俄羅斯莫斯科喀秋莎農場 仰望七星

編輯上傳 水星

dnyuz.com

“副標題B——國際安全事務”的“第225節. 印度洋-太平洋地區的外國軍事資助,東南亞海上安全項目和外交外聯活動的撥款授權”、“第226節. 印度洋-太平洋外國軍事資助契約試點項目”、”227節. 印度洋-太平洋國際軍事教育和訓練的額外資金”、“第228節. 優先考慮印度洋-太平洋地區過剩的國防物資轉移”、“第229節. 優先考慮印度洋-太平洋地區過剩的海軍艦艇轉移”略譯。

本節要點:國會譴責脅迫性和威脅性行動或使用武力,改變現狀,或破壞印度洋-太平洋區域的穩定,敦促中共國不要在南中國海設防空識別區,不要在印度洋-太平洋地區其他地方採取類似的挑釁行動,重申中共國對南中國海大部分海域的近海資源主張是非法的,譴責中共國不遵守2016年仲裁庭的裁決,拒絕中共國對其在南沙群島宣稱的12海裡衍生領海以外水域的任何主張。

欲了解更多的內容,請看本節全文(僅供參考)。

第230印度洋-太平洋國際水道和空域,以及南中國海人工特徵土地海上作業自由的政策聲明

(a)國會意識——國會 –

(1)譴責脅迫性和威脅性行動或使用武力,以軍事或民用飛機阻礙國際空域的行動自由,改變現狀,或破壞印度洋-太平洋區域的穩定;

(2)敦促中共國政府不要在南中國海設已宣布的東海防空識別區(ADIZ),或違反國際領空飛越自由的防空識別區,不要在印度洋-太平洋地區其他地方採取類似的挑釁行動;

(3)重申2016年仲裁庭的裁決是終局的,對雙方都具有法律約束力,中共國對南中國海大部分海域的近海資源主張是非法的;以及

(4)譴責中共國不顧中共國作為《聯合國海洋法公約》(the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea)締約國的義務,不遵守2016年仲裁庭的裁決。

(b)政策聲明——美國的政策是 –

(1)重申對印太地區盟國和夥伴的承諾和支持,包括美國對《美菲共同防禦條約》(the United States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty)第五條的長期政策,重申《美日共同防禦條約》(the United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty)第五條適用於日本管理的尖閣諸島的立場;

(2)反對侵犯各國對海洋及其上空的權利、自由和合法使用的主張,反對將南海新的、填海特徵的土地軍事化;

(3)繼續執行對中共國在南中國海聲明的有關政策,即-
(A)中共國在南中國海(包括對南中國海大部分海域的近海資源)的主權主張是非法的;
(B)中共國不能在仲裁庭認定位於菲律賓專屬經濟區或其大陸架的地區,對菲律賓依法提出海事的請求;
(C)拒絕中共國對其在南沙群島宣稱的12海裡衍生領海以外水域的任何主張;以及
(D)中共國對詹姆斯淺灘(James Shoal)沒有合法的領土或海洋要求權;
(4)敦促所有各方不要從事破壞穩定的活動,包括非法佔領或對有爭議的領土進行非法管理的努力;

(5)確保在沒有恐嚇、脅迫或武力的情況下處理爭端;

(6)呼籲所有當事國根據國際法淨化或調整索取;

(7)堅持領土和海洋要求,包括領水或領海,必鬚根據陸地特徵提出,否則必須符合國際法的原則;

(8)反對在南中國海有爭議地區實施新的捕魚規定,這些規定加劇了該地區的緊張局勢;

(9)支持有效的行為守則,前提是該行為守則反映了東南亞當事國的利益,並且不是中共國提出非法海事索取的工具;

(10)重申現有的一整套國際規則和準則,包括1972年10月12日在倫敦制定的《國際海上避碰條例》(the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea,),足以確保美國武裝部隊與包括中共國在內的其他國家部隊之間的航行安全;

(11)支持區域機構和機構的發展,包括東盟區域論壇、東盟國防部長會議附加會議、東亞首腦會議和擴大的東盟海事論壇,以在該地區建立務實合作,加強國際法的作用;

(12)鼓勵深化與本區域其他國家在海洋領域認識和能力建設方面的伙伴關係,以及美國政府努力探索建立適當的多邊機制,以便東南亞國家在南中國海形成“共同行動圖景”,幫助各國避免破壞穩定的行為,阻止危險活動;

(13)反對任何國家採取行動,阻止任何其他國家行使對專屬經濟區和大陸架資源的主權權利,對南海沒有國際法支持的地區提出主權要求;以及

(14)確保美國在印太地區行動的連續性,包括酌情與夥伴和盟國合作,根據國際法的既定原則和慣例,重申在國際水域和領空行動自由的原則。
(本節完)

原文鏈接:
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DAV21598%20-%20Strategic%20Competition%20Act%20of%202021.pdf

文字整理:

SEC. 230. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM OF OPERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress—

(1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of force to impede freedom of operations

in international airspace by military or civilian aircraft, to alter the status quo, or to destabilize the

Indo-Pacific region;

(2) urges the Government of China to refrain from implementing the declared East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea, which is contrary to freedom

of overflight in international airspace, and to refrain from taking similar provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region;

(3) reaffirms that the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal’s decision is final and legally binding on both parties

and that the People’s Republic of China’s claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are unlawful; and

(4) condemns the People’s Republic of China for failing to abide by the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal’s ruling, despite Chinese obligations as a state party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States to—

(1) reaffirm its commitment and support for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including longstanding United States policy regarding Article V of the United States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and reaffirm its position that Article V of the United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands;

(2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and lawful use of the sea, or the airspace

above it, that belong to all nations, and oppose the militarization of new and reclaimed land features in the South China Sea;

(3) continue certain policies with respect to the PRC claims in the South China Sea, namely—

(A) that PRC claims in the South China Sea, including to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea, are unlawful;

(B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a maritime claim vis-`a-vis the Philippines in areas that the Tribunal found to be in the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf;

(C) to reject any PRC claim to waters beyond a 12 nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands its claims in the Spratly Islands; and

(D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial or maritime claim to James Shoal;

(4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in destabilizing activities, including illegal occupation or efforts to unlawfully assert administration over disputed claims;

(5) ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation, coercion, or force;

(6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in accordance with international law;

(7) uphold the principle that territorial and maritime claims, including territorial waters or territorial seas, must be derived from land features and otherwise comport with international law;

(8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regulations covering disputed areas in the South China Sea, regulations which have raised tensions in the region;

(9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if that Code of Conduct reflects the interests of South east Asian claimant states and does not serve as a vehicle for the People’s Republic of China to advance its unlawful maritime claims;

(10) reaffirm that an existing body of international rules and guidelines, including the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation between the United States Armed Forces and the forces of other countries, including the People’s Republic of China;

(11) support the development of regional institutions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation in the region and reinforce the role of international law;

(12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with other countries in the region for maritime domain awareness and capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States Government to explore the development of appropriate multilateral mechanisms for a ‘‘common operating picture’’ in the South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries that would serve to help countries avoid destabilizing

behavior and deter risky and dangerous activities;

(13) oppose actions by any country to prevent any other country from exercising its sovereign rights to the resources of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by making claims to those areas in the South China Sea that have no support in international law; and

(14) assure the continuity of operations by the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, when appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, to reaffirm the principle of freedom of operations in international waters and airspace in accordance with established principles and practices of international law.