俄羅斯莫斯科喀秋莎農場 仰望七星

編輯上傳 水星

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要點:G7國家中共的認知應包括,民主和人權的侵蝕,5G電信的安全性,反競爭​​行為,如知識產權盜竊、企業大規模補貼等政策和做法,掠奪性國際主權貸款。承認台灣是美國印太平洋戰略的重要組成部分,增強台灣的自衛能力,特別是發展和整合反艦、海防、反裝甲、防空、海戰、先進指揮、控制、通信、計算機、情報等不對稱能力,軍事力量的監視、偵察和彈性指揮控制能力,積極推動台灣有意義地參與聯合國、世界衛生大會、國際民用航空組織、國際刑事警察組織和其他國際機構。

欲了解更多的內容,請看本節全文(僅供參考)。

第211節 關於與七國集團(G7)國家就中共國問題談判的國會意識

(a) 通常情況 – 國會認為,總統通過國務卿應與七國集團國家就有關經濟和民主自由的事項啟動一項議程,包括以下:
(1)貿易和投資問題及執行。
(2)為國際基礎設施標準提供支持,包括2018年大阪G20峰會商定的標準。
(3)民主和人權的侵蝕。
(4)5G電信的安全性。
(5)反競爭行為,如知識產權盜竊、企業大規模補貼等政策和做法。
(6)不符《經濟合作與發展組織》(OECD)和《巴黎俱樂部原則》(Paris Club)的掠奪性國際主權貸款。
(7)國際影響力運動。
(8)環境標準。
(9)與不在G7中的志同道合的區域夥伴的合作。
(原文只到此,似乎缺內容……)

第212節 加強美台夥伴關係

這是美國的政策-
(1)承認台灣是美國印太平洋戰略的重要組成部分;
(2)推進台灣的安全和民主,作為大印度洋-太平洋地區持續和平與穩定,以及美國的重大國家安全利益的關鍵因素;
(3)加強其根據《台灣關係法》(the Taiwan Relations Act)(公共法96–8)對台灣的承諾並按照“六個保證”和美國的“一個中國”政策;
(4)支持台灣實施非對稱防禦戰略,包括台灣整體防禦概念中確定的優先事項;
(5)敦促台灣增加國防開支,以充分利用其國防戰略;
(6)定期向台灣移交國防物資,以增強台灣的自衛能力,特別是發展和整合反艦、海防、反裝甲、防空、海戰、先進指揮、控制、通信、計算機、情報等不對稱能力,軍事力量的監視、偵察和彈性指揮控制能力;
(7)酌情倡導和積極推動台灣有意義地參與聯合國、世界衛生大會、國際民用航空組織、國際刑事警察組織和其他國際機構;以及
(8)促進美國、台灣等志同道合夥伴之間的有意義的合作。

第213節 台灣政府的待遇

(a)通常情況– 國務院和其他美國政府機構應與台灣民選政府在相同的基礎上,使用相同的術語和協議,如同美國政府與其他外國政府進行的接觸一樣,儘管在台灣的美國協會在執行美國外交政策和保護美國在台灣的利益方面繼續發揮支持作用,美國政府不得對國務院和其他美國政府機構的官員與台灣政府對口部門直接和例行互動的能力施加任何限制。
(b) 實施規則 – 本款不應解釋為恢復與中華民國(台灣)的外交關係或改變美國政府對台灣國際地位的立場。
(3節完)

對邪惡中共的認知,只有美國是不夠的,G7包括其他文明國家,如果沒有對這個惡魔有清醒的認識,魔就有空間,惡就有場所,它就會繼續生存,所以除魔是全球性的任務。台灣則是一個與魔淵源最深,深受其害,牽連又多的地區,若不是文貴先生的及時爆料,國民黨必會贏得大選,這對文明世界將是災難性的後果。中共不會放棄對台灣當局藍金黃的策略,台灣的危機並沒有消除,所以,在台灣問題上,美國繼續接受了文貴先生的建議,力挺台灣。

原文鏈接:

https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DAV21598%20-%20Strategic%20Competition%20Act%20of%202021.pdf

文字整理:

SEC. 211. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH G7 COUNTRIES ON THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) IN GENERAL. — It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting through the Secretary of State, should initiate an agenda with G7 countries on matters relevant to economic and democratic freedoms, including the following:

(1) Trade and investment issues and enforcement.

(2) Building support for international infrastructure standards, including those agreed to at the G20 summit in Osaka in 2018.

(3) The erosion of democracy and human rights.

(4) The security of 5G telecommunications.

(5) Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellectual property theft, massive subsidization of companies, and other policies and practices.

(6) Predatory international sovereign lending that is inconsistent with OECD and Paris Club principles.

(7) International influence campaigns.

(8) Environmental standards.

(9) Coordination with like-minded regional partners that are not in the G7.

SEC. 212. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PARTNERSHIP.

It is the policy of the United States—

(1) to recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the United States Indo-Pacific strategy;

(2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its democracy as key elements for the continued peace

and stability of the greater Indo-Pacific region, and a vital national security interest of the United

States;

(3) to reinforce its commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8)

and the ‘‘Six Assurances’’ and in accordance with the United States ‘‘One China’’ policy;

(4) to support Taiwan’s implementation of its asymmetric defense strategy, including the priorities

identified in Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept;

(5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense spending in order to fully resource its defense strategy;

(6) to conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop and integrate asymmetric capabilities, including anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, undersea warfare, advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and resilient command and control capabilities, into its military forces;

(7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the United Nations, the World Health Assembly, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization, and other international bodies as appropriate; and

(8) to promote meaningful cooperation among the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded partners.

SEC. 213. TREATMENT OF TAIWAN GOVERNMENT.

(a) IN GENERAL. — The Department of State and other United States Government agencies shall engage with the democratically elected government of Taiwan on the same basis, and using the same nomenclature and protocol, as the United States Government engages with other foreign governments. Notwithstanding the continued supporting role of the American Institute in Taiwan in carrying out United States foreign policy and protecting United States interests in Taiwan, the United States Government shall not place any restrictions on the ability of officials of the Department of State and other United States Government agencies to interact directly and routinely with counterparts in the Taiwan government.

(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION. — Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as entailing restoration of diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) or altering the United States Government’s position on Taiwan’s international status.