俄罗斯莫斯科喀秋莎农场   仰望七星

编辑上传  水星

news.sky.com

“副标题B——国际安全事务”的“第231节. 印度洋-太平洋盟国和伙伴能力发展报告”、“第232节. 国家技术和产业基础报告”略译,本文是翻译了第233、234、235节。

要点:在本法案颁布之日后180天内,国务卿与国防部长协调,应就美国与一些国家的外交往来,向相应的国会委员会提出报告,这些国家有中共国军事设施,或正在考虑建造军事设施。列出拥有中共军事设施国的清单,评估对美国利益的影响。 敦促中共国执行联合国对朝鲜的现有制裁,严格禁止朝鲜货物的进出口,包括船与船之间的货物转移。国会认为中共国利用“一带一路”来扩大其军力的投射能力,并通过海外军事设施为中共军队提供更大的通道,中共国军队的全球扩张,将损害美国的中长期安全。

欲了解更多的內容,请看3节全文(仅供参考)。

第233节 中共国驻外军事设施外联工作报告

(a)概述——在本法案颁布之日后180天内,国务卿与国防部长协调,应就美国与中共国政府军事设施所在国或正在考虑所在国的外交往来,向相应的国会委员会提出报告。

(b)应包括的事项——第(a)小节要求的报告应包括-
(1)中共国政府军事设施所在国或者正在考虑所在国名单;
(2)详细说明美国在外交和有关方面对考虑建设中共国政府军事设施的国家所作的努力,以及这些努力的结果;
(3)评估中共国政府成功建立的军事设施对美国利益的不利影响,这些设施是他们目前考虑在任何地方(建设)的;
(4)中共国境外任何商业港口的说明和清单,这些港口经美国政府评估认为可供中共国政府用于军事目的,说明和清单也包括这些港口所在国政府的任何外交企图;
(5)中共国政府军事设施对美国利益的影响;以及
(6)在吉布提建立中共国第一个海外基地的外交经验和教训。

(c)报告格式——第(a)小节要求的报告应保密,但可包括非保密的摘要。
(本节完)

第234节 关于普遍执行联合国对朝鲜制裁的政策声明

美国的政策是对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国(在本节中称为“朝鲜”)政府施加最大的经济压力,直到该政权采取全面、可核查和不可逆转的行动实现无核化,包括-

(1)敦促包括中共国在内的所有国家执行联合国对朝鲜的现有制裁;

(2)敦促包括中共国在内的所有国家,根据联合国安全理事会决议,终止接纳朝鲜公民为客座工人的做法,认识到这些工人被证明是朝鲜政权及其核野心的非法收入来源;

(3)敦促包括中共国在内的所有国家,按照联合国安理会决议,严格禁止朝鲜货物的进出口,包括船与船之间的货物转移;

(4)向中共国和中共国实体施压-
(A)停止与联合国指定实体及其在朝鲜的附属机构的商业活动;以及
(B)将使朝鲜获得核和弹道导弹项目所需材料的个人驱逐出中共国。

(5)执行联合国安理会和美国关于对朝鲜制裁的决议,包括2016年《朝鲜制裁和政策加强法案》(the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act)(公共法114-122)、《通过制裁打击美国对手法案》(the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act)(公共法115-44)中的决议,2019年《奥托·温比尔朝鲜核制裁和执行法案》(the Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear Sanctions and Enforcement Act)(第116–92号公法F部分第LXXI篇)和相关的美国行政命令。
(本节完)

第235节 对中共国军事设施所在国援助的限制

(a)国会意识 — 国会认为—

(1) 尽管中共国将“一带一路”描述为发展倡议,但中共国也利用“一带一路”来推进自身的安全利益,包括扩大其军力的投射能力,并通过海外军事设施为中共军队提供更大的通道;以及
(2)中共国军队通过海外军事设施向全球扩张,将损害美国的中长期安全,以及世界重要地区战略伙伴的安全与发展,这与美国促进的伙伴国和平、繁荣和自力更生的目标背道而驰,包括通过“千年挑战团体”(the Millennium Challenge Corporation)途径实现的这种目标。

(b)对援助的限制—除第(c)小节规定的情况外,在2022至2031财政年度,在其领土上拥有中共军队军事设施,或为扩大中共军队存在提供便利的国家的政府,其目的不是参加联合国维和行动,或临时的人道主义援助,根据2003年《千年挑战法案》(the Millennium Challenge Act)(《美国法典》第22卷第7708、7715条)第609或616节的规定,该国的医疗和救灾行动没有资格获得援助。

(c)国家利益豁免—如果总统向相应的国会委员会提出申请,总统可以根据具体情况放弃(b)小节中的限制-
(1)对美国国家利益重要的书面决定;以及
(2)详细说明弃权对这些利益的重要性。
(本节完)

原文链接:

https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DAV21598%20-%20Strategic%20Competition%20Act%20of%202021.pdf

文字整理:

SEC. 233. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH WITH RESPECT TO CHINESE MILITARY INSTALLA TIONS OVERSEAS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees regarding United States diplomatic engagement with other nations that host or are considering hosting any military installation of the Government of the People’s Republic

of China.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include—

(1) a list of countries that currently host or are considering hosting any military installation of the

Government of the People’s Republic of China;

(2) a detailed description of United States diplomatic and related efforts to countries that are considering hosting a military installation of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, and the results of such efforts;

(3) an assessment on the adverse impact on United States interests of the Government of the People’s Republic of China successfully establishing a military installation at any of the locations it is currently considering;

(4) a description and list of any commercial ports outside of the People’s Republic of China that

the United States Government assesses could be used by the Government of the People’s Republic of China for military purposes, and any diplomatic efforts with the governments of the countries where

such ports are located;

(5) the impact of the military installations of the Government of the People’s Republic of China

on United States interests; and

(6) lessons learned from the diplomatic experience of addressing the PRC’s first overseas base in

Djibouti.

(c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be classified, but may include a unclassified summary.

SEC. 234. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING UNIVERSAL IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS

SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA.

It is the policy of the United States to sustain maximum economic pressure on the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (referred to in this section as the ‘‘DPRK’’) until the regime undertakes complete, verifiable, and irreversible actions toward denuclearization, including by—

(1) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to implement and enforce existing United Nations sanctions with regard to the DPRK;

(2) pressing all nations, including the PRC, and in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, to end the practice of hosting DPRK citizens as guest workers, recognizing that such workers are demonstrated to constitute an illicit source of revenue for the DPRK regime and its nuclear ambitions;

(3) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to pursue rigorous interdiction of shipments to and

from the DPRK, including ship-to-ship transfers, consistent with United Nations Security Council resolutions;

(4) pressing the PRC and PRC entities—

(A) to cease business activities with United Nations-designated entities and their affiliates in the DPRK; and

(B) to expel from the PRC individuals who enable the DPRK to acquire materials for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs; and

(5) enforcing United Nations Security Council resolutions with respect to the DPRK and United States sanctions, including those pursuant to the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (Public Law 114–122), the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public Law 115–44), the Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear Sanctions and Enforcement Act of 2019 (title LXXI of division F of Public Law 116–92), and relevant United States executive orders.

SEC. 235. LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES HOSTING CHINESE MILITARY INSTALLA TIONS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) although it casts the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a development initiative, the People’s Republic of China is also utilizing the BRI to advance its own security interests, including to expand its power projection capabilities and facilitate greater access for the People’s Liberation Army through overseas military installations; and

(2) the expansion of the People’s Liberation Army globally through overseas military installations will undermine the medium- and long-term security of the United States and the security and development of strategic partners in critical regions around the world, which is at odds with United States goals to promote peace, prosperity, and self-reliance among partner nations, including through the Millennium Challenge Corporation.

(b) LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE.—Except as pro23 vided in subsection (c), for fiscal years 2022 through 2031, the government of a country that is hosting on its territory a military installation of the Government of the People’s Republic of China or facilitates the expansion of the presence of the People’s Liberation Army for purposes other than participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations or for temporary humanitarian, medical, and disaster relief operations in such country shall not be eligible for assistance under sections 609 or 616 of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7708, 7715).

(c) NATIONAL INTEREST WAIVER.—The President may, on a case by case basis, waive the limitation in subsection (b) if the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

(1) a written determination that the waiver is important to the national interests of the United States; and

(2) a detailed explanation of how the waiver is important to those interests.