俄羅斯莫斯科喀秋莎農場 仰望七星

編輯上傳 水星

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“副標題B——國際安全事務”的“第231節. 印度洋-太平洋盟國和夥伴能力發展報告”、“第232節. 國家技術和產業基礎報告”略譯,本文是翻譯了第233、234、 235節。

要點:在本法案頒布之日後180天內,國務卿與國防部長協調,應就美國與一些國家的外交往來,向相應的國會委員會提出報告,這些國家有中共國軍事設施,或正在考慮建造軍事設施。列出擁有中共軍事設施國的清單,評估對美國利益的影響。敦促中共國執行聯合國對朝鮮的現有製裁,嚴格禁止朝鮮貨物的進出口,包括船與船之間的貨物轉移。國會認為中共國利用“一帶一路”來擴大其軍力的投射能力,並通過海外軍事設施為中共軍隊提供更大的通道,中共國軍隊的全球擴張,將損害美國的中長期安全。

欲了解更多的內容,請看3節全文(僅供參考)。

第233節 中共國駐外軍事設施外聯工作報告

(a)概述——在本法案頒布之日後180天內,國務卿與國防部長協調,應就美國與中共國政府軍事設施所在國或正在考慮所在國的外交往來,向相應的國會委員會提出報告。

(b)應包括的事項——第(a)小節要求的報告應包括-
(1)中共國政府軍事設施所在國或者正在考慮所在國名單;
(2)詳細說明美國在外交和有關方面對考慮建設中共國政府軍事設施的國家所作的努力,以及這些努力的結果;
(3)評估中共國政府成功建立的軍事設施對美國利益的不利影響,這些設施是他們目前考慮在任何地方(建設)的;
(4)中共國境外任何商業港口的說明和清單,這些港口經美國政府評估認為可供中共國政府用於軍事目的,說明和清單也包括這些港口所在國政府的任何外交企圖;
(5)中共國政府軍事設施對美國利益的影響;以及
(6)在吉布提建立中共國第一個海外基地的外交經驗和教訓。

(c)報告格式——第(a)小節要求的報告應保密,但可包括非保密的摘要。
(本節完)

第234節 關於普遍執行聯合國對朝鮮制裁的政策聲明

美國的政策是對朝鮮民主主義人民共和國(在本節中稱為“朝鮮”)政府施加最大的經濟壓力,直到該政權採取全面、可核查和不可逆轉的行動實現無核化,包括-

(1)敦促包括中共國在內的所有國家執行聯合國對朝鮮的現有製裁;

(2)敦促包括中共國在內的所有國家,根據聯合國安全理事會決議,終止接納朝鮮公民為客座工人的做法,認識到這些工人被證明是朝鮮政權及其核野心的非法收入來源;

(3)敦促包括中共國在內的所有國家,按照聯合國安理會決議,嚴格禁止朝鮮貨物的進出口,包括船與船之間的貨物轉移;

(4)向中共國和中共國實體施壓-
(A)停止與聯合國指定實體及其在朝鮮的附屬機構的商業活動;以及
(B)將使朝鮮獲得核和彈道導彈項目所需材料的個人驅逐出中共國。

(5)執行聯合國安理會和美國關於對朝鮮制裁的決議,包括2016年《朝鮮制裁和政策加強法案》(the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act)(公共法114-122)、《通過制裁打擊美國對手法案》(the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act)(公共法115-44)中的決議,2019年《奧托·溫比爾朝鮮核制裁和執行法案》(the Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear Sanctions and Enforcement Act)(第116–92號公法F部分第LXXI篇)和相關的美國行政命令。
(本節完)

第235節 對中共國軍事設施所在國援助的限制

(a)國會意識 — 國會認為—

(1) 儘管中共國將“一帶一路”描述為發展倡議,但中共國也利用“一帶一路”來推進自身的安全利益,包括擴大其軍力的投射能力,並通過海外軍事設施為中共軍隊提供更大的通道;以及
(2)中共國軍隊通過海外軍事設施向全球擴張,將損害美國的中長期安全,以及世界重要地區戰略夥伴的安全與發展,這與美國促進的伙伴國和平、繁榮和自力更生的目標背道而馳,包括通過“千年挑戰團體”(the Millennium Challenge Corporation)途徑實現的這種目標。

