intelligence with European allies and partners on Huawei’s 5G capabilities and the intentions of the Government of China with respect to 5G expansion in Europe;

(14) the European Union’s Investment Screening Regulation, which came into force in October 2020, is a welcome development, and member states should closely scrutinize Chinese investments in their countries through their own national investment screening measures;

(15) the President should actively engage the European Union on the implementation of the Export Control Reform Act regulations and work to align the law’s regulations with European Union priorities;

(16) the President should strongly advocate for the listing of more items and technologies to restrict dual use exports controlled at the National Security and above level to the People’s Republic of China

under the Wassenaar Arrangement;

(17) the United States should explore the value of establishing a body akin to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) that would specifically coordinate the export of United States and European Union sensitive technologies to the People’s Republic of China; and

(18) the United States should work with counterparts in Europe to—

(A) evaluate United States and European overreliance on Chinese goods, including in the medical and pharmaceutical sectors, and develop joint strategies to diversify supply chains;

(B) counter Chinese efforts to use COVID–19-related assistance as a coercive tool to pressure developing countries by offering relevant United States and European expertise and assistance; and

(C) leverage the United States and European private sectors to advance the post COVID–19 economic recovery.