俄羅斯莫斯科喀秋莎農場 仰望七星

編輯上傳 水星

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“標題2——聯盟和夥伴關係的投入”中,“副標題A——戰略和外交事務”的“第214節. 關於中共病毒起源的報告”已發表【1】,“第215節. 加強與太平洋島國的外交支持和經濟接觸”、“第216節. 增加國務院對印度洋-太平洋地區的人員和資源投入”、“第217節. 提高美國在聯合國系統的領導地位”沒作翻譯,暫時省略。

本節開始,進入“副標題B——國際安全事務”的章節。

本節要點:中共國的目標是建立對印太地區的霸權,中共國正在印太建立有爭議的地區,中共國會有勇氣採取行動,在美國做出有效反應之前改變現狀。實現台灣與中共國大陸的所謂“統一”,是中共國實現地區霸權野心的關鍵一步,美國要保衛台灣人民,限制中共軍隊向第一島鏈以外地區(包括關島和夏威夷等美國領土)投射力量的能力,維護日本領土完整,北京對南海大部分海域的近海資源主張是完全非法的。

欲了解更多的內容,請看本節全文(僅供參考)。

副標題B——國際安全事務

第221節 定義

在此副標題中:
(1)適當的國會委員會 – “適當的國會委員會”一詞是指-
(A)參議院外交關係委員會、情報特別委員會和撥款委員會;以及
(B)眾議院的外交委員會、情報常設特別委員會和撥款委員會。

(2)公司 – “公司”是指任何機構、公司、有限責任公司,有限合夥、商業信託、商業協會或其他類似的實體。

(3)其他安全部隊 – “其他安全部隊”一詞 –
(A)包括負責海上安全的國家安全部隊;以及
(B)不包括自稱的民兵或準軍事組織。

第222節 調查結果

國會得出以下結論:

(1)中共國的目標是利用其日益強大的軍事力量和其他的國家力量,取代美國在印太地區的地位,建立對該地區的霸權。

(2)印太地區的軍事力量對比越來越不利於美國,因為-
(A)中共國正在迅速現代化和擴大中共軍隊的能力,以便在整個印太地區投射力量和建立有爭議的地區;
(B)中共軍隊的現代化主要集中在其擁有作戰優勢和可以利用美國裝備能力有弱點的領域;以及
(C)由於美國在印度洋-太平洋地區的盟國、基地和海上部隊集中在大型基地,這些基地極易受到中共國打擊能力的影響,因此美國目前的部隊結構和存在不足以應對印度洋-太平洋地區的威脅。

(3)這一地區軍事平衡的轉變和印太地區常規威懾力量的削弱 –
(A)對美國的安全構成重大和迫在眉睫的危險;以及
(B)如果任其發展,中共國將有勇氣採取行動,包括使用軍事力量,在美國做出有效反應之前改變現狀。

(4)中共國認為有機會削弱美國盟友和夥伴之間,在美國承諾的力度上的信心,甚至到了這些國家覺得必須與中共國一道保護自己的利益的程度。中共國正密切關注美國對中共國施壓,以及美國盟國對中共國強制的反應,窺測美國採取措施的跡象。

(5)實現台灣與中共國大陸的所謂“統一”,是中共國實現地區霸權野心的關鍵一步,中共國增加了針對台灣的演習和行動的頻率和範圍,例如在台灣海峽進行的兩棲攻擊和實彈演習、中共軍隊空軍環繞台灣的飛行,以及穿越台灣海峽非正式中線的飛行。中共國對香港全面降服的統治潛在地加速了台灣(危機)局勢的時間表,使台灣的國防變得更加緊迫。

(6)台灣的防衛對我們來說至關重要 –
(A)保衛台灣人民;
(B)限制中共軍隊向第一島鏈以外地區(包括關島和夏威夷等美國領土)投射力量的能力;
(C)維護日本領土完整;
(D)防止中共軍隊將軍事計劃、軍事資源和軍事人員用於更廣泛的軍事野心;以及
(E)保持美國作為台灣人民和政府所體現的民主價值觀和自由市場原則的捍衛者的信譽。

(7)中共國利用世界對中共病毒的關注,推進其在南中共國海的軍事目標,強化和加速已經啟動的趨勢。中共國派遣軍事化的測量船進入馬來西亞專屬經濟區,宣佈在中共國三沙地方政府管轄的南沙群島和西沙群島設立行政區,用火控雷達瞄準一艘進入印尼漁場的菲律賓海軍艦艇,擊沉了一艘越南漁船,宣佈在火燒橫礁(Fiery Cross Reef)和蘇比礁(Subi Reef)建立新的“研究站”,特種軍機降落在火燒橫礁,使部署正常化,並派出一支由200多艘民兵船隻組成的船隊,前往菲律賓專屬經濟區內的惠特桑礁(Whitsun Reef)。

(8)2020年7月13日,美國國務院澄清了美國對南海的政策,並表示“北京對南海大部分海域的近海資源主張是完全非法的”。

(9)中共軍隊在南海的這些行動,使中共軍隊能夠向大洋洲和印度洋更深入地施加影響和投射力量,正如印度太平洋司令部司令菲爾·戴維森(Phil Davidson)上將在2019年作證所說,“簡言之,除了與美國開戰之外,中共國現在任何情況下都有能力控制南中共國海。”

(10)中共軍隊還繼續推進其在東海的主權主張,包括通過大量水面戰鬥巡邏和頻繁進入尖閣諸島領海,美國承認日本對尖閣諸島的行政控制。 2014年4月,美國總統奧巴馬錶示,“我們對日本安全的承諾是絕對的,【美日安保條約】第五條涵蓋了日本管理下的所有領土,包括尖閣諸島。”

(11)2019年3月1日,美國國務卿蓬佩奧表示,“由於南中國海是太平洋的一部分,在南中國海對菲律賓軍隊、飛機或公共船隻的任何武裝攻擊,都將觸發我們共同防禦條約第4條規定的共同防禦義務。”

(12)中共軍隊在各個部門和各個領域都在進行現代化建設,並獲得關鍵能力,包括 –
(A)將中共軍隊海軍定位為強大的海上力量或“藍水”海軍,到2030年,中共軍隊海軍將擁有425艘戰鬥力艦艇的艦隊,能夠完全控制第一島鏈內的所有活動,並將力量投射到第一島鏈以外;
(B)增加其打擊能力的規模和射程,包括大約1, 900枚地面發射的短程和中程導彈,能夠瞄準美國在第一和第二島鏈的盟國和夥伴、美國在印度洋-太平洋的基地以及美國海上部隊;
(C)增強空戰能力,包括俄羅斯產的蘇-35戰鬥機和S-400防空系統、新型殲-20第5代隱形戰鬥機、先進的轟-6改進型轟炸機、遠程隱形轟炸機和運-20重型飛機;以及
(D)在網絡戰、電子戰和空間戰等新的戰爭領域進行關鍵性投資。

(13)中共國正在通過其所掌握的一切手段來實現這一現代化,包括其“軍民融合”倡議,該倡議號召整個中共國社會開發和獲取具有軍事應用的技術,以追求在人工智能、高超音速飛行器方面超過美國的技術優勢,定向能武器、電磁軌道炮、反空間武器和其他新興能力。

(14)面對來自中共國的競爭,美國在國防科技發展方面的領先地位正在削弱,美國在國防能力方面的研發支出在全球研發中所佔份額急劇下降,商業部門在創新中的主導作用對國防部依靠技術獲取戰場優勢提出了某些獨特的挑戰。

(15)中共國大幅增加了國內研發支出,支持發展新的尖端產業,並利用大量勞動力投資促進科學發展和工程人才。

(16)中共國正在增加國防和安全能力的出口,以建設其國防技術和工業基礎,提高其自身的軍事能力,以及對購買和依賴其軍事系統的國家的影響。
(本節完)

可以斷定,最近的美日峰會,是落實本法案的措施之一,兩國的聯合聲明,基本上反映了本法案的內容。滅共原則已定,措施正在實施,邪共的末日臨近。

有關鏈接:
【1】https://gnews.org/post/p1074312/

法案原文鏈接:

https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DAV21598%20-%20Strategic%20Competition%20Act%20of%202021.pdf

文字整理:

Subtitle B—International Security Matters

SEC. 221. DEFINITIONS.

In this subtitle:

(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. – The term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives

(2) COMPANY. – The term ‘‘company’’ means any corporation, company, limited liability company,

limited partnership, business trust, business association, or other similar entity.

(3) OTHER SECURITY FORCES. – The term ‘‘other security forces’’—

(A) includes national security forces that conduct maritime security; and (B) does not include self-described militias or paramilitary organizations.

SEC. 222. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The People’s Republic of China aims to use its growing military might in concert with other instruments of its national power to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific and establish hegemony over the region.

(2) The military balance of power in the Indo Pacific region is growing increasingly unfavorable to

the United States because—

(A) the PRC is rapidly modernizing and expanding the capabilities of the PLA to project power and create contested areas across the entire Indo-Pacific region;

(B) PLA modernization has largely focused on areas where it possesses operational advantages and can exploit weaknesses in the United States suite of capabilities; and

(C) current United States force structure and presence do not sufficiently counter threats in the Indo-Pacific, as United States allies, bases, and forces at sea in the Indo-Pacific region are concentrated in large bases that are highly vulnerable to the PRC’s strike capabilities.

(3) This shift in the regional military balance and erosion of conventional deterrence in the Indo Pacific region—

(A) presents a substantial and imminent risk to the security of the United States; and

(B) left unchecked, could embolden the PRC to take actions, including the use of military force, to change the status quo before the United States can mount an effective response.

(4) The PRC sees an opportunity to diminish confidence among United States allies and partners

in the strength of United States commitments, even to the extent that these nations feel compelled to bandwagon with the PRC to protect their interests. The PRC is closely monitoring the United States reaction to PRC pressure and coercion of United States allies, searching for indicators of United

States resolve.

(5) Achieving so-called ‘‘reunification’’ of Taiwan to mainland China is a key step for the PRC to achieve its regional hegemonic ambitions. The PRC has increased the frequency and scope of its exercises and operations targeting Taiwan, such as amphibious assault and live-fire exercises in the Taiwan Strait, PLA Air Force flights that encircle Taiwan, and flights across the unofficial median line in the Taiwan Strait. The Government of the PRC’s full submission of Hong Kong potentially accelerates the timeline of a Taiwan scenario, and makes the defense of Taiwan an even more urgent priority.

(6) The defense of Taiwan is critical to—

(A) defending the people of Taiwan;

(B) limiting the PLA’s ability to project power beyond the First Island Chain, including to United States territory, such as Guam and Hawaii;

(C) defending the territorial integrity of Japan;

(D) preventing the PLA from diverting military planning, resources, and personnel to broader military ambitions; and

(E) retaining the United States credibility as a defender of the democratic values and free 6 market principles embodied by Taiwan’s people and government;

(7) The PRC capitalized on the world’s attention to COVID–19 to advance its military objectives in the South China Sea, intensifying and accelerating trends already underway. The PRC has sent militarized survey vessels into the Malaysian Exclusive Economic Zone, announced the establishment of an administrative district in the Spratly and Paracel Islands under the Chinese local government of Sansha, aimed a fire control radar at a Philippine navy ship, encroached on Indonesia’s fishing grounds, sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat, announced new ‘‘research stations’’ on Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef, landed special military aircraft on Fiery Cross Reef to routinize such deployments, and sent a flotilla of over 200 militia vessels to Whitsun Reef, a feature within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines.

(8) On July 13, 2020, the Department of State clarified United States policy on the South China Sea and stated that ‘‘Beijing’s claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are completely unlawful’’.

(9) These actions in the South China Sea enable the PLA to exert influence and project power deeper into Oceania and the Indian Ocean. As Admiral Phil Davidson, Commander of Indo-Pacific Command, testified in 2019, ‘‘In short, China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States.’’.

(10) The PLA also continues to advance its claims in the East China Sea, including through a high number of surface combatant patrols and frequent entry into the territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands, over which the United States recognizes Japan’s administrative control. In April 2014, President Barack Obama stated, ‘‘Our commitment to Japan’s security is absolute and article five [of the U.S.-Japan security treaty] covers all territory under Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku islands.’’.

(11) On March 1, 2019, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo stated, ‘‘As the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under Article 4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty.’’.

(12) The PLA is modernizing and gaining critical capability in every branch and every domain, including—

(A) positioning the PLA Navy to become a great maritime power or ‘‘blue-water’’ navy that can completely control all activity within the First Island Chain and project power beyond it with a fleet of 425 battle force ships by 2030;

(B) increasing the size and range of its strike capabilities, including approximately 1,900 ground-launched short- and intermediate range missiles capable of targeting United States allies and partners in the First and Second Island chains, United States bases in the Indo-Pacific, and United States forces at sea;

(C) boosting capabilities for air warfare, including with Russian-origin Su–35 fighters and S–400 air defense systems, new J–20 5th ration stealth fighters, advanced H–6 bomber variants, a long-range stealth bomber, and Y–20 heavy lift aircraft; and

(D) making critical investments in new domains of warfare, such as cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and space warfare.

(13) The PRC is pursuing this modernization through all means at its disposal, including its Military-Civil Fusion initiative, which enlists the whole of PRC society in developing and acquiring technology with military applications to pursue technological advantage over the United States in artificial intelligence, hypersonic glide vehicles, directed energy weapons, electromagnetic railguns, counterspace weapons, and other emerging capabilities.

(14) The United States lead in the development of science and technology relevant to defense is eroding in the face of competition from the PRC. United States research and development spending on defense capabilities has declined sharply as a share of global research and development. The commercial sector’s leading role in innovation presents certain unique challenges to the Department of Defense’s reliance on technology for battlefield advantage.

(15) The PRC has vastly increased domestic research and development expenditures, supported the

growth of new cutting-edge industries and tapped into a large workforce to invest in fostering science

and engineering talent.

(16) The PRC is increasing exports of defense and security capabilities to build its defense technology and industrial base and improve its own military capabilities, as well as its influence with countries that purchase and become dependent on its military systems.