(b)對援助的限制—除第(c)小節規定的情況外,在2022至2031財政年度,在其領土上擁有中共軍隊軍事設施,或為擴大中共軍隊存在提供便利的國家的政府,其目的不是參加聯合國維和行動,或臨時的人道主義援助,根據2003年《千年挑戰法案》(the Millennium Challenge Act)(《美國法典》第22卷第7708、7715條)第609或616節的規定,該國的醫療和救災行動沒有資格獲得援助。

(c)國家利益豁免—如果總統向相應的國會委員會提出申請,總統可以根據具體情況放棄(b)小節中的限制-
(1)對美國國家利益重要的書面決定;以及
(2)詳細說明棄權對這些利益的重要性。
(本節完)

原文鏈接:
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DAV21598%20-%20Strategic%20Competition%20Act%20of%202021.pdf

文字整理:

SEC. 233. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH WITH RESPECT TO CHINESE MILITARY INSTALLA TIONS OVERSEAS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees regarding United States diplomatic engagement with other nations that host or are considering hosting any military installation of the Government of the People’s Republic

of China.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include—

(1) a list of countries that currently host or are considering hosting any military installation of the

Government of the People’s Republic of China;

(2) a detailed description of United States diplomatic and related efforts to countries that are considering hosting a military installation of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, and the results of such efforts;

(3) an assessment on the adverse impact on United States interests of the Government of the People’s Republic of China successfully establishing a military installation at any of the locations it is currently considering;

(4) a description and list of any commercial ports outside of the People’s Republic of China that

the United States Government assesses could be used by the Government of the People’s Republic of China for military purposes, and any diplomatic efforts with the governments of the countries where

such ports are located;

(5) the impact of the military installations of the Government of the People’s Republic of China

on United States interests; and

(6) lessons learned from the diplomatic experience of addressing the PRC’s first overseas base in

Djibouti.

(c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be classified, but may include a unclassified summary.

SEC. 234. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING UNIVERSAL IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS

SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA.

It is the policy of the United States to sustain maximum economic pressure on the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (referred to in this section as the ‘‘DPRK’’) until the regime undertakes complete, verifiable, and irreversible actions toward denuclearization, including by—

(1) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to implement and enforce existing United Nations sanctions with regard to the DPRK;

(2) pressing all nations, including the PRC, and in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, to end the practice of hosting DPRK citizens as guest workers, recognizing that such workers are demonstrated to constitute an illicit source of revenue for the DPRK regime and its nuclear ambitions;

(3) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to pursue rigorous interdiction of shipments to and

from the DPRK, including ship-to-ship transfers, consistent with United Nations Security Council resolutions;

(4) pressing the PRC and PRC entities—

(A) to cease business activities with United Nations-designated entities and their affiliates in the DPRK; and

(B) to expel from the PRC individuals who enable the DPRK to acquire materials for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs; and

(5) enforcing United Nations Security Council resolutions with respect to the DPRK and United States sanctions, including those pursuant to the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (Public Law 114–122), the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public Law 115–44), the Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear Sanctions and Enforcement Act of 2019 (title LXXI of division F of Public Law 116–92), and relevant United States executive orders.

SEC. 235. LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES HOSTING CHINESE MILITARY INSTALLA TIONS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) although it casts the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a development initiative, the People’s Republic of China is also utilizing the BRI to advance its own security interests, including to expand its power projection capabilities and facilitate greater access for the People’s Liberation Army through overseas military installations; and

(2) the expansion of the People’s Liberation Army globally through overseas military installations will undermine the medium- and long-term security of the United States and the security and development of strategic partners in critical regions around the world, which is at odds with United States goals to promote peace, prosperity, and self-reliance among partner nations, including through the Millennium Challenge Corporation.

(b) LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE.—Except as pro23 vided in subsection (c), for fiscal years 2022 through 2031, the government of a country that is hosting on its territory a military installation of the Government of the People’s Republic of China or facilitates the expansion of the presence of the People’s Liberation Army for purposes other than participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations or for temporary humanitarian, medical, and disaster relief operations in such country shall not be eligible for assistance under sections 609 or 616 of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7708, 7715).

(c) NATIONAL INTEREST WAIVER.—The President may, on a case by case basis, waive the limitation in subsection (b) if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a written determination that the waiver is important to the national interests of the United States; and

(2) a detailed explanation of how the waiver is important to those interests